ETHIOPIA: MELES REACHING OUT TO SOME INTERNAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001042 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER BUJUMBURA FOR DAS YAMAMOTO E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2016 TAGS: PREL PHUM ASEC MARR ET SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: MELES REACHING OUT TO SOME INTERNAL OPPONENTS Classified By: CDA Vicki Huddleston ¶1. (C) Summary: The Charge pressed PM Meles again to release on bail at least some of those facing treason charges in connection with November riots. While the PM offered no concessions now, he reaffirmed that after the trial had been completed, political options were available. Meles also promised to be flexible in facilitating a takeover of Addis Ababa by CUD council members-elect. He also agreed to a flexible formula for resolving legal questions concerning the allocation of committee seats and debate time for parties in Parliament. The PM also highlighted the GOE's ongoing overture to the insurgents in the Ogaden region. The Charge encouraged this last effort, which would make it easier for CJTF-HOA to conduct its civil affairs projects in the region. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Charge called on Prime Minister Meles Zenawi April 17 to discuss a number of issues. Discussion of ongoing diplomatic efforts on the border dispute with Eritrea are reported via septel. This message deals with internal Ethiopian politics. Personal assistance Amb. Gebretensai accompanied the Prime Minister, while Pol/Econ Counselor joined the Charge. -------------- -------------- GOE Facilitating City Council and Parliamentary Representation -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) PM Meles told the Charge that the GOE would continue to show maximum flexibility in allowing Addis City Council members elected under the CUD banner to achieve quorum for taking over administration of the capital. (Note: the National Electoral Board notified the City Council Organizing Committee April 18 that it could have one more week to verify the signatures on the petition it had submitted to form a government. The group appeared to be one or two members short of the 69 needed for quorum as of April 18. End note.) ¶4. (C) The PM also accepted an informal solution tentatively worked out by Charge Huddleston and other Western diplomats to allocate both committee seats and debate time amongst various parties in Parliament caught up in legal ambiguities. Under the arrangement, Lidetu Ayalew's UEDP-Medhin party would insist on receiving debate time based on all the MPs (41) it had elected as part of the CUD coalition in May 2005, but would demand representation in standing committees based only on the 21 MPs that currently remained loyal to Lidetu. For its part, the CUDP delegation in Parliament, under Chief Whip Temesgen Zewde, would cede debate time to UEDP-Medhin in return for Lidetu's commitment not to legally contest the migration of Temesgen and other former UEDP-Medhin members to the new CUDP. The CUDP would receive committee seats based on its actual number of MPs (roughly 65) as well as recognition as the largest opposition party in the chamber. On another front, Tolosa Tesfaye, the head of the legally-recognized Oromo National Congress (ONC),had agreed to share debate time and committee seats on a pro-rated basis with the group of MPs that remained loyal to former ONC chairman Merera Gudina. -------------- -------------- No Release of CUD Detainees Now, But Post-Trial Options Open -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Charge Huddleston pressed Meles for some forward movement on those detaineed in connection with November 2005 riots. Some progress on this front would reduce the threat of violence in the streets and strengthen the hand of moderate CUDP leaders who were participating in Parliament and City Council in the face of serious threats and harassment from Diaspora hard-liners. She suggested that the GOE consider releasing on bail and/or reducing charges for civil society detainees, for example. She also advocated an early start to the ruling party's planned dialogue with Parliamentary CUDP leaders and more access to state media for the Parliamentary opposition. ¶6. (C) Meles said that while bullying pressure was easy to resist, he regretted that he could not agree to the proposals for releasing detainees made by friends like the Charge and University of Chicago Prof. Donald Levine. He recalled that the most difficult moment for him was having to turn down such requests from his friend (British PM) Tony Blair in South Africa. Nonetheless, Meles said there limits to what he could agree to. Charges against detainees must be consistent with the evidence, and only the court could resolve the cases. To do otherwise would put the GOE and the ADDIS ABAB 00001042 002 OF 002 country on a slippery slope toward lawlessness. There must be no connections between the road to democracy and the road to violence, he added. Meles discounted the possibility of more large-scale unrest in Addis, and said problems in Oromiya had been "quarantined" in schools. At the Charge's insistence, however, the PM reaffirmed that once the trial had been completed and verdicts rendered, "political options would be available." The Charge emphasized the need to begin pulling the country together again. -------------- -- GOE Reaching Out to ONLF Through Ogadeni Elders -------------- -- ¶7. (C) The Charge told the PM that AF DAS Don Yamamoto had met recently in Washington with representatives from the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). The group had indicated its readiness to begin talking with the GOE if self-determination was on the agenda. Yamamoto had discouraged the group from pressing immediately on the issue of self-determination, she added, but the USG was ready to facilitate talks if that would be useful. Meles replied that the GOE had sent a team of Ogadeni elders to both Washington and Europe to approach the ONLF. The proposal they carried was that the GOE was ready to talk with the ONLF outside Ethiopia, perhaps in one of the Gulf states, if the ONLF agreed to accept the Constitution as it currently existed. Some participation of Somali clan leaders would also be welcome. The ONLF had indicated that it did not want elders involved in talks, but Meles wanted the elders as observers, if not facilitators, so that they could also see what the GOE was really offering. If the ONLF opted to pursue violence with the support of the Eritrean government, then at least the elders would have witnessed the process. The Prime Minister added that if ONLF leaders did not agree to pursue peace through negotiations, then the GOE was prepared to engage in a more aggressive military campaign against them. ¶8. (C) Charge Huddleston welcomed the GOE's initiative and pointed out that peace in the Ogaden would make the civil affairs work of CJTF-HOA far easier, and make closer cooperation with the Ethiopian military far less dangerous for U.S. service members. -------------- Comment: Meles Seeking Peace Where He Can -------------- ¶9. (C) Amidst credible charges of heavy-handedness and abuses by the GOE, it is easy to forget that internal opponents like the OLF, ONLF and some elements of the CUD have been openly seeking to overthrow the EPRDF regime through undemocratic -- and sometimes violent -- means. Ethiopia remains a diverse and difficult country to govern. At present, it appears that PM Meles is seeking to make peace with those elements who are willing to compete for power strictly within the confines of (still imperfect) democratic institutions. He is seeking to maintain his grip on the situation here through a mixture of toughness and accommodation that will be efficient and effective internally, as well as acceptable to the international community, especially "friends" like the U.S. and Britain. HUDDLESTON