Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ADDISABABA1961
2006-07-19 04:48:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

DARFUR: JULY 13 AU DITF BRIEFING HIGHLIGHTS

Tags:  PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU 
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VZCZCXRO2754
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #1961/01 2000448
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190448Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1613
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 001961 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND AF/RSA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: JULY 13 AU DITF BRIEFING HIGHLIGHTS
AMIS SHORTCOMINGS

REF: (A) STATE 111612

(B) BANJUL 411
(C) ADDIS ABABA 1738
(D) ADDIS ABABA 1736

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 001961 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND AF/RSA LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU SUBJECT: DARFUR: JULY 13 AU DITF BRIEFING HIGHLIGHTS AMIS SHORTCOMINGS REF: (A) STATE 111612 (B) BANJUL 411 (C) ADDIS ABABA 1738 (D) ADDIS ABABA 1736 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: African Union planners state that USD 440 million will be needed to extend the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to the end of December 2006 and have it implement the additional tasks required by the May 5 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). The degree of AMIS enhancement will depend largely on the outcome of the July 18 pledging conference. On the security front, some AU officials are concerned that Government of Sudan forces are now engaged in a de facto military alliance with fellow DPA signatory SLA/Minni Minawi, while the recent ambush and surrender of an entire 32- person AMIS patrol highlight deficiencies of AMIS capabilities in the field. DPA implementation is hampered by AMIS delays in releasing a public diplomacy strategy, in providing final comments on the report of the joint AU-UN technical assessment mission completed in June, in establishing a forward joint mission headquarters, and in determining when the next meeting of the DPA Joint Commission will occur to review ceasefire violations. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) Poloffs and DAO TDYer attended a two-hour briefing on July 13 by the African Union Commission?s Darfur Integrated Task Force (AU DITF) to the AU Partners Liaison Group (chaired by the EU, and comprised of Canada, the US, UK, UN, and NATO). -------------- JULY 18 AMIS PLEDGING CONFERENCE -------------- ¶3. (SBU) EC POLAD observed that AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Ambassador Said Djinnit had recently affirmed to the EU Peace and Security Council (PSC) in Brussels that despite press reports to the contrary, the mandate of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) would end in October, consistent with the June 27 AU PSC decision (ref B). Nevertheless, AMIS would present two budgets at the July 18 EU-hosted AMIS Pledging Conference in Brussels. ¶4. (U) NOTE: Budget documents provided by the AU to partners (forwarded to AF/FO and AF/SPG) estimate a total of USD 441 million is needed for AMIS: -- USD 170.3 million for AMIS 2-E (i.e., to maintain current strength from April 1 to September 30, 2006); -- USD 76.3 million for AMIS 2
-E extension (i.e., extending AMIS at its current strength from October 1 to December 31, 2006); -- USD 194.4 million for AMIS 3 (i.e., ?tasks specified and implied in the DPA... required for strengthening AMIS during the transition? from October 1 to December 31, 2006). Of these budget items, USD 88.6 million is for ?facilities and infrastructure? (primarily camps for AMIS personnel, which the USG has been funding). In addition, AU officials have identified an additional USD 16.5 million needed to establish a secretariat and conference facilities for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, envisaged to involve 1,000 delegates in 90 days of talks. END NOTE. -------------- AMIS ENHANCEMENT DEPENDS ON FUNDS AVAILABLE -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Head of the AU Darfur Integrated Task Force (AU DITF) Ambassador Ki Doulaye Corentin reported that AMIS would present the concept of operations (CONOPS) for AMIS at the beginning of the July 18 pledging conference. AMIS enhancement would depend on the outcome of the pledging conference. Currently, funding only existed for AMIS through June. He noted that extending AMIS from October 1 to the end of December would require ?a completely new budget? that would also have to address additional tasks from the implementation of the DPA. AU member states had ADDIS ABAB 00001961 002 OF 004 reportedly committed to sending 2-3 additional battalions, pending availability of funds, although six additional battalions had been requested. While AMIS was ?telling people on the ground to make do with what they have,? without enhancement of its logistics, AMIS would face difficulty implementing