DARFUR: SEPTEMBER 7 AU DITF BRIEFING REPORTS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002524 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND AF/RSA LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU SUBJECT: DARFUR: SEPTEMBER 7 AU DITF BRIEFING REPORTS FUNDING SUFFICIENT TO EXTEND AMIS REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2420 ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 2523 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. On September 7, African Union officials reported to AU partners that recent cash contributions would allow the AU Mission in Sudan to continue operations beyond September 30, but that any decision on either extending or strengthening AMIS by two additional battalions would have to made at a September 18 meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council. AU planners said they were making contingency plans for withdrawal, while acknowledging that withdrawal would be "a political tragedy for Africa." AMIS military observers reported significant troop movements by GOS forces into Darfur, but could not estimate their number. Among the security incidents highlighted were an August 31 attack by uniformed GOS forces on women and children in Graida; AMIS forces did not react, angering local IDPs who then had to be repelled with APCs. AU officials said that a September 5 incident, in which GOS troops entered an IDP camp at Kutum, represents a violation of both the Darfur Peace Agreement and the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. AU officials said Sudan's proposed security stabilization plan is unacceptable. On the political front, AU officials said there are no legal grounds for excluding DPA non-signatories from participating in Ceasefire Commission meetings. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On September 7, the African Union Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) briefed selected AU partners (US, UK, Canada, EC, NATO, and UN) on political, logistical, and security developments of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). (NOTE: AU DITF's subsequent September 14 briefing has been reported SEPTEL (ref B).) -------------- -------------- FUNDING SUFFICIENT TO CONTINUE, BUT WITHDRAWAL NOT RULED OUT -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) AU DITF POLAD Dr. Solomon Gomes reiterated observations made September 6 by AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ambassador Said Djinnit (ref A) that the possibility of AMIS withdrawal after September 30 could not be ruled out, but that any decision on the future of AMIS would have to await the outcome of a September 18 AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting. Partners who highlighted the AU's "moral responsibility" to remain in Darfur, had the equal responsibility of funding AMIS's continued presence, Gomes said. AU DITF Head Ambassador Ki Doulaye Corentin said the September 18 PSC would ask whether sufficient funds existed to allow AMIS to continue to December; if not, it would likely push for AMIS's withdrawal. The PSC would also consider whether AMIS had sufficient logistics on the ground to sustain its forces. Ki Doulaye said funds were sufficient to take AMIS beyond September and suggested that the UNGA's Fifth Committee could request additional funding. EC representative clarified that current funding would cover AMIS to October 22; cash contributions from the Netherlands and the UK would cover AMIS to December. Ki Doulaye acknowledged that the AU had been informed that USG support for AMIS would continue beyond September 30. ¶4. (SBU) A September 14-15 meeting with the UN would discuss how to strengthen AMIS on the ground, Ki Doulaye added. Commenting on a new concept of operations (CONOPs) for AMIS, AU DITF Military Component Chief Colonel Mayell Mbaye said the AU needed to await the PSC decision before adding two battalions and asking partners to airlift them. An UNMIS representative had informed AU Commissioner Djinnit on September 6 that the UN strongly needed these two additional battalions. Ki Doulaye said the UN should fund these battalions, if the UN wanted the AU to continue to December. Gomes observed that UNSCR 1706 "has the potential to create a problem between the AU and the UN," as it limited AMIS's support to the DPA to only the transition. According to UNSCR 1706, once transition occurred, the AU no longer had a role to play; this was "troubling," Gomes said. He said that the UNSCR was "far-reaching," but that a draft addendum to the UN SYG report, prepared by UN DPKO and issued on the eve of the adoption of UNSCR 1706, envisaged "incremental infiltration" of UN staff into Darfur, which created a problem for the AU. Gomes said the AU would send a ADDIS ABAB 00002524 002 OF 004 delegation to the UN in New York. Mbaye commented that the addendum was "opposite" to the agreement the AU had with the UN. ¶5. (SBU) DITF's military component was discussing the contingency of withdrawal with troop contributing countries (TCCs),but the AU was "aware withdrawal from Darfur would be a political tragedy