C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 002118

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO AU SO ET
SUBJECT: AU PSC REPRESENTATIVES OUTLOOK ON SOMALIA

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2114

B. ADDIS ABABA 2093

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D).


1. (C) Summary: During an August 1 meeting with staff members
from the African Union Peace and Security Council - PSC
Director Geofrey Mugumya, Head of the African Standby Force
Maj General Ishaya Isah Hassan, Technical Advisor Dr. Aim
Kamubudzi, and Conflict Management Director El-Ghassim Wane -
Ambassador Huddleston raised deployment of IGAD troops and AU
possible governance and peace keeping assistance to the TFG
in Somalia. The AU representatives said that their
objectives are to stabilize the TFG and deploy IGAD troops.
The group agreed that a positive outcome of the ministerial
level IGAD meeting on Somalia being held in Nairobi on August
1 would reinforce the urgency of lifting the arms embargo on
the TFG and deployment of the first phase of Uganda peace
keeping to Baidoa. End Summary.


2. (C) Dr. Kamubudzi, PSC Technical Advisor, began the
conversation by outlining the historical relationship between
the African Union and Somalia explaining the important job
that President Yusuf has in stabilizing the region. He
emphasized that the AU fully supports the TFG and, in fact,
their top priorities are to stabilize the TFG, and help
President Yusuf connect with all clans to be a strong
representative of Somalia supported by the people.


3. (C) PSC Conflict Management Director Wane noted that
although the AU and IGAD hope to deploy troops to lend
support to the TFG, the situation is highly polarized and the
AU needs the international community's support to find a
common approach and a "comprehensive framework." Otherwise,
he said, "the ICU will swallow up the TFG." In Wane's view,
IGAD has outlined the deployment of Ugandan and Sudanese
troops but, it is highly unlikely that Sudan will deploy.
Even Uganda, which is ready in principle to deploy to Baidoa,
there needs to be strong financial support and consensus from

the region. Wane frankly admitted that although it would
make sense for countries like South Africa and Nigeria to
step up, South Africa may volunteer to send in troops under
the AU, after an initial IGAD deployment by Uganda.
According to Wane, what is most important is to get Uganda
ready to &act as a lead nation8, then the AU will secure
other African countries under IGAD/AU auspices. The May 2005
PSC meeting approved phase one of IGASOM deployment with an
AU rehatting during phase two. However, the AU lacks funds
to implement such a plan. To that end, if the U.S. wants the
AU to move fast, Wane advised, the AU needs to &secure
predictable funding.8 Uganda will also need lift for its
troops.


4. (C) Ambassador Huddleston agreed that a common approach is
needed and a dialogue between the ICU and the TFG is
essential to stabilizing Somalia. Furthermore, at a minimum,
in the immediate future IGAD should deploy troops to Baidoa
to stabilize the site and therefore a partial lifting of the
embargo by the UN is critical. Commenting on Ethiopia's
engagement, Wane said that &if no forces are on the ground
and the TFG is jeopardized, Ethiopia will go in.8


5. (C) AU counterparts emphasized the necessity to lift the
arms embargo, particularly because Ethiopia and Eritrea are
technically both violating it by distributing arms and
supporting the TFG and ICU respectively. However, Eritrea is
supporting the Islamic fundamentalists while Ethiopia is
supporting the TFG, the internationally created transitional
Somali government. AU representatives pointed out that there
is a huge difference between an offensive and defensive
strategy and that the two countries should not be put into
the same category.


6. (C) As for the AU military perspective, Maj General Hassan
reviewed his view of an AU deployment to Somalia. He
emphasized the need to first stabilize a comprehensive peace
support mission for the entire country; including an exit
strategy, before IGAD troops are deployed. The Maj General
said that deployment of IGASOM troops, assuming there is
consensus at the August 1 ministerial meeting, may be
critical to prevent the TFG from deteriorating. The AU is
assessing a possible phased process of deployment of IGAD and
then AU troops, but the international community must be

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engaged, particularly assisting logistically and financially.
Regarding transition from IGAD to AU, Maj Gen Hassan said
that the AU plans on rehatting IGAD troops after nine months
maintaining that their &first priority is IGAD.8
Ambassador Huddleston said that she understood the military
strategy but the political situation is worsening and
emphasized the need for rapid deployment of troops.


7. (C) Dr. Kamubudzi made the case that right after the ICU
took over Mogadishu, Uganda had troops ready to deploy but
there was no funding for logistical assistance and the UNSC
arms embargo had not been partially lifted. Because of that
&we lost momentum, and that is a lesson learned,8 he said.


8. (C) Comment: A UN or UNSC partial lifting of the arms
embargo will not only allow the international community to
stiffen the TFIs but it will reinforce its legitimacy. This
will then remove the excuse used by Eritrea and others that
if the TFG is backed by Ethiopia on IGAD forces, it has the
right to back the AIAI led ICU. Hence in the region we
continue to fear that the TFG will collapse or Ethiopia will
deploy if a green light is not given to the IGAD-Ugandan
troop deployment to Baidoa. End comment.
HUDDLESTON