BEREKET SAYS HR 4423 COULD HURT BILATERAL RELATIONS

UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 001902 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL ET SUBJECT: BEREKET SAYS HR 4423 COULD HURT BILATERAL RELATIONS ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Bereket Simon, public relations advisor to Ethiopia's Prime Minister with rank of Minister, told PAO that CUDP leaders' request to arrange a meeting with the jailed CUD leaders was a positive initiative, which he would support. After praising the way the Charge had conducted the bi-lateral relationship, he argued that HR4423 'was a thorn in the flesh of Ethiopia', and 'a development that could affect US-Ethiopia bilateral relationship' if not managed appropriately. END SUMMARY. -------------- CUDP PRISON CONTACTS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The PAO explained to Bereket that the leaders of the CUDP had wanted the Mission to intercede in arranging a meeting including Temesgen Zewde and Ayele Chamiso, with the CUD leaders in prison. The Charge had raised the issue towards the end of her last conversation with the Prime Minister, in the presence of A/S Jendayi Frazer. He told Bereket that the purpose of the CUDP leaders' visit with the jailed CUD was to: ascertain whether they accepted the leadership of Ayele and Temesgen of the CUDP; determine whether the jailed CUD leaders were in agreement with the peaceful and democratic political change espoused by the CUDP; and determine whether those in jail would publicly disavow the radical agenda of the Diaspora Ethiopians, who were bent on the overthrow of the government. ¶3. (SBU) The PAO offered the opinion that the CUDP, under the leadership of Temesgen and Ayele, was making an honest effort to build Ethiopian democracy as a loyal opposition party, but that they needed to strengthen their party. Without the ability of the CUDP leaders to convince the incarcerated CUD leadership to join their cause, or to make a clean break with those in jail, and explain why to the electorate and the Diaspora, they would not be able to consolidate themselves as a genuine opposition party. ¶4. (SBU) Bereket indicated that he thought it would be a good idea for the CUDP leaders to meet with the CUD leaders in prison, since their doing so in his view, would produce no harm, and could do some good. He offered to suggest this to Prime Minister Meles when he returned from Banjul the following week. The PAO reviewed with Bereket the four names of the incarcerated leaders to be visited (Hailu Shawel, Dr. Hailu Araya, Ingr. Gizachew, Yacob Hailemariam). Bereket asked why the CUDP leaders did not want to meet with Berhanu Nega. The PAO told him that he felt the CUDP leaders were convinced that Berhanu Nega would not be supportive of the conciliatory agenda they were pursuing, and that his actions in past months had indicated that he was vehemently opposed to any type of engagement with the government. -------------- YOU GIVE ME ONE ROSE, BUT MANY THORNS... -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Bereket said that he was very pleased with how the Ambassador had conducted the relationship between the two countries, but that the progress of the HR 4423 bill was viewed by the GOE as 'a thorn in the flesh of Ethiopia'. He expressed perplexity and disappointment about the U.S. government's promotion of the bill, and ended his observations with a veiled threat. He was perplexed that "the American government had let the bill get so far in Congress". This bill in his view, was in the interest of "hardliners". Someone, he said, had to find a way to tell Congress: "hands off Ethiopia". -------------- WHY I AM POUTING -------------- ¶6. (SBU) He complained to the PAO that Ethiopia had always acted in concert with U.S. interests. Bereket was disappointed that the U.S. had often let Ethiopia down when it came to receiving support on issues important to them. For example, the US he said, had not supported Ethiopia's five- point peace plan in the border dispute with Eritrea. U.S. reluctance to take Ethiopia's side, in his view, had emboldened Eritrea's Isaias, and contributed to that country's ruler's intransigence on resolving the border issue. Bereket complained that now, at a crucial time for Ethiopia, his country was being held to task by the U.S. for a variety of human rights violations. He reported having followed Ana Gomes' testimony to the House Subcommittee on Africa, and had been dismayed by the warm reception she had gotten. Bereket also cited the fact that USAID in some unspecified report, had depicted Ethiopia as a 'failed state', an appellation he felt particularly unfair, and inaccurate at best. (Note: USAID's 2005 strategy for Ethiopia classified the country as a "fragile state." End Note) Bereket said that the International Crisis Group had even maligned Ethiopia in the past for supporting the TFG in Somalia, while much of what Ethiopia had done, being with the full knowledge of, and in concert with the US. -------------- SHOW ME YOU LOVE ME...OR ELSE -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The above were illustrative of the types of actions by the U.S., Bereket told the PAO, that over time accumulated, and had led in the past to the Ethiopian government deciding to, for example, expel the Republican and Democratic election observer organizations during the May 2005 elections. He reminded the PAO that Ethiopia is a strategic ally of the United States and that if the government were to collapse, then the whole region would fall to fundamentalists. The issue of HR 4423 had to be addressed politically in his view, without the Ethiopian government being hauled in front of a committee. Were this not done, Bereket said, "it could harm Ethiopia's bilateral relations with the U.S." At the end of the day, in Bereket's opinion, if Ethiopia felt "pushed into a corner, it would act to protect its interests". -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Bereket's ready willingness to have the CUDP leaders visit the jailed CUD leaders, is indicative of the distance the regime feels it has come in consolidating its position and advancing its agenda. Its strategy has begun to pay off domestically. A number of editorials in the private media have congratulated the regime on its engagement and accommodation. However, silencing its detractors in the Diaspora has proved more difficult. As Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia increases, the EPRDF leadership will most likely play the terrorism card often, at all levels, to solicit demonstrations from the US, that it is a constant and reliable partner in the 'long war' on the Horn of Africa. END COMMENT. HUDDLESTON