AU PSC REPRESENTATIVES OUTLOOK ON SOMALIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 002118 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2016 TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO AU SO ET SUBJECT: AU PSC REPRESENTATIVES OUTLOOK ON SOMALIA REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2114 ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 2093 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: During an August 1 meeting with staff members from the African Union Peace and Security Council - PSC Director Geofrey Mugumya, Head of the African Standby Force Maj General Ishaya Isah Hassan, Technical Advisor Dr. Aim Kamubudzi, and Conflict Management Director El-Ghassim Wane - Ambassador Huddleston raised deployment of IGAD troops and AU possible governance and peace keeping assistance to the TFG in Somalia. The AU representatives said that their objectives are to stabilize the TFG and deploy IGAD troops. The group agreed that a positive outcome of the ministerial level IGAD meeting on Somalia being held in Nairobi on August 1 would reinforce the urgency of lifting the arms embargo on the TFG and deployment of the first phase of Uganda peace keeping to Baidoa. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Dr. Kamubudzi, PSC Technical Advisor, began the conversation by outlining the historical relationship between the African Union and Somalia explaining the important job that President Yusuf has in stabilizing the region. He emphasized that the AU fully supports the TFG and, in fact, their top priorities are to stabilize the TFG, and help President Yusuf connect with all clans to be a strong representative of Somalia supported by the people. ¶3. (C) PSC Conflict Management Director Wane noted that although the AU and IGAD hope to deploy troops to lend support to the TFG, the situation is highly polarized and the AU needs the international community's support to find a common approach and a "comprehensive framework." Otherwise, he said, "the ICU will swallow up the TFG." In Wane's view, IGAD has outlined the deployment of Ugandan and Sudanese troops but, it is highly unlikely that Sudan will deploy. Even Uganda, which is ready in principle to deploy to Baidoa, there needs to be strong financial support and consensus from the region. Wane frankly admitted that although it would make sense for countries like South Africa and Nigeria to step up, South Africa may volunteer to send in troops under the AU, after an initial IGAD deployment by Uganda. According to Wane, what is most important is to get Uganda ready to &act as a lead nation8, then the AU will secure other African countries under IGAD/AU auspices. The May 2005 PSC meeting approved phase one of IGASOM deployment with an AU rehatting during phase two. However, the AU lacks funds to implement such a plan. To that end, if the U.S. wants the AU to move fast, Wane advised, the AU needs to &secure predictable funding.8 Uganda will also need lift for its troops. ¶4. (C) Ambassador Huddleston agreed that a common approach is needed and a dialogue between the ICU and the TFG is essential to stabilizing Somalia. Furthermore, at a minimum, in the immediate future IGAD should deploy troops to Baidoa to stabilize the site and therefore a partial lifting of the embargo by the UN is critical. Commenting on Ethiopia's engagement, Wane said that &if no forces are on the ground and the TFG is jeopardized, Ethiopia will go in.8 ¶5. (C) AU counterparts emphasized the necessity to lift the arms embargo, particularly because Ethiopia and Eritrea are technically both violating it by distributing arms and supporting the TFG and ICU respectively. However, Eritrea is supporting the Islamic fundamentalists while Ethiopia is supporting the TFG, the internationally created transitional Somali government. AU representatives pointed out that there is a huge difference between an offensive and defensive strategy and that the two countries should not be put into the same category. ¶6. (C) As for the AU military perspective, Maj General Hassan reviewed his view of an AU deployment to Somalia. He emphasized the need to first stabilize a comprehensive peace support mission for the entire country; including an exit strategy, before IGAD troops are deployed. The Maj General said that deployment of IGASOM troops, assuming there is consensus at the August 1 ministerial meeting, may be critical to prevent the TFG from deteriorating. The AU is assessing a possible phased process of deployment of IGAD and then AU troops, but the international community must be ADDIS ABAB 00002118 002 OF 002 engaged, particularly assisting logistically and financially. Regarding transition from IGAD to AU, Maj Gen Hassan said that the AU plans on rehatting IGAD troops after nine months maintaining that their &first priority is IGAD.8 Ambassador Huddleston said that she understood the military strategy but the political situation is worsening and emphasized the need for rapid deployment of troops. ¶7. (C) Dr. Kamubudzi made the case that right after the ICU took over Mogadishu, Uganda had troops ready to deploy but there was no funding for logistical assistance and the UNSC arms embargo had not been partially lifted. Because of that &we lost momentum, and that is a lesson learned,8 he said. ¶8. (C) Comment: A UN or UNSC partial lifting of the arms embargo will not only allow the international community to stiffen the TFIs but it will reinforce its legitimacy. This will then remove the excuse used by Eritrea and others that if the TFG is backed by Ethiopia on IGAD forces, it has the right to back the AIAI led ICU. Hence in the region we continue to fear that the TFG will collapse or Ethiopia will deploy if a green light is not given to the IGAD-Ugandan troop deployment to Baidoa. End comment. HUDDLESTON