ETHIOPIA: PM MELES ON SOMALIA, ERITREA BORDER AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001634 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF FOR A/S FRAZER THE HAGUE FOR A/DAS REDDICK E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2016 TAGS: PREL ASEC MARR KPKO ET ER SO SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: PM MELES ON SOMALIA, ERITREA BORDER AND CJTF-HOA Classified By: CHARGE VICKI HUDDLESTON FOR REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Meles told the Charge and CJTF-HOA Commander Rear Admiral Hunt June 13 that Ethiopia would not take military action against the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia unless the ICU moved against Baidoa, which the PM did not expect them to do. Meles said the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) remained an ally of Ethiopia. On the border dispute with Eritrea, the PM said the GOE would attend the June 15 EEBC meeting in the Hague, but believed the process was a dead end and would soon break down because Eritrean Isaias had not yet committed to peace. Isaias, he said, remained focused on undermining the GOE through providing arms and cash to all of the GOE's enemies. Adm. Hunt pitched his plans for CJTF-HOA in the region and asked for the PM's help in sorting out recent restrictions imposed by ENDF Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Samora. Meles expressed strong support for the CJTF-HOA operation and suggested re-locating some HOA activities until current military operations in the Ogaden are completed. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) The Charge called on PM Meles June 13, accompanied by Rear Admiral Rick Hunt, Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and Pol/Econ Counselor. Meles was joined by his special assistant, Amb. Gebretensai. Charge requested the meeting primarily to discuss new restrictions on CJTF-HOA operations in the Ogaden, but took advantage of the opportunity to discuss plans for the June 15 meeting of the Ethiopia-Eritrean Boundary Commission (EEBC) as well as the developing situation in Somalia. -------------- EEBC: WE'LL GO, BUT THE PROCESS IS DEAD -------------- ¶3. (C) The Charge reiterated to the Prime Minister the USG's desire that the GOE send representatives to the June 15 EEBC meeting in the Hague. She acknowledged that the Eritrean Government (GSE) had indicated earlier in the day that it would not attend the meeting. Meles indicated that the GOE would attend the meeting, but only to minimize "collateral damage" to Ethiopia from the inevitable failure of the current diplomatic initiative. "We don't want to prolong the agony, but we don't want to be blamed for the demise" of the process, he said. Meles added that he was not sure whether the GSE would attend the meeting in the end. If they don't, he concluded, the GSE would indirectly announce the end of the process. ¶4. (C) The PM also stated that the GOE would not offer a security plan for the demarcation process. To do so would be "wrong for all sorts of reasons." One reason was that a security plan would "perpetuate the agony" of the doomed diplomatic process. Another was that any plan would be hypothetical while restrictions on UNMEE continued. The Charge argued that the USG still believed that the current EEBC process could work. It was essential that the GOE provide the EEBC with a security plan; it could be conditional upon the lifting of UNMEE restrictions if necessary. She also indicated that the USG was trying to lay the groundwork for talks on the normalization of relations under the auspices of the UN to run in parallel to technical discussions on demarcation at the EEBC. ¶5. (C) Meles said that Ethiopia's bottom line was that there had to be discussions on problem areas of the border. The EEBC, he claimed, was eating away at that bottom line a little bit at a time. The PM recalled that the EEBC had said that the boundary had already been demarcated -- a position Ethiopia could not accept. "If we go ahead with demarcation without any commitment to dialogue, we will have given away everything that we have been working for over the last several years." He added that Ethiopia could not sign on to some consultant's view of anomalies in the EEBC line. ¶6. (C) The Charge asked the PM about the implications of a total breakdown in talks. What if UNMEE left? What about the possibility of renewed conflict? Meles reiterated his oft-stated view that there would be no peace until President Isaias abandoned his strategy of undermining the GOE and ADDIS ABAB 00001634 002 OF 003 arming its opponents, and instead made a strategic commitment to peace. Isaias had already concluded that there was no way he could defeat Ethiopia through direct military action; for that reason, there was no danger of a military confrontation even if UNMEE departed. There will be no war, even by accident, Meles assured the Charge. Isaias would eventually realize that indirect military action through proxies would not work either. Until he did, there was no technical means of solving this basic problem, the PM said. The current EEBC process would have been a useful ladder for Isaias to climb down, but the time was not right. To push the process beyond its limits would simply create more problems. In fact, Meles said, the real ladder for climbing down would always be the influence and engagement of the USG. The Eritrean leader would reach for it when he was ready. It was already clear, Meles added, that "the USG will not do Isaias' police work for him." For that reason, the PM said, continuing USG contact with Asmara was essential even if the current diplomatic process broke down. At the same time, the USG should simply ignore Eritrean outbursts such as the recent media attacks against DAS Yamamoto. -------------- -------------- SOMALIA: ICU ATTACKS ON BAIDOA OR TFG WOULD TRIGGER ENDF RESPONSE -------------- -------------- ¶7. (S) When Charge asked about Meles' view of developments in Somalia, the PM replied that the GOE did not plan to take "precipitous action." At the same time, "if Baidoa was threatened, we will act." The GOE would not make this threat public, he said, and didn't expect that the ICU would move