for Africa," Ki Doulaye said. He noted, however, that withdrawal "would not be the first," citing the UN's withdrawal from Somalia in 1994. "It will be very painful for all of us to pull out of Darfur," he said. Mbaye confirmed that rotation of Nigerian troops, and of 152 CIVPOL, had started. DITF Head of Civilian Police Karl Mario Nobin reported that 260 CIVPOL staff awaited rotation (down from 498): those from Mali would rotate September 8, and those from Cameroon would rotate September 10. Ki Doulaye said that signing a contract for the construction of CIVPOL stations should continue, despite uncertainty about AMIS's future. (NOTE: On September 14, DITF announced that the Nigerian rotation was complete, but that the rotation of Rwandan troops had been put on hold pending the September 18 PSC. END NOTE.) ¶6. (SBU) Dr. Gomes noted that in discussions held the previous day on options besides withdrawal, the concept of "co-deployment" (implemented in Liberia) had not been raised. He explained that if GOS continued to withhold consent to transition, one could have UN CIVPOL, humanitarian, and other staff arrive to reinforce AMIS; they would be AMIS forces but would adopt the mandate outlined in UNSCR 1706. -------------- AMIS STANDS BY AS WOMEN AND CHILDREN ATTACKED -------------- ¶7. (SBU) DITF Military Component Chief Mbaye reported that the situation in Darfur over the last two weeks was "generally calm" except for Sectors 1 and 6 (where National Redemption Front and SLM Abdel Wahid forces had conducted attacks) and Sector 2 (where Arab militia had conducted attacks near Nyala). Heavy rainfall continued to limit AMIS activities by road; banditry and rapes continued. There had been significant GOS troop movements, although AMIS could not estimate their number. Perhaps 6,000 GOS forces were in Darfur; AMIS could confirm that they were being reinforced but could not confirm that such reinforcements were coming from the south. Canada noted that the GOS security plan had called for 10,000 more troops in Darfur by August 31; Mbaye said he could not confirm whether this was being implemented. ¶8. (SBU) Mbaye said MILOB group sites had reported the following incidents: August 31 -- Graida, Sector 2: 50 suspected Arab militia on horseback but in GOS uniform attacked women and children gathering grass. "Non-reaction" by AMIS MILOB group angered IDPs, who were then "scared away" by AMIS using armored personnel carriers (APCs). DITF does not know what AMIS did not intervene, and has asked AMIS for an explanation. (EC said non-action in Graida was "regrettable" and "shameful", and welcomed the outcome of any investigation.) -- Kutum, Sector 6: GOS representative reported seeing NRF vehicles. -- Sector 1: Intelligence report received of NRF preparing an ambush (where attack of August 19 occurred). -- CIVPOL vehicle hijacked; AMIS weapons, 140 rounds, and 1 CIVPOL radio seized. September 1 -- Graida, Sector 2: 3 killed in clash with (pro-SLM/A Minni Minawi) Zagawa fighters. -- Tawilla, Sector 1: SLA Abdel Wahid sympathizers were recruiting in IDP camp for his movement; led to approximately 100 IDPs departing the camp. -- Sector 6: movement northwest (destination unknown) of 28 trucks with heavily armed GOS troops. September 2 -- Sector 2: GOS army convoy sighted near Nyala/El Fasher ADDIS ABAB 00002524 003 OF 004 road. -- Sector 1: demonstration against international intervention by 5,000 protestors who presented petitions and bore signs reading, "No way, USA." -- Sector 5: similar demonstration against UNSC resolution 1706 by 300 protestors, including women and children. September 3 -- El Geneina, Sector 3: demonstration against UNSCR 1706 by 5,000 demonstrators (including students, GOS workers, police, and National Congress Party members) led by the Wali (governor) of West Darfur, with signs reading, "No to foreign forces" and "No to non-believers." -- Sector 3: 400 SLA Wahid soldiers conducted attack with mortars and machine guns; 1 GOS police and 8 attackers killed. -- El Fasher, Sector 1: GOS "show of force" as 50 vehicles pointed their weapons at AMIS HQ while passing. September 5 -- Nyala, Sector 2: Damage to UN property, some injured, as result of demonstration against UN deployment in Darfur. -- Kutum, Sector 6: 10 LandCruisers with mounted guns and GOS soldiers moved to an IDP camp, where they were reportedly conducting a "security patrol." (NOTE: Col. Mbaye underscored that this was a violation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. END NOTE.) -- 20 trucks with GOS soldiers were sighted moving to an unknown destination. ¶9. (SBU) In response to LG's request for additional information on reports that the local sheikh in Sector 7 had asked to participate in AMIS patrols, due to alleged abuses, Mbaye said one could not impose conditions on AMIS. DITF Head of Civilian Police Nobin explained that Zalengei, Sector 7, had been a "no-go area" for several months; DITF was seeking information from the field on the resumption of AMIS activities there, he said. Gomes said that the internal report on alleged abuses had been completed