IAEA AND IRAN: GHANA'S VIEWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ACCRA 000164 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2016 TAGS: AORC GH KNNP PREL TRGY IAEA SUBJECT: IAEA AND IRAN: GHANA'S VIEWS REF: A) STATE 6236 B) UNVIE VIENNA 45 Classified By: Ambassador Pamela E. Bridgewater for reasons 1.5 d and e . ¶1. (C) On January 19, Ambassador raised ref A points on Iran and the IAEA with Ghanaian Deputy Foreign Minister Awasi Osei-Adjei (the Foreign Minister was out of the country.) The Ambassador mentioned that she had raised the IAEA issue on January 13 with Professor Bekowe, Chairman of the Council of State and Ghana's representative to the IAEA, who promised to forward our concerns to his colleagues in Geneva. ¶2. (C) Osei-Adjei said Ghana had been consistent as the only sub-Saharan African country supporting a resolution against Iran in the IAEA. He had delivered the same message to British, French, German and Israeli Ambassadors who had come to see him in the past week. Ghana wanted to play a consistent, leading role in ensuring the safety of the world. The GOG decided not to abstain on the previous IAEA vote on Iran because this was an important matter of principle. ¶3. (C) The GOG delivered a similar "very emphatic" message to an Iranian delegation which visited Ghana in November/December 2005, Osei-Adjei said. The four-person Iranian delegation included the Energy Committee chairman of Iran's parliament and a nuclear expert. President Kufuor and others in the GOG had told the Iranains that if they comply with the IAEA resolution, Ghana might change its mind. But if they did not comply, Ghana would maintain its consistency in opposing Iran in the IAEA. ¶4. (C) The Deputy Foreign Minister said he was worried by the Iranian visit to Ghana. The Government of Iran clearly wants to build bilateral relations with Ghana and promised hospital facilities and other projects here. Osei-Adjei said the GOG refused the offers because they are worried about the potential Iranian attempt to fuel Islamic fundamentalism in Ghana. The Iranains were frustrated that a fellow member of the Non-Aligned Movement would oppose them in the IAEA. Osei-Adjei asked the Ambassador for USG help in countering Iran's attempts to gain influence with Ghana's Muslim community, such as speeding up approval of a Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) compact and security assistance. The Ambassador expressed the USG's appreciation for Ghana's support in the IAEA. She noted that the MCA compact was moving unimpeded as quickly as possible. ¶5. (U) On January 20, in response to ref b, which we received after the Ambassador's meeting with Osei-Adjei, the Ambassador called Secretary to the President D.K. Osei to urge the GOG to pay its arrears to the IAEA before the February 2 Special BOG meeting on Iran. Also on January 20, PolChief raised ref b points with Osei-Adjei and Econ Chief raised the issue with Chairman of the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission Bekoe. Osei-Adjei said he understood the urgency and would call Geneva about it. Bekoe said he was already working on the arrears issue and hoped to have payment by January 23. We will follow up with all of them. ¶6. (C) Comment: In the meeting with Osei-Adjei, he told the Ambassador about the Iranian visit after he asked his staff to leave the room. His concerns mirror ours about Iran's attempts to gain influence in Ghana. He was clearly trying to leverage the GOG's IAEA support for more bilateral assistance of some form. When asked if he knew of any specific terrorism threats in Ghana, he said no, but said that there were some radical elements who had support from former President Rawlings and the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) party, a "very dangerous" development. We have no information to link the NDC or Rawlings to radical Islamic elements but this is not the first time senior GOG officials (including the President) have made this argument with us. Osei-Adjei said the GOG (especially the Vice President) was reaching out to Muslims but could do better Public Relations work to communicate its efforts. The GOG's firm stance on Iran in the IAEA seems influenced not only by a desire to win favor in Washington and Europe, but also to contain Iran's possible influence on Ghana's Muslims. End comment. BRIDGEWATER