ETHIOPIA: UN U/S GENERAL GUEHENNO LAYS OUT NEXT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001566 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AF/E. LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS. E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL KPKO MARR SU AU SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: UN U/S GENERAL GUEHENNO LAYS OUT NEXT STEPS FOR AMIS TO UN OPERATION TRANSITION ¶1. (SBU) Summary: United Nations Undersecretary General Jean-Marie Guehenno met with the Charge and Admiral Hunt June 7 to review the AMIS to UN transition efforts and his views of next steps. By the time he returned to Khartoum, he hoped that he would be able to gain greater clarity on the mandate and agreement about the nature of the transition. He believed that the best case scenario for the transition from AMIS to UN is January 2007. Guehenno worried that the biggest challenge now was the interim period. Guehenno noted that much was expected of the US politically as it was the real catalyst in getting the agreement and now the US and others need to keep the political momentum going. Guehenno said that to overcome misperceptions of a UN "invasion" he and the UNSC -- also visiting the AU -- must work with Sudan to create a foundation of cooperation at all levels. The message that Guehenno wanted us to take home was the same one we received from the President of the UNSC, AMIS must not fail in the next six months and to avoid that we must find ways to enhance its performance and capacity. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) On the eve of the joint UN-AU trip to Sudan and Chad, Charge Huddleston, accompanied by the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) Rear Admiral Richard Hunt and poloff, met June 7 with United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Undersecretary General Jean-Marie Guehenno, DPKO Africa Division Director Dmitriy Titov, DPKO Africa Division Senior Political Affairs Officer Michael Gaouette, Head of the UN Assistance Cell to the AU Major General Henry Anyidoho, and Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) Azouz Ennifar. ¶3. (SBU) Guehenno's itinerary for the remainder of the UN visit includes travel to Khartoum, Darfur, southern Sudan, and Chad. FOUNDATION OF COOPERATION -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Undersecretary General Guehenno told the Charge June 7 that his primary mission over the next three to four weeks was to "educate" the Sudanese on the strategic value of a UN operation, begin building cooperation at all levels of the GOSS necessary for a successful transition, and lay the �A;foundation for negotiating the required changes associated with the operation. Guehenno emphasized that the UN operation would be significantly different than the AMIS operation and his intention was to send a "message of strength." In Guehenno's view, the transition should be clear cut rather than a gradual transition. There must be a clear change in the way the force is used, if public perceptions are to be changed, he said. Utilizing the same command and overall structure would dent the UN mission's credibility. Guehenno said the UN mission should start from the top of the mountain not by climbing up. He indicated the UN operation would require a more robust force with a largely, though not entirely, African composition. Guehenno said certain operational activities, such as night patrols, currently forbidden by the GOSS will need to be revisited. The Undersecretary said that an ultimate solution to the Darfur crisis may include "blood money," compensation to all involved parties. AMIS IN "STATE OF DESPAIR" -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Guehenno pointed out little support had been given to AMIS since the decision was made to transition to a UN mission. He added that the partners had provided little or no support in the past few months and allowance had not been paid. Guehenno contended that AMIS must be strengthened over the next six months to ensure any measure of success. He also said AMIS's success will determine the UN mission's success. Major General Anyidoho warned that lack of funds to pay salaries, weapons, gear and other equipment had led to a "state of despair" at AMIS and without assistance a deteriorating situation will be "dropped in the lap" of the UN. Anyidoho said African countries were not in a position to offer assistance and AMIS would need to rely on the UN, United States, Canada, and other countries. ¶6. (SBU) Guehenno agreed that AMIS must not be allowed to ADDIS ABAB 00001566 002 OF 002 fail prior to the UN handover and said the UN Secretary General was looking for a solution that was not just limited to troops as there were weaknesses in the area of command and control. He said even if the troops were ready -- the South Africans have already indicated a readiness to deploy -- there would be no facilities to house them. The Undersecretary noted that given the circumstances perhaps the smart option was to enhance the capacity of AMIS with targeted assistance that will improve its performance. Guehenno mentioned that setting up the Joint Operation Center (JOC) and/or UN personnel to shadow the AMIS personnel to learn and to reinforce their capacity would be two possibilities. Admiral Hunt indicated that the USG would like to provide the J2 and J9 to the JOC and that the EUCOM mission now in Addis might be able to also assist in this endeavor. He also stated that NATO is looking at 300-400 troops to assist the UN Mission. USG ROLE -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Guehenno said that security for UN personnel -- given the Al Qaida threat -- was a serious matter that they will need help on. Any intelligence of long or short term nature from the USG on this would be appreciated. General Anyidoho said that in his view there were two sets of issues for the US military, namely what to do now with AMIS and what to do in the future with the UN. In his opinion, the US could be most useful in providing intelligence and mobility - air forces. HUDDLESTON