and given to the AU Chairperson but would not be publicized or given to the AU PSC. Canada suggested that the AU strengthen its "lessons learned" process: one could not afford to wait for the completion of work of formal boards of inquiry; given NRF threats to AMIS convoys, it was necessary to make preliminary recommendations for implementation as soon as possible. ¶10. (SBU) Commissioner Djinnit had approved the appointment of a retired Zambian general to serve as chief of staff of the AMIS Forward Joint Mission Headquarters (FJMHQ),Colonel Mbaye said. A note verbale had been sent, and he was expected to arrive before the end of September. Mbaye expressed concern about serious problems in AU administration, noting a one-month delay in the hiring of an official from Gambia. -------------- -------------- AU AGREES WITH UNSYG THAT GOS SECURITY PLAN UNACCEPTABLE -------------- -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Asked to provide an assessment of GOS military movement, Ki Doulaye said that the GOS intended to solve the problems of Darfur by itself, as it had in 2003. He reaffirmed that the AU's mandate in Darfur ended September 30; it was unknown whether the PSC would extend AMIS's mandate to the end of December. The GOS wanted to implement its own plan, "which would be catastrophic," Ki Doulaye said. The GOS said it would fight the National Redemption Front (NRF) and Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),and the Janjaweed were "all over the place with impunity," Ki Doulaye added. He said that the UNSYG had already said the GOS security plan (sent to the UN but not to the AU) was unacceptable, a position that all should endorse, Ki Doulaye said. If the GOS were to implement its plan, the number of IDPs would dramatically increase, he said. He noted fighting between GOS and Minni parties to control areas, and said that the AU had "no visibility on the future of this mission." ¶12. (SBU) Canada reported that a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation team had been attacked September 6 outside their ADDIS ABAB 00002524 004 OF 004 hotel in Khartoum, likely by official security forces in plain clothes; the CBC's visit to Khartoum had been facilitated by AU DITF. -------------- -------------- NO LEGAL GROUNDS TO EXCLUDE DPA NON-SIGNATORIES FROM CFC -------------- -------------- ¶13. (SBU) One could not rule out the possibility of the breakup of Sudan, Gomes said; if the slow pace of the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) continued, and the south sought independence, other states could follow. Gomes reported that the DPA Implementation Team remained understaffed, and that no replacement had been named for AU Special Representative for Sudan Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe, who had recently announced his resignation. Ki Doulaye said that appointments to the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (chair and preparatory committee) were "in the pipeline." ¶14. (SBU) Commenting on the recent expulsion of Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatores from the Ceasefire Commission (CFC),Ki Doulaye underscored that Minni Minawi, not just the GOS, strongly opposed the participation of non-signatories. If a meeting were convened, an "incomplete picture" would result. The AU therefore proposed holding two meetings (one for signatories, one for non-signatories),as an earlier proposal for a single meeting in two phases had been rejected. Having non-signatories no longer participate in the CFC had created problems for AMIS troops, who were now being targeted. Nevertheless, he said, the AU still hoped to engage non-signatories, especially Abdel Wahid. Gomes added that AU Commission Chairperson Konare had indicated his willingness to engage non-signatories. Gomes noted that AU partners had said they were not part of the decision to exclude non-signatories; Commissioner Djinnit had received a note from the USG asking for reconsideration of the decision. The GOS had taken a political decision, not a legal decision, Gomes said, as the DPA did not specify "those who did not sign should not sit." "They have no grounds, legally," Gomes said, noting that discussions in Abuja had proposed a two-track mechanism. Ki Doulaye highlighted the need to find ways to engage non-signatories, not exclude them; a high-level meeting to engage non-signatories, especially Abdel Wahid, was possible, he said. ¶15. (SBU) COMMENT: The August 31 incident in which AMIS peacekeepers failed to intervene to protect women and children under attack in Graida by uniformed GOS forces was still under investigation as of September 14, and appears to have prompted AMIS to respond more robustly to subsequent attacks (ref B). Lack of progress on the political front (i.e., slow implementation of the DPA, dysfunctional Ceasefire and Joint Commissions, and delays in launching the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation) highlights that the AU faces significant challenges in fulfilling not only its peacekeeping role but also its political role in Darfur. END COMMENT. WILGUS