AFRICAN UNION'S KONARE AND DJINNIT ON CHAD AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 001542 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO AU SU SUBJECT: AFRICAN UNION'S KONARE AND DJINNIT ON CHAD AND DARFUR Classified By: Classified By: DCM Janet Wilgus for reasons 4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) African Union Chairperson Konare told U.S. Ambassador to Chad Marc Wall, accompanied by Charge, AF/E Office Director Reddick and DCM (notetaker) in a meeting May 26 that the problem in Chad is bad governance, exacerbated by the Darfur conflict. According to Konare, Sudanese President Bashir needs to uphold his commitments under the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) which would then take pressure off President Deby and allow him to have the internal political dialogue that is necessary to resolve clan issues. Otherwise, Konare said, there is risk of civil war in Chad and that Deby could be assassinated, which would plunge the central Africa region into violent turmoil and set off repercussions across the continent of Africa and deepen any latent Black African-Arab African rifts. (Konare said that he has warned Deby of this risk.) Konare emphasized that the needed political solution in Chad would be possible only after the Darfur situation is improved with the implementation of the DPA. Therefore, the AU, at the heads of state level, and others in the international community must work with Deby to give him an incentive for internal political dialogue. ¶2. (C) Implementation of the DPA is critical, Konare said. Power-sharing must be seen to be working, and those who upset implementation must be sanctioned. The AU would like to see a Darfur-Darfur dialogue, coupled with increased humanitarian aid. A statesman is needed to provide leadership for this process, ideally a Sudanese, Konare said, but it could also be an African of stature from another country. The immediate goal is ceasefire and the commencement of political and humanitarian work. ¶3. (C) On NATO support for AMIS during the transition to a UN mission, Konare stated that logistic support is welcome, but troops are not. He directed that a letter from him to NATO be immediately drafted to convey this message "and remove all doubt." ¶4. (C) On May 28, as the suggestion of Chairperson Konare, Ambassador Wall, DAS Yamamoto and DCM (notetaker) met with Peace and Security Commissioner Djinnit who expressed concern that the internal political dynamics of Chad could undermine the DPA. DAS Yamamoto stated that in his upcoming visit to Chad he would be pressing Deby to open the political process and that developing the elements and principles of such a strategy should include coordination with the AU, EU and France. Djinnit welcomed the opportunity to stay coordinated with the U.S. on Chad. ¶5. (C) On implementing the DPA, Djinnit said that Sudan is now eager to have the joint UN-AU assessment mission (which Djinnit will join). He requested that U.S. assistance be coordinated with that of other partners. He also said that the AU is trying to identify a mechanism to associate to the DPA those rebel groups which now want to be part of it. This would not be a signing but some other way to acknowledge their participation. Djinnit said that such a mechanism should be discussed with the partners that helped negotiate the DPA. He also emphasized that firm measures must be taken against those who have not signed or associated themselves with the DPA and also against any who impede the DPA implementation. ¶6. (U) Ambassador Wall and DAS Yamamoto have cleared this cable. HUDDLESTON