against Baidoa. The PM added that his government did not want to go into Baidoa because it had too many other things to do. (NOTE: In a subsequent phone conversation with Charge on June 14, Meles clarified that ICU moves against the border town of Belet Weyne would also trigger a military response from the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF). The GOE was not eager to fight Somali technicals in the desert and knew that there would be political consequences for Ethiopia if it engaged militarily, but the ENDF would do what it had to do to prevent ICU "expansion." END NOTE.) ¶8. (S) Meles told the Charge and Adm. Hunt in their meeting on June 13 that the best approach to Somalia in the long run would be to lift the arms embargo and allow IGAD members like Rwanda to strengthen the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). As things were, the ICU was receiving support from Eritrea while regional partners could not build the capacity of the TFG. Meles added that it would be too obvious for the GOE to smuggle weapons to the TFG; a UNSC decision to lift the arms embargo would be necessary. When Charge noted that at least one major regional country opposed lifting the arms embargo, Meles replied that maintaining this strategy would ultimately draw the USG into Mogadishu, and Ethiopia as well. Worse still, such an intervention would have to proceed "without the TFG" (NOTE: Meles' implication was that the TFG would be defeated by the ICU in the interim. END NOTE.) At the moment, the "fundamentalists" had money to buy the services of the technicals, which was making all the difference. The TFG could also buy the loyalty of the technicals is they had financial support. ¶9. (S) Another central element of Meles' view was that the ICU would likely splinter if bottled up in Mogadishu. For that reason it was essential to key them from moving into "expansion mode." The GOE's approach, therefore, was not to seek the ICU's elimination, but rather prevent them from gathering steam if they approached the Ethiopian Somali region or sought to eliminate the TFG. -------------- CJTF-HOA: GOE STILL COMMITTED TO PARTNERSHIP -------------- ¶10. (C) Adm. Hunt explained to PM Meles his vision for CJTF-HOA's continuing operations in the Horn, which included a stronger emphasis on counter-terrorism training, closer cooperation between the ENDF and HOA and a stronger maritime component to battle illegal activities in the Gulf of Aden ADDIS ABAB 00001634 003 OF 003 and along the East African coast. Hunt emphasized that Ethiopia was the main focus of his mission and that he hoped to build long-term, solid relationships here. He also wanted to continue the work that had begun recently to partner with USAID, Embassy Addis and civilian GOE officials to make HOA civil affairs projects more sustainable. For instance, HOA was bringing U.S. expertise to bear on better utilizing underground water resources in the parched Somali region and sharing what it learned with Ethiopian authorities. ¶11. (C) Hunt asked for the PM's assistance in working around recent restrictions imposed by ENDF Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Samora on HOA operations. In particular, he hoped to avoid a complete pull-out of HOA's operations in Gode. He also hoped to usefully employ a new contingent of civil engineers in areas which would not interfere in ENDF operations in the Ogaden. Hunt indicated that HOA had already pulled out of Jijiga and would soon pull out of Kebri Dehar. ¶12. (C) PM Meles replied that HOA's civil affairs work in the past had been very positive. Training had also been valuable. The GOE remained eager to expand these activities. Civil affairs had been useful in changing people's attitudes. Meles also welcomed Hunt's increased focus on maritime operations, and noted that these efforts would complement Ethiopia's desire to make better use of Somaliland's Berbera port. He was particularly interested in hydrological work in the Ogaden, which could help overcome technical and financial limitations in the GOE's own work in this area. ¶13. (C) Meles shared USG concerns about extremist elements entering the region through Somaliland, Puntland and other areas of Somalia. He explained that the GOE's approach to the region had included an effort to reach out to Somali region elders to assist in resolving the conflict with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). The ONLF had not been receptive, but the GOE had noted a positive shift in attitudes among the ethnic Somali Diaspora. In the absence of negotiations with the ONLF, the GOE's approach was now to drive the ONLF underground to open up space for more constructive politics in the region. The GOE was planning a major conference in July to bring together elders, regional officials and others to consolidate this approach. In the meantime, coming period represented the best time to operate militarily against the ONLF and the ENDF intended to pursue its campaign vigorously. ¶14. (C) The GOE's operations the Ogaden put a great deal of pressure on LTG Samora, Meles told Hunt and the Charge. U.S. lives could be at risk if HOA personnel found themselves in the middle of the combat zone. Tensions in the area would rise as military operations intensified. In addition, the GOE wanted the local population to understand that ongoing efforts were a purely Ethiopian affair, without the involvement of the USG. For these reasons, LTG. Samora and others were less comfortable with HOA operations in Ogaden recently. Meles indicated that he wanted HOA to work with LTG. Samora to identify areas outside the theater of ENDF operations where HOA could continue its civil affairs work and training. The PM said that the area around Hurso, where training was already taking place, would be suitable for civil affairs projects. The Shinale and East Hararge Zones might also offer opportunities, along with some areas of the Wabe Shebelle Valley. The PM did not give a definite response on a HOA "care-taker" unit for Gode, saying that he would have to raise the issue with LTG. Samora, since he did not want to tie the latter's hands. He did undertake to intercede with Samora on HOA's behalf, however. HUDDLESTON