C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002021

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/SPG AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: NATO REPORTS LITTLE PROGRESS IN BOOSTING NATO
ASSISTANCE TO AU MISSION IN SUDAN

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 1581


B. ADDIS ABABA 1472

C. STATE 98115 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASON: 1.4 (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for
Planning Maurits Jochems and other NATO representatives cite
little progress in convincing African Union officials to
allow NATO to expand the types of assistance it is now
providing to the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), despite earlier
consultations with the AU and formal requests exchanged
between AU Commission Chairperson Konare and NATO SYG de Hoop
Scheffer. NATO will continue to provide AMIS with strategic
airlift and training, but is awaiting formal requests from
the AU for assistance in developing a "lessons learned"
mechanism, conducting pre-deployment certification, or
training AMIS officers who are to man a new forward joint
mission headquarters. AU officials have rejected
intelligence-sharing with NATO as well as the presence of
NATO trainers in the field to conduct on-the-job capacity
building. Compounding reluctance on the part of the AU, both
France and Belgium have opposed NATO engagement with Africa,
preferring to limit NATO's role to a military alliance rather
than a political organization. Appointing a full-time NATO
civilian representative at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa
would strengthen NATO's ability to advocate for stronger
engagement with the AU. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) On July 14, Charge and deputy pol-econ counselor met
with visiting NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for
Planning Ambassador Maurits Jochems (Netherlands),
accompanied by NATO International Staff Mr. Manlio Silvestri
(Operations Division, Operations Section), Allied Joint
Command Lisbon POLAD Mr. Hasan Aygun (Turkey), NATO Senior
Military Liaison Officer (SMLO) to the African Union Captain
Henrik Kudsk (Denmark) and Ambassador of Norway to Ethiopia
Mette Ravn. Amb. Jochems provided a readout of recent
meetings in Addis Ababa with officials of the African Union's
Darfu

r Integrated Task Force (DITF), intended to follow up on
earlier discussions with AU officials (ref B) held
immediately after the May 15 AU Peace and Security Council
(PSC) meeting that endorsed the signing of the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA).


3. (SBU) Amb. Jochems expressed disappointment that he had
not been able to fully engage senior AU principals during his
most recent visit: AU Commission Chairperson Konare was in
Brazil (participating with the heads of state of Senegal,
Ghana, Cape Verde and others in the "Second Conference of
Intellectuals from Africa and the Diaspora") and would not
arrive in Brussels until mid-day July 18 for the EU-AU
pledging conference on AMIS; as Konare would depart Brussels
the following morning with AU Peace and Security Commissioner
Ambassador Said Djinnit, Konare would not have the
opportunity to address the North Atlantic Council (NAC).
NATO SYG Jaap de Hoop Scheffer hoped to meet with Konare and
Djinnit on the margins of the conference to follow up on
Konare's June 2 letter, which requested limited NATO
assistance to AMIS (ref A). Instead, Jochems had met with AU
DITF Head Ambassador Ki Doulaye Corentin, AU DITF POLAD Dr.
Solomon Gomes, and other working-level officials responsible
for AMIS.


4. (C) Whether AMIS would be extended from September 30 to
the end of December would largely depend on available
financing, Jochems said, as well as on GOS approval. NATO
SMLO Kudsk observed that the June 27 AU PSC decision had
affirmed that AMIS would withdraw by September 30, in the
absence of any agreement on UN transition, but could extend
if an agreement was reached. Norwegian ambassador commented
that this was meant to pressure the GOS. POLAD Aygun noted
that were the GOS to offer to be a donor to AMIS, it would
challenge both the AU and UN.

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NATO ASSISTANCE STILL LIMITED TO AIRLIFT AND TRAINING
-------------- --------------


5. (SBU) NATO was already providing assistance to AMIS in two
specific areas approved by the NAC, Jochems said. With the
EU, NATO was providing strategic lift for the autumn troop
rotations of African battalions serving in Darfur; "80 per
cent" of such planning was complete. Secondly, NATO could

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continue to provide a "package of training," in cooperation
with SHAPE and Joint Command Lisbon.


6. (C) On the other hand, "we did not make much progress"
with the AU on three new areas of proposed assistance
approved by the NAC, Jochems said. While AU DITF officials
were "positive" about NATO helping to establish a "lessons
learned" mechanism to study AMIS for future AU peace support
operations, as well as about pre-deployment certification of
troops to be deployed to Darfur, there had already been
agreement in May that NATO would send experts to work on
both. (NOTE: Both "lessons learned" and pre-deployment
certification are specifically mentioned in Konare's June 2
request to Scheffer; see ref A. END NOTE.) NATO was also
proposing to provide training to assist AMIS in establishing
a Joint Operations Center within the proposed Forward Joint
Mission Headquarters, which would enhance AMIS command and
control, but had been told to delay sending any training
expert to El Fasher until a newly recruited AMIS Joint Chief
of Staff from Zambia and other AMIS staff officers had
arrived. NATO SMLO Kudsk explained that AU DITF Head
Ambassador Ki Doulaye Korentin had promised to send formal
diplomatic notes requesting NATO assistance in each of these
three areas, but that none had been received yet by NATO.
Jochems complained that by requiring such an exchange of
diplomatic notes, the AU treated partners differently; NATO
did not command the same respect at the AU as the United
States, for example. Charge agreed that the AU appeared
reluctant to engage NATO and only did the "minimum." She
noted that visiting AF A/S Frazer had advocated strongly with
Konare to engage NATO.


