DARFUR PEACE TALKS: TAHA OPTIMISTIC, MEDIATION

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000772 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, D, INR, DRL, PRM E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE TALKS: TAHA OPTIMISTIC, MEDIATION MISSTEPS REF: ABUJA 758 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Sudanese Vice President Taha remains hopeful that a comprehensive peace deal can be reached within weeks. Taha and top SPLM leaders continue bilateral meetings with the movements in order to develop clear proposals on the way forward. Taha expressed his desire for the AU to put forward the entire peace deal soon. The talks experienced a temporary setback on April 11 when the AU tried to narrow differences on the cease-fire document at the same time it began consultations on the final security arrangements. USDEL and international partners are working with the parties and mediation to get the security arrangements discussions back on track. End Summary. - - - - - - - TAHA MEETING - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Taha received USDEL on April 10. He was hopeful that an agreement could be reached within two weeks and said he encouraged the mediation to put forward a comprehensive document. Taha described his meeting with Sudan Liberation Movement faction leader Minni Minnawi as "positive". Taha also met with Abdelwahid Nur later that day. He expects to meet with Justice and Equality Movement. After he completes his meetings with the parties, Taha said his team will make an assessment and make clear proposals. He indicated some GOS flexibility. Taha thanked the US Government for its overall engagement and praised USDEL for its efforts in Abuja that created momentum in the process. Sudanese delegation leader Magzoub al-Kalifa described USDEL's persuasion of the movements to map their locations as the key impetus in moving the security discussions forward. He also said that USDEL remains a critical player in obtaining an final agreement. Taha is set to depart on April 13. ¶3. (SBU) Khartoum CDA Hume told Taha that USDEL will continue to push for a balanced, comprehensive package from the AU mediation. Once the package is introduced, USDEL will support negotiated changes only as long as a fair balance on key issues is maintained. Taha appreciated USDEL willingness to work with all parties to encourage trade-offs and flexibility and continued pressure on AU mediation for a final document. - - - - - - - AU MEDIATION - - - - - - - ¶4. (SBU) AU Special Envoy Salim Salim is staying in Abuja until VP Taha leaves. In a meeting with USDEL and Special Representative Ranneberger on April 9, Salim said that he would reschedule a trip to New York to brief the UNSC. In the meantime, Salim is encouraging bilateral discussions between the movements and Taha. The AU intends on narrowing the "gaps" on some issues before presenting the comprehensive peace deal, according to Salim. The AU is starting discussions on the final security arrangements document and getting the parties' final views on the cease-fire document. Salim said that if the parties balk at the cease-fire document, the AU will put the rest of the security arrangements (DDR, integration) forward. Amb. Ranneberger expressed our desire to see the comprehensive deal on the table as soon as possible. According to Salim, Taha had encouraged him to do the same thing. On the UN transition, Salim said that AU President Sassou-Nguesso is supportive an AMIS-UN transition and that the preponderant view among African countries is that the UN re-hatting is necessary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - MIXED SIGNALS SCUTTLE SECURITY MEETINGS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (SBU) On April 11, the AU proceeded in its attempt to "narrow differences" on the cease-fire document while simultaneously carrying out discussions on the final security arrangements. Their clumsy efforts created significant confusion and mistrust throughout the day. In two plenary meetings, the AU's lack of clarity as to the purpose of the meetings led to embarrassing situations for the GOS and the movements. In the morning, the AU called a meeting with the GOS. The GOS arrived to discuss the cease-fire document only to be told by the AU mediation that the purpose of the meeting was to get the GOS's thoughts on final security arrangements. After a brief delay, the GOS's delegation head ABUJA 00000772 002 OF 002 Gen. Esmat made the best of the meeting but he expressed his delegation's frustration with the AU's performance. He accused the AU of trying to embarrass the GOS delegation while their Vice President was in town. After the meeting, Khartoum CDA Hume explained to Esmat what the AU was trying to achieve. ¶6. (SBU) The AU then conducted separate, private bilateral meetings with the movements on the final security arrangements. In the evening, the AU held a plenary with all the parties and partners on the cease-fire document. The parties had told the partners and mediation that they needed to have the final security arrangements text prior to concluding work on the cease-fire document. International partners were led to believe that the meeting would register the parties' positions on the cease-fire draft, which would then allow the AU to immediately put the final security arrangements text on the table. AU Chief Mediator Sam Ibok, however, unexpectedly proceeded to try to narrow differences on the document. He asked the parties to express their concerns with the cease-fire document, which led the GOS delegation into a page-by-page discussion of the text. ¶7. (SBU) In his reaction to the GOS presentation, SLM's security arrangements chief negotiator, Ali Trai, asked the mediation for more time to prepare. The movements had received mixed signals throughout the day on the purpose of the meeting. According to Trai, they came to the meeting to say that they would not accept the cease-fire document without knowing the future status of their forces. Ibok then chastised the movements publicly, which created a significant level of anger, embarrassment, and distrust of the AU mediation. USDEL members spoke with Ali immediately after the meeting to help smooth unnecessarily ruffled feathers. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶7. (SBU) The process can overcome yesterday's brief setback brought on by the AU's own miscalculation of the parties positions, failure to take its own experts' advice, and deeply-ingrained sense of caution. We will encourage the mediation to get the final security arrangements document to the parties rather than discuss the cease-fire document. Taha and top level SPLM members are continuing their bilateral discussions with the movements. We will continue working with the parties to rebuild their trust in the mediators and pushing the mediation to move the comprehensive document forward. CAMPBELL