ETHIOPIA: GENERALS' DEFECTION MAY SIGNAL DEEPER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002572 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM MOPS ASEC ET ER SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: GENERALS' DEFECTION MAY SIGNAL DEEPER RIFT Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON REASON: 1.4(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent defections of senior Oromo military officers have shaken the Ethiopian military establishment. Brigadier General Kemal Gelchu of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) defected to Eritrea on Aug 8, taking as many as two hundred soldiers and lower level officers with him. General Kemal was in charge of the 18th division, stationed near the Ethiopian - Eritrean border, before his defection. General Kemal, who is an ethnic Oromo, subsequently pledged his allegiance to the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Kemal was joined a month later by the Oromo head of the Eighth Mechanized Division, Brig. General Hailu Gonfa, as well as some lower ranking officials, who also defected and announced their support for the OLF and the multi-ethnic Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD). Oromo National Congress (ONC) leader Merera Gudina told post in mid-August that the defection of Kemal might signal the beginning of a crack in the ENDF,s unified support for the EPRDF. Clandestine reporting and opposition-oriented websites have indicated that the ENDF arrested a number of Oromo officers in response to the defection, increased surveillance of others and held a number of gatherings with military personnel to discuss the defections and the conditions that prompted them. A retired senior ENDF commander told Pol/Econ Counselor that morale within the ENDF is poor and readiness significantly lower than in previous years. Comment: The ruling EPRDF's control over the military was put to the test in 2005 when the armed forces were called upon to put down massive, violent demonstrations against the regime. The firm and disciplined response of the ENDF was crucial to the EPRDF's survival. The Tigrayan- dominated ENDF leadership continues to face a restive population, internal insurgencies and growing external threats from Somalia and Eritrea; it can ill afford the ethnic divisions that recent defections suggest. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- TWO OROMO GENERALS BOLT FROM TIGRAYAN-DOMINATED MILITARY -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) Brigadier General Kemal Gelchu of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) defected to Eritrea on Aug 8, taking as many as two hundred soldiers and lower level officers with him. General Kemal was in charge of the 18th division, stationed near the Ethiopian - Eritrean border, before his defection. General Kemal, who is an ethnic Oromo, subsequently pledged his allegiance to the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Kemal was joined a month later by the Oromo head of the Eighth Mechanized Division, Brig. General Hailu Gonfa, as well as some lower ranking officials, who also defected and publicly announced their support for the OLF and the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD),a multi-ethnic opposition coalition. -------------- -------------- DEFECTIONS HIGHLIGHT EXISTING TENSIONS WITHIN ENDF -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) According to former Ethiopian President Negaso Gidada, Kemal and Hailu are two of only 7 Oromo generals out of a total of 60-70 general officers in the ENDF. Tigrayans hold about 70 percent of the senior positions, and officers from other ethnic groups report that even if they get senior spots, Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) "commissars" are usually assigned to their staffs to make most of the real decisions. Oromos, who are reportedly the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, are much better represented in the rank and file of the ENDF, probably comprising 25-35 percent of the force. Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM) leader Bulcha Demeksa told post that Kemal was the first Oromo general to rebel against the government since Gen. Tadesse Birru, who took on Emperor Haile Selassie in the early 1970's. Bulcha noted that Tadesse survived and went on to found the Mecha-Tulema Society, the premier Oromo civil society organization whose leaders were arrested in 2004. ONC chairman Merera Gudina told the Charge that he had spoken with a number of rank and file Oromo ENDF soldiers during his mid-August trip to Oromiya. They told him that Kemal,s defection had prompted much discussion amongst Oromos in the ENDF. ¶4. (S) Another senior Oromo officer still on duty told DATT ADDIS ABAB 00002572 002 OF 003 Sept. 20 (septel) that he feels he is under greater suspicion since the defection of Kemal. He confirmed that Tigrayan staff were assigned to monitor his actions. The officer expressed annoyance that he would be suspected of disloyalty after many years of faithful service, but professed his continuing allegiance