ETHIOPIAN MILITARY ASSESSES BORDER SITUATION WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002178 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016 TAGS: PREL PINS MOPS ET SO ER SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN MILITARY ASSESSES BORDER SITUATION WITH ERITREA AND SOMALIA REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2170 ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 2093 ¶C. ADDIS ABABA 2041 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASON: 1.4 (B),(D) . ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Ethiopia's senior military officer, Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Samora Yonus, expressed concern that Eritrea, Somalia's Union of Islamic Courts (UIC),and Ethiopian insurgent groups are collaborating to destabilize Ethiopia. Ethiopia plans to train troops for Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG),and continues to advocate the modification of the UNSC arms embargo on Somalia, in order to allow the immediate deployment of a peacekeeping mission (likely with Ugandan troops) to Baidoa. Having warned the UIC of retaliation if it did not end attacks on the TFG, the Ethiopia assesses that the TFG now controls more troops than the UIC and no longer faces immediate danger of military defeat. According to Samora, while the TFG appears to have reconciled its internal differences, the UIC remains divided between moderates and Islamic extremists. Samora also noted reduced tensions along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, as adverse weather will render any military operations difficult through September, and Eritrean troops are now preoccupied with agricultural activities. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On August 9, visiting Congressman Donald Payne and House International Relations Committee staff Ted Dagne met with Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Samora Yonus and Samora's aide-de-camp Major Yeshiwas, deputy head of the Ministry of Defense's foreign affairs department. Acting DATT, deputy pol-econ counselor, and Pickering Fellow, accompanied CODEL Payne. -------------- ERITREA SUPPORTS SOMALIA'S ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS -------------- ¶3. (C) General Samora said that military activity by Somalia's Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) now focused more on activities within Ethiopia's Somali Region than within Somalia itself, and were intended to destabilize Ethiopia. In contrast, Samora said, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was a broad-based government comprised of members of all clans, who sought to stabilize Somalia. As Ethiopia shared a 1,600 km-long border with Somalia, Somali instability had a direct effect on Ethiopian security, Samora explained. Samora asserted that the UIC, Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI),and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) shared objectives: Islamicists in the UIC had as their political goal the formation of a "greater Somalia" that included parts of Kenya and Ethiopia. According to Samora, AIAI comprised the largest force within the UIC. Eritrea was also supporting the UIC, he said, just as it had supported other opposition forces to destabilize Ethiopia. For several years, ONLF fighters had infiltrated Ethiopia via Sudan and Kenya. According to Samora, some 1,000 Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) fighters had been based in Kiloma (50 km from Assab),Eritrea, 600 of whom were now in Mogadishu preparing for military operations. In the past week alone, Samora said, some 350 OLF fighters had entered Ethiopia. Foreign assistance had helped rehabilitate Mogadishu's airport and seaport, and large quantities of armaments were arriving, including from Eritrea, he added. -------------- ETHIOPIA TO TRAIN SOMALI TFG FORCES -------------- ¶4. (C) There was no need for Ethiopia to send troops into Somalia now, Samora said, as Ethiopian intelligence units monitored the situation. However, "if there is a problem, we will enter," he declared. Samora explained that Ethiopia would train Somali troops for the TFG, once an international peacekeeping operation was approved. The TFG's forces were comprised of members of all clans, and included officers trained in the Soviet Union, he noted. Ethiopia would participate in discussions to be held in the following week on the deployment of a peacekeeping mission to Baidoa, Samora said, adding that troops would likely hail from Uganda if the ADDIS ABAB 00002178 002 OF 003 UNSC modified the arms embargo on Somalia. ¶5. (C) Questioned by CODEL Payne about Sudan's involvement with the UIC, Samora said there was no conflict of interests between Ethiopia and Sudan, a fellow member of IGAD and the African Union. Commercial ties between Ethiopia and Sudan were growing, he said, including road linkages and petroleum sales. He noted that Sudan, under the auspices of the League of Arab States, sought to mediate between the TFG and the UIC. While observing that OLF fighters had previously been sent from Eritrea to western Ethiopia via "Russian" flights through Sudan, Samora said that Ethiopia acknowledged that Sudan lacked the capability to control its entire border. While Ethiopia monitored