DARFUR NEGOTIATIONS: MAIN ISSUES IN SECURITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000677 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, D, DRL, INR E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PROV PREL NI SU SUBJECT: DARFUR NEGOTIATIONS: MAIN ISSUES IN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TEXT REF: ABUJA 676 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Many hours of discussion with the mediation team and with the parties have identified five key issues that will have to be resolved: how the ceasefire commission will make decisions; how different geographic areas will be defined and managed; provisions for the exercise of the policing function; the regime for control of the international border; and, provisions for arms control, demobilization, and integration of forces. The mediation team has prepared a revised 25 page text for presentation to the parties. USDEL has urged the AU mediators to present this text and a revised text on power-sharing as soon as possible. SEPTEL reports on other activity. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION DECISION-MAKING - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) How the ceasefire commission will make decisions: The current "ceasefire" is frequently violated by all parties, with no significant action taken by the ceasefire commission. The parties agree that the commission can act on the basis of consensus; they reject the idea that in the absence of consensus the commission chairman (AU force commander) can take a decision. The mediation is considering a proposal that, in the absence of consensus, a troika (AU, EU and U.S.) could take a decision. No discussion has taken place whether the commission might operate differently after the transition from AU to UN forces in Darfur. - - - - - - - - - - - - GEOGRAPHIC DEFINITIONS - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. How different geographic areas will be defined and managed: The present text has provisions that refer to: zones of de facto control (where a specified party now has a military position); exclusion zones (where, after regrouping and consolidation of forces, one of the parties is recognized as being in control and the other parties excluded); IDP camps (where a humanitarian agency is the camp manager); buffer zones from which the parties are excluded (areas surrounding IDP camps and areas to separate the parties' zones of control/exclusion zones); and, humanitarian routes (to a limited number of IDP camps). Gradually the parties are seeing that the present definitions are unworkable, and the mediation plans to use 
the map work to generate usable definitions and plans. A key issue is deciding who is responsible for security in buffer zones and along humanitarian routes; another is recognizing the obligation, under international humanitarian law, for safe access for all humanitarian activities (not just those along humanitarian routes) to be respected. - - - - - - - - - - POLICING FUNCTIONS - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. Provisions for exercise of the policing function: The present draft states that AMIS police monitors will patrol all IDP camps (about 100) and provide for their perimeter security in the buffer zones, plus perform the police function in other buffer zones. To perform these tasks adequately 24/7 at all locations would require a large police force. AMIS does not have sufficient police to perform these tasks, and the government will probably object to AMIS police having arrest powers (as opposed to monitoring arrests by government police). Another issue is the movements' assertion that they have their own "police"; the government has rejected this assertion. - - - - - - - - BORDER CONTROL - - - - - - - - ¶5. Regime for control of the international border: Both sides regularly violate international law by taking arms and supplies across the Chad-Sudanese border and by allowing various rebel groups to enjoy safe-havens on the opposite side of the border. The recently signed Tripoli Agreement promises an end to this activity, but it lacks any practical implementation mechanism (only ten observation posts to cover the border from Libya to Central African Republic). The current draft text repeats the absolute obligation of the parties not to allow arms, materiel, and fighters to cross the border, but both sides privately admit that they expect such activity to continue. Current UN thinking is to ABUJA 00000677 002 OF 002 use two 500 troop battalions to control the border, a task that could only be performed with the assistance of aerial surveillance. In addition the parties and mediators have not yet come to grips with the challenge of zones of de facto control and zones of exclusion controlled by the movements that abut the international border (as will most likely be the case for the northern part of the border with Chad and the border with Libya). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ARMS CONTROL, DEMOBILIZATION, INTEGRATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) Arms Control, demobilization, and integration of forces: These issues are located in the "bridging section" of the current draft for an "Enhanced Humanitarian Ceasefire." The government has stated that it wants a "permanent ceasefire" that addresses these issues; and, some movement spokesmen have said they want these issues resolved before they sign a new ceasefire text. Work on the mapping of forces has moved the parties in this direction. During the course of this week USDEL will work with the mediation to open discussion of these issues, especially the need to make provision for disarmament of janjaweed and tribal militias. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶7. (SBU) For the first time the parties are entering into serious discussion of all security issues. The mediation, depleted by departure of several of its military experts, needs constant encouragement to take advantage of this opportunity. End comment. CAMPBELL