7. (C) Jochems reported that two areas of assistance not yet
fully approved by the NAC had nevertheless been rejected by
the AU. Intelligence-sharing with NATO was "dismissed out of
hand" by the AU (Commissioner Djinnit did not rule out
bilateral intelligence-sharing, however), while on-the-job
capacity building (consisting of NATO trainers in the field,
or "boots on the ground," to advise AMIS battalions) was
deemed "too sensitive for the Government of Sudan." NATO
therefore needed to continue to maintain a low profile.
Jochems noted that AU Commissioner Djinnit appeared to be
cautious in engaging NATO, but saw the merits of further
assistance, while AU DITF POLAD Dr. Solomon Gomes was
reluctant to espouse any position. In general, Jochems
observed, the AU was impressed by the "machinery" of NATO but
preferred to have NATO support long-term capacity building
(e.g., for the African Standby Force).

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NATO CAN PLAY LIMITED ROLE IN DISARMING FIGHTERS
-------------- ---


8. (C) While the UK was taking the lead in response to the
AU's June 5 request to partners for 27 experts to run a
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) course
in each of AMIS's 8 sectors, it was important not to "push
NATO out," Jochems said. The UK had assured him that it
would find a role for NATO. Jochems explained that NATO's
experience was limited to disarmament of combatants in
Macedonia and Afghanistan; demobilization and reintegration
were activities that required significant donor assistance
(e.g., from the World Bank). "We can only do the first 'D,'"
he quipped. Due to concerns about force protection and
inadequate medical care, NATO military personnel could take
the lead on disarmament efforts at AU Headquarters in Addis
Ababa, AMIS headquarters in El Fasher, or in Khartoum, but
not in the individual sectors in the field. NATO SMLO Kudsk
noted that partners had asked for the AU to elaborate further
on its need for DDR assistance. (NOTE: UK and DFID officials
have subsequently briefed partners that the UK will lead a
limited "scoping mission" in Darfur in mid-August, with the
participation of NATO and AU DITF representatives, but that
the UK currently does not have any plans to provide any
additional assistance for large-scale DDR. No additional
partners, including Japan, have announced any assistance for
DDR. END NOTE.)

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"INTERNAL NATO PROBLEMS" A BARRIER TO FURTHER ENGAGEMENT
-------------- --------------


9. (C/NF) In addition to reluctance on the part of the AU,
Jochems (a career Dutch diplomat) complained that some NATO

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members had their own agenda and opposed NATO engagement with
Africa. Belgian and French nationals seconded to NATO
reported to their own capitals, rather than exercise
allegiance to NATO. Belgium often questioned "whether NATO
should play a role at all," Jochems said. Jochems elaborated
on France's opposition to any political engagement by NATO,
asserting that France preferred to limit NATO's role to
solely a military alliance. While NATO need not serve as the
world's policeman, it could provide training to local
security forces in the Middle East and Africa, Jochems said,
but France had opposed this. With NATO playing a role in the
Middle East, "the cost is not doing training in Africa," he
said. "They always try to keep us out of Africa," Jochems
added. NATO SMLO Kudsk observed that at the NAC, France had
opposed NATO playing any role in DDR in Darfur.


10. (C/NF) While NATO was a political-military organization,
France and the EU stressed NATO's military role, preferring
not to include Canada and other partners in political
consultations but rather to include only the United States.
As an example, Jochems cited the limited attendance at the
proposed EU-hosted "political luncheon" at the AMIS pledging
conference, which was restricted to the UN SYG, the EU,
Finland (as the EU presidency), the United States, the AU,
and Sudanese FM Lam Akol; major AMIS donors, such as the UK
or the Netherlands, had not been invited.


11. (C) Jochems expressed concern about NATO engagement with
the African Union in the long term if AMIS ended, noting that
the USG had taken a "hard line" in pre-pledging conference
discussions among partners in Washington. Charge responded
that Konare had not objected when senior USG officials pushed
for AMIS to end by September 30 and for a transition from
AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation, but that the July 18
pledging conference would help clarify the future of AMIS.
The United States would continue strongly advocating that the
AU engage NATO, she added. Jochems reported that he would
return to Addis Ababa for further consultations prior to
September 30.


12. (C) COMMENT: The frank observations by DASG Jochems and
other NATO officials highlight the difficulties of pushing
the AU to engage NATO further and to expand NATO assistance
to the AU mission in Darfur. Despite the exchanges of formal
notes between AU Chairperson Konare and the NATO SYG (ref A),
and similar appeals by Washington (ref C), AU peacekeeping
planners appear reluctant to expand NATO's role in Darfur
beyond strategic airlift and training. Continued political
engagement with the AU will be essential to advocate for
strengthening cooperation with NATO; the absence of a NATO
political representative in Addis Ababa (NATO has been
represented only by its military liaison office) may hamper
its ability to lobby AU Commission principals consistently
and effectively. END COMMENT.
HUDDLESTON