TURKEY: OPPOSITION IN ADANA HOPING FOR EARLY ELECTION

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADANA 000145 SIPDIS SENSITIVE NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM CASC TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: OPPOSITION IN ADANA HOPING FOR EARLY ELECTION ADANA 00000145 001.3 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In Adana, Turkey's fourth largest city, local opposition leaders are pushing for an early national election to prevent the Justice and Development Party (AKP)-controlled parliament from choosing the next Turkish President. To do so, they hope to stoke fears of an "Islamic threat" to the Republic and to ride the wave of strong nationalism in Adana, rather than offer an alternative program with concrete policy alternatives. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) AmCon Adana poloffs recently held a series of meetings with local opposition party leaders, including the provincial chairmen for the Republican People's Party (CHP),True Path Party (DYP),and Motherland party (Anavatan). The chairman of the local branch of the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP) refused to see us. Adana has historically been a left-leaning province, but that began to change in the mid- and late-1990s. Current Adana mayor Aytac Durak was first elected on the Anavatan ticket in 1999 (Anavatan was ANAP at the time) and later joined the AKP. The more affluent Seyhan district of Adana municipality is in the hands of the AKP as well, although from 1999-2004 it was dominated by CHP. The AKP also runs Yuregir, Adana municipality's poorer quarter. The nearby town of Ceyhan, which is Turkmen-dominated, is an MHP area as well. -------------- -------------- Riding nationalism and "secularism" to early elections? -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In a series of early June meetings, opposition leaders in Adana asserted that Turks see that the AKP is not addressing the country's core problems, like unemployment, and that there is a growing expectation that there will be a national election before November 2007--by which time an election has to be held. In anticipation of an early election, opposition parties in Adana are slowly beginning to map out an election strategy that seeks to capitalize on the high level of nationalism here and on what they claim is a growing public concern regarding the AKP's "Islamic agenda." CHP provincial chairman Serdar Seyhan averred that events in northern Iraq--both the ongoing PKK presence and the perception of growing Kurdish autonomy--are fueling Turkish nationalism, which will redound to CHP's benefit, he claimed. One of Seyhan's aides noted that party chairman Deniz Baykal has opened CHP's doors to voters on the right, because the party administration recognizes that nationalism will be a political force in any upcoming election. Seyhan himself was careful to draw a distinction between what he sees as the MHP's brand of ethnic nationalism and the CHP's Ataturkist (i.e. statist, anti-religious) nationalism, which he asserted is a "positive" version of nationalism. (Comment: In practice, however, there is not much of a distinction. End comment.) ¶4. (SBU) Seyhan also invoked the specter of an AKP plot to overthrow the state and install an Iran-like regime. DYP provincial chairman Nevsat Saskin echoed Seyhan's sentiments in a separate meeting. When challenged to demonstrate how AKP is undertaking to undermine the Turkish Republic, Saskin and a bevy of his comrades claimed that an outsider would not notice any changes but that the AKP is acting in small ways to insert Islam into every aspect of life in Turkey. One DYP official alleged that some municipal services in Adana are being doled out based on whether or not a person prays five times a day. In any case, Saskin argued, DYP supporters are "more pious" and more serious about religion than those who support the AKP, and voters in Adana know this. Saskin also added that unlike the AKP, DYP would have no problems working with the Turkish military. DYP chairman Mehmet Agar, he said, knows the military well and, in fact, "commanded" the General Staff in the 1990s. (Note: Agar has served as national chief of police and Interior Minister. In the 1990s while serving as Minister, Agar was implicated in the infamous 1996 Susurluk scandal that revealed a shadowy nexus among the mafia, politicians, and security forces. The Semdinli incident has awakened fears in the Southeast of a re-emergence of such groups. End note.) ¶5. (SBU) In contrast to the CHP and DYP leaders, the local Anavatan chairman, Necati Erdem, sought to downplay both the rise of nationalism over the last several years and the supposed threat political Islam poses to the Republic. Erdem, who is a former head of the local bar association, said that Anavatan simply seeks to promote individual freedom and a "liberal" economic policy. He claimed that Anavatan and its predecessors have always sought close relations with the United States and will continue to do so. Unlike his DYP and CHP, Erdem asserted, ADANA 00000145 002.3 OF 002 Anavatan is not seeking an early election, because his party is only now beginning to rebound from its historically low performance in opinion polls. By 2007, he claimed, Anavatan will be in position to either lead a government or be a significant coalition partner. -------------- Post-2002 election lessons not learned -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Although the opposition parties were largely trounced in the 2002 election, our meetings revealed that their Adana representatives have yet to learn many lessons from their defeat. It is clear that the opposition hopes to use what it sees as emerging, parallel social forces--nationalism and a public reaction to the AKP's religious leanings--to win back voters, but its leaders in Adana, especially those from the DYP and CHP, speak often, it seems, from the same talking points. There is little to distinguish them. More important, none, except perhaps the Anavatan chairman, outlined a specific party program or a set of alternative policies to the AKP's agenda. ¶7. (SBU) The more religious political parties in Turkey--including the AKP and its predecessors--for years have had effective, highly organized election machines at the grassroots level, which explains in part the AKP's success in both the 2002 national election and 2004 local elections. Based on our meetings, the Adana branches of CHP and DYP appear not to have adopted similar tactics. When prodded for specific activities the parties are undertaking to win back the voters, both the DYP and CHP chairmen spoke only generally of visits to villages and small businessmen. CHP's Seyhan said his party organizes "coffee shop" discussions from time to time, but the effort did not appear to be consistent or organized. Anavatan appeared to be slowly adopting some of the AKP's tactics but may not have the popularity locally to make it work. Anavatan chairman Erdem said his party is dividing Adana province into 200-person districts to which the party hopes to assign four activists. The activists would then visit each person individually to court them on behalf of the party. ¶8. (SBU) All three opposition leaders complained repeatedly about media bias against them, both locally and nationally. They claimed that the owners of the major outlets have business deals with the AKP that lead to bias in news reporting. Anavatan chairman Erdem claimed his local activists go from door to door in Adana trying to get people to tune into party chairman Erkan Mumcu's weekly address to his parliament group--a speech carried only on state-run TRT, according to Erdem. Replying to poloff's assertion that the national media seems to have grown more critical of the AKP recently, DYP's Saskin said the media only criticize the government if the media bosses' material interests are being harmed. -------------- -------------- Comment: Nothing new from Adana opposition parties -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Although we are likely a long way from a true campaign season--local AKP contacts continue to echo PM Erdogan, saying the election will be held November 2007--our recent meetings in Adana reveal opposition parties hoping simply to be "not the AKP." Putting forward solutions for Turkey's lingering social and economic problems is secondary--at best. The atmospherics at all meetings were generally cordial and free of the America-bashing we have seen in the past, probably partially reflecting a widespread belief here that the U.S. can "control" electoral outcomes in Turkey. As opposition leaders continue to push for an early national election, they will look for signs of dissatisfaction with the AKP and may wish to be seen as having the U.S.'s endorsement. REID