C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 001542

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO AU SU
SUBJECT: AFRICAN UNION'S KONARE AND DJINNIT ON CHAD AND
DARFUR


Classified By: Classified By: DCM Janet Wilgus for reasons 4 (b) and (d
).


1. (C) African Union Chairperson Konare told U.S. Ambassador
to Chad Marc Wall, accompanied by Charge, AF/E Office
Director Reddick and DCM (notetaker) in a meeting May 26 that
the problem in Chad is bad governance, exacerbated by the
Darfur conflict. According to Konare, Sudanese President
Bashir needs to uphold his commitments under the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) which would then take pressure off President
Deby and allow him to have the internal political dialogue
that is necessary to resolve clan issues. Otherwise, Konare
said, there is risk of civil war in Chad and that Deby could
be assassinated, which would plunge the central Africa region
into violent turmoil and set off repercussions across the
continent of Africa and deepen any latent Black African-Arab
African rifts. (Konare said that he has warned Deby of this
risk.) Konare emphasized that the needed political solution
in Chad would be possible only after the Darfur situation is
improved with the implementation of the DPA. Therefore, the
AU, at the heads of state level, and others in the
international community must work with Deby to give him an
incentive for internal political dialogue.


2. (C) Implementation of the DPA is critical, Konare said.
Power-sharing must be seen to be working, and those who upset
implementation must be sanctioned. The AU would like to see
a Darfur-Darfur dialogue, coupled with increased humanitarian
aid. A statesman is needed to provide leadership for this
process, ideally a Sudanese, Konare said, but it could also
be an African of stature from another country. The immediate
goal is ceasefire and the commencement of political and
humanitarian work.


3. (C) On NATO support for AMIS during the transition to a
UN mission, Konare stated that logistic support is welcome,
but troops are not. He directed that a letter from him to
NATO be immediately drafted to convey this message "and
remove all doubt."


4. (C) On May 28, as the suggestion of Chairperson Konare,
Ambassador Wall, DAS Yamamoto and DCM (notetaker) met with
Peace and Security Commissioner Djinnit who expressed concern
that the internal political dynamics of Chad could undermine
the DPA. DAS Yamamoto stated that in his upcoming visit to
Chad he would be pressing Deby to open the political process
and that developing the elements and principles of such a
strategy should include coordination with the AU, EU and
France. Djinnit welcomed the opportunity to stay coordinated
with the U.S. on Chad.


5. (C) On implementing the DPA, Djinnit said that Sudan is
now eager to have the joint UN-AU assessment mission (which
Djinnit will join). He requested that U.S. assistance be
coordinated with that of other partners. He also said that
the AU is trying to identify a mechanism to associate to the
DPA those rebel groups which now want to be part of it. This
would not be a signing but some other way to acknowledge
their participation. Djinnit said that such a mechanism
should be discussed with the partners that
helped negotiate the DPA. He also emphasized that firm
measures must be taken against those who have not signed or
associated themselves with the DPA and also against any who
impede the DPA implementation.


6. (U) Ambassador Wall and DAS Yamamoto have cleared this
cable.
HUDDLESTON