to the ENDF command structure. The officer indicated that arrests of mid-ranking Oromo officers in the ENDF were fairly widespread, with those arrested being charged in many cases with trumped-up corruption charges or disloyalty. The officer also discussed with the DATT an imminent plan for "down-sizing" the ENDF officer ranks that would involve dismissing thousands of mostly ethnic Oromo and Amhara officers, with a small number of Tigrayans thrown in for the sake of appearances. According to this senior officer, these developments were deepening the climate of tension within the ENDF, but most military personnel were focused on their own economic survival, rather than on resistance. He added, however, that 3-5 Oromo officers of various ranks were deserting almost every day. ¶5. (S) Retired Lt. Gen. Tsadkan Gebretensae (protect),the former Chief of Staff of the ENDF, told Pol/Econ Counselor Sept 18 that the DATT's contact was indeed being closely watched since the defections, and that Eastern Region Commander Gen. Bacha, also an Oromo, had come under suspicion as well. (DATT's contact believes Bacha is safe for the moment.) Bacha is also known as an intimate of Tsadkan, who was reportedly relieved of command in 2001 after he refused an order to deploy ENDF troops to influence internal TPFL debates. Bacha currently plays an especially key role as the commander of ENDF operations against the ONLF insurgency as well as operations to counter the growing influence of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC). -------------- TSADKAN: ENDF MORALE AND READINESS LOW SIPDIS -------------- ¶6. (S) Gen. Tsadkan, a Tigrayan, called recent defections "extremely serious." He said they indicated that the armed forces were no longer as disciplined or motivated as they had once been. He also claimed that the EPRDF's willingness to use the ENDF for political purposes had sapped morale in the organization. He said the deployment of ENDF units to quell protests in June and November 2005 had taken a toll on the organization. Although relatively few officers had defected to date, many -- especially Oromos -- had checked out mentally and were focused on their own personal well-being, and enrichment in some cases, rather than on the mission of defending the country. Asked what GOE leaders could do to remedy this situation, Tsadkan replied that no solution for the ENDF was possible in isolation. Only a broader solution to Ethiopia's political problems would reinvigorate troops' commitment to the ENDF. The General cautioned that while ongoing purges and arrests within the ENDF might intimidate potential troublemakers and reduce instability temporarily, they would ultimately worsen the situation. ¶7. (S) Tsadkan remarked that while the ENDF should still be capable of mounting targeted military operations to influence the situation in Somalia, a full-scale invasion of Somalia would likely reveal the low morale and lack of readiness that now plagued the institution. Tsadkan claimed that the GOE was still trading on the reputation that the ENDF had earned in the late 1990's, when it had gone into Somalia and dealt a decisive military defeat to Al-Itihad Al-Islami (AIAI). It would be better, said the General, if that reputation were not put to the test today. (NOTE: As the commander of the ENDF during the late 1990's, Tsadkan's views of readiness then and now may be somewhat biased.) Asked about the potential for Eritrean adventurism given the weakened state of Ethiopian readiness, Tsadkan replied that President Isaias was more likely to wait for his strategy of undermining Ethiopia from within to work. -------------- COMMENT: BAD TIME FOR INTERNAL DIVISIONS -------------- ¶7. (S) It is too early to conclude that discipline and loyalty to the EPRDF in the armed forces are breaking down generally. There are some indications, however, that the defections of Generals Kemal and Hailu may prompt others, ADDIS ABAB 00002572 003 OF 003 especially Oromos, to examine more intensely their continuing support for the EPRDF. The defection and its potential ripple effects poses a serious dilemma for the EPRDF and ENDF leadership: taking measures to increase control over Oromo officers and minimize the risks of additional desertions will only exacerbate feelings among Oromo military personnel that they are neither trusted nor truly represented by the GOE. This dilemma comes at a time when the GOE is already grappling with how to confront the threat of Islamic fundamentalists in Somalia while not neglecting the defense of its long border with Eritrea. The ENDF also faces several internal insurgencies; the battle with the ONLF in the Somali region remains particularly fierce. Firm control over the armed forces has been the bulwark of the EPRDF since the May 2005 election laid bare the GoEQuced popular support and November unrest further damaged its image. If further developments demonstrate broader erosion of support in the armed forces, the structural weaknesses of Ethiopia's tough but minority-led ruling coalition may finally manifest themselves. HUDDLESTON