the DPA tasks accepted by the June 27 PSC, Ki Doulaye said. ¶6. (SBU) The report of the June AU/UN technical assessment to mission to Sudan had been provided by the UN to the AU, but was still awaiting comment from AU Special Representative for Sudan Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe and others, Ki Doulaye said. Separately, the UN Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) was preparing a report on UN transition, for the UN Secretary-General to present to the UN Security SIPDIS Council. (NOTE: On July 14, the UN distributed a ?Final Report of the Joint United Nations-African Union Assessment Mission to Darfur,? dated June 22; copy has been forwarded to AF and AF/SPG. END NOTE.) -------------- MILITARY ALLIANCE BETWEEN GOS AND MINNI? -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Amb. Ki Doulaye announced that the Government of Sudan (GOS) had written to the AU and the UN Security Council to condemn the July 3 attack by the National Salvation/Redemption Front on the town of Hamrat el-Sheikh in Kordofan. The GOS paper had noted that the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),but not SLA Abdul Wahid, was part of the Front. AU DITF POLAD Dr. Solomon Gomes highlighted the need to consider ways to engage the Front: an attack by the front on AMIS areas of operation (vice Kordofan) would complicate matters for AMIS, as would a military alliance between SLA Minni Minawi and the GOS. ¶8. (SBU) Amb. Ki countered that there was no military alliance between SLA Minni Minawi and the GOS, citing political differences between them. On the other hand, he acknowledged that the GOS was ?closing its eyes? to military operations by Minni in his stronghold (AMIS Sector 1, headquartered in El Fasher). Implementation of the DPA would bring the GOS and Minni closer together (as they were the only signatories). Amb. Ki said that the AU DITF had requested that AMIS staff in Khartoum meet with Minni. The AU was concerned about a growing number of IDPs, he said; some 15-20 villages have been emptied, with their inhabitants fleeing to IDP camps. -------------- AMIS PATROL SURRENDERS IN AMBUSH -------------- ¶9. (SBU) AU DITF Operations and Plans Team Leader Col. Guy Y. Mahunu reported a recent incident in which a 32-person AMIS escort patrol was ambushed in Sector 6 (near Kutum),possibly by SLA Wahid forces. Ambushers seized four vehicles, weapons, and two PAE fuel tankers. The 32 AMIS personnel were detained but released later the same day; an interpreter was just released July 12. Amb. Ki said the AMIS Force Commander (FC) had established an investigation team, and was concerned that South African troops had abandoned a vehicle in a previous incident. South Africa was also dispatching its own board of inquiry. ¶10. (SBU) Mahunu also reported that SLA Minni forces had stopped an AMIS escort, and that President Bashir had visited Nyala; otherwise, it had been ?quiet? for the last two days. ¶11. (SBU) Responding to poloff?s comments on June 10 underscoring USG concern that AMIS needed to deploy full-time guards to prevent the theft of jet A-1 fuel from GOS facilities used by AMIS in El Fasher (ref A), Ki Doulaye said an investigation into the theft had been inconclusive: ?those guarding it (were) taking the fuel.? A UN DPKO official noted that the theft was ?routine,? despite seals. Ki Doulaye asked Col. ADDIS ABAB 00001961 003 OF 004 Mahunu to pursue the issue. ¶12. (SBU) Ki Doulaye also reported that the AMIS team investigating allegations of sexual abuse was now in Addis. Separately, a report on an attack on a Skylink manager had been forwarded to Canada. An AMIS board of inquiry had been established, but its report had not been received. -------------- DPA IMPLEMENTATION: ON HOLD? -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Amb. Ki had nothing new to report on contacts with non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),nor on any progress made in launching the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation. Asked to clarify when the Darfur Peace Agreement entered into force, as it would effect timelines for implementation, Ki Doulaye explained that the May 15 PSC had specified May 16 as ?D-day,? while the deadline for non-signatories to sign the DPA had been extended to May 31. ¶14. (SBU) Similarly, AMIS public diplomacy activities appeared to be on hold. While the UK had volunteered three communication experts who were now in Darfur, Germany was still awaiting a formal note verbale from the AU on specific information activities that Germany could fund. Ki Doulaye recommended Germany following up in both Addis and Khartoum, as the DPA implementation team was under AU Special Representative Kingibe, was to have its own secretariat, but did not coordinate closely with AU SIPDIS DITF in Addis. AU DITF needed to consult with Darfur mediators Ambassador Sam Ibok and Boubou Niang, prior to release of a public information strategy, Ki Doulaye said. No decision had been taken yet on whether AMIS would support UNMIS establishing