the situation, it had no information on Government of Sudan support to the UIC, he said. -------------- TFG CAN NOW HOLD ITS OWN AGAINST UIC -------------- ¶6. (C) While the UIC sought to expand its reach to Puntland, Samora assessed that the TFG now no longer faced imminent danger. Ethiopia had warned the UIC to stop attacking the TFG or face retaliation: "if they (the UIC) attack, we will attack them," Samora said. The UIC was now active only in propaganda, not in fighting the TFG, he added. Samora attributed the UIC's popular support to its success in displacing warlords who previously collected taxes from the areas under their respective control, but noted that some forces loyal to Hussain Aideed (son of Mohammed Farah Aideed) still remained in Mogadishu. BBC reports asserting that UIC forces were stronger than the TFG were misleading: with control of Baidoa, Puntland and the Kismayo region, the TFG had more troops than the UIC, he said. Samora noted that lack of economic opportunities in Somalia made serving as a militia member an attractive option, as each clan paid its fighters through taxes; UIC forces were largely comprised of such fighters, he said. Samora dismissed military operations by the UIC during the previous week as "propaganda" intended solely to bolster the UIC's image in the media: UIC fighters were not organized as cohesive units but only along clan lines, which made them reluctant to engage other clan-based militia, he said. Fighting between the UIC and Somali militias had erupted August 8 in Galcaiyo, he said, after the UIC had sent letters to all Somali clans directing them to accept the UIC or face punishment. UIC forces had also clashed amongst themselves near the border with Ethiopia on August 8, he said, as a result of disagreement over the establishment of an Islamic court. ¶7. (C) The UIC was divided between moderates advocating peace talks with the TFG and Islamic extremists who did not, Samora said. On the other hand, the TFG had now resolved its own internal differences between the president and the prime minister (ref A). Samora noted that UIC head Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, a member of the Ayr clan rather than the Hawiye clan which was predominant in Mogadishu, was no longer in Mogadishu. CODEL Payne noted that the difficulty of Darod clan members, such as TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf, establishing a foothold in Hawiye territory. Samora said he personally saw no difference, apart from clan identity, among Somalis, as they all shared the same language and culture, and were all Muslims; Somalia's internal problems had created divisions among Somali clans, he said. -------------- -------------- RAIN MAKES ERITREA-ETHIOPIA BORDER CLASH UNLIKELY NOW -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) General Samora downplayed the risk of hostilities along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, citing adverse weather conditions at least through September, and Eritrean troops' current pre-occupation with the agricultural harvest. On the one hand, he said, the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) no longer existed, he said, due to the presence within the TSZ of Eritrean troops and militia. Eritrea also continued to impose restrictions within Eritrea on the movement of United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) observers: forbidding helicopter flights and night patrols, and restricting ground patrols to specific areas. As a result, UNMEE had no control over Eritrean troop movements, either within the TSZ or elsewhere. On the other hand, Samora said, ADDIS ABAB 00002178 003 OF 003 the current rainy season was not conducive to military operations, which would require support by trucks. "The weather itself doesn't help anyone; we both fight with old technology," he noted. Moreover, according to Samora, the Eritrean military was now busy with the agricultural harvest: whereas the Ethiopian government believed development should come from the people, Eritrea's government focused on economic activity by the army, he said. ¶9. (C) Samora assessed that Eritrea sought to exploit any perceived weakness of Ethiopia, even if it did not lead to military victory. Thus, he said, Ethiopia tried to "make it impossible" for Eritrean forces to attack along their common border, and had conducted exercises on this scenario last year. For this reason, Samora explained, Eritrea was now focusing on destabilizing Ethiopia by intervention in Somalia. ¶10. (C) COMMENT: Samora's comments come only days after Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum successfully mediated among TFG leaders, resulting in an agreement to engage the UIC in dialogue (ref A). Samora's assessment that the UIC now no longer threatens to obliterate Somalia's Transitional Federal Government is consistent with recent observations by TFG officials (refs B-C) that it now has "breathing room" to develop its capacity and build popular support, rather than fear military defeat by the UIC. In the meantime, Post continues to recommend UNSC action to modify the existing arms embargo on Somalia, in order to facilitate the immediate deployment of an IGAD peace support mission to ensure Somalia's stability. END COMMENT. HUDDLESTON