a radio station in Darfur; the governor of North Darfur had earlier stopped daily hour-long AMIS radio broadcasts from El Fasher but had now allowed their resumption, Ki Doulaye said. ¶15. (SBU) Ki Doulaye said setting the next meeting of the DPA Joint Commission would require further consultations with the GOS and SLA Minni faction, and would depend on AU Special Representative Kingibe. The UK suggested that if the AU needed technical assistance, the AU should raise this with partners at the July 18 AMIS Pledging Conference. (NOTE: Per ref C, the June 23 inaugural meeting of the Joint Commission failed to review ceasefire violations, as both GOS and SLA Minni representatives objected to the participation of DPA non-signatories. END NOTE.) ¶16. (SBU) Commenting on a UK proposal to provide experts on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) (in response to a June 5 request from AMIS to partners),Col. Mahunu said it was not advisable to conduct training now; rather, training should occur after the September rotation in order to benefit incoming troops. Gomes said he hoped the UK- led scoping mission would occur in mid-August: visiting 3 sectors accompanied by an AU DITF representative. NATO military liaison officer expressed NATO?s desire to participate in the scoping mission as well, citing DDR experience in Bosnia. Amb. Ki Doulaye also called for including GTZ, which he said was working on a DDR plan for the GOS. UK affirmed it would prepare terms of reference for the mission. -------------- GOS PLAN FOR DISARMING JANJAWEED -------------- ¶17. (SBU) According to Amb. Ki Doulaye, Sudanese generals had briefed the AMIS Force Commander on a draft GOS plan to disarm the Janjaweed (as stipulated by the DPA),the day after the June 23 Joint Commission meeting. However, AU Peace and Security ADDIS ABAB 00001961 004 OF 004 Commissioner Said Djinnit had wanted to wait until after the July 1-2 AU Summit to provide official comments on the GOS plan. Ki Doulaye asserted that the plan had not been officially presented to the AU, and that the AU was now awaiting submission of an amended version from the GOS. (COMMENT: The AU reportedly considered the original plan provided by the GOS to be insufficient, prompting the revisions. END COMMENT.) -------------- FJMHQ NOT YET ESTABLISHED -------------- ¶18. (SBU) Partners reported on the status of the six expert/advisors being sent to the AMIS Forward Joint Mission Headquarters (FJMHQ) to be established at El Fasher in response to a May 18 request from the AU (ref D): -- EU: Danish police advisor was in Addis; Italian colonel and UK J-3 advisor were still in Europe, awaiting visas for Sudan; -- US: With visas in hand, USG J-2 and J-9 experts were traveling to Khartoum the weekend of July 16; -- UN: J-5 expert is already in Sudan. ¶19. (SBU) Col. Mahunu reported that facilities for the FJMHQ?s Joint Operations Center (JOC) were ?almost in place... awaiting kickoff,? and expressed optimism that AMIS would receive joint situation reports later this week. However, the Zambian general appointed as the AMIS Joint Chief of Staff (to whom the partner experts would report) was still awaiting approval. UK underscored the importance of providing ?concrete information? to partners at the pledging conference, on the FJMHQ and on efforts to strengthen AMIS command and control. ¶20. (SBU) Canada announced that as of August 11, the AU DITF?s Information Analysis Cell (IAC),which had received technical assistance from Canadian military intelligence, would be handed over to the AU. (NOTE: Canadian poloff noted privately that support was ending due to disagreement between the Canadian ministries of defense and foreign affairs on the value of continuing such assistance to the AU. END NOTE.) ¶21. (SBU) COMMENT: The weekly AU DITF briefings highlight that a range of political, logistical, and capacity-building challenges continue to hamper the efficiency of the AU Mission in Sudan and implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. AU planning reflects the ambiguity of the future of AMIS. While the AU PSC has officially stated that AMIS?s mandate will end in October, the AU has prepared budget estimates for the July 18 pledging conference that go through the end of December. With May 15 as ?D-day? for the entry into force of the Darfur Peace Agreement, the DITF briefing also underscores that many of the DPA?s timelines for implementation are long overdue: -- e.g., ?development of a sensitization strategy and dissemination of the DPA? was to occur within 5 days, but AMIS still has not released a public information strategy to donors willing to fund such activities; -- cessation of hostilities were to occur within 72 hours, but AMIS patrols continue to report skirmishes and clashes; -- submission by the GOS of a comprehensive plan for disarming Janjaweed and armed militias was to occur within 37 days, but, as Ki Doulaye notes, AMIS is still awaiting revisions from the GOS. END COMMENT.

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