PRESIDENTIAL AIDE ASSURES ON DELTA CRISIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000494

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2012
TAGS: EPET PREL PGOV KFLU PTER NI
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL AIDE ASSURES ON DELTA CRISIS


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN Campbel For Reasons 1.4 A, B and D


1. (C) Summary: Presidential spokesman Femi Fani-Kayode met
with Ambassador on February 28 to deliver a message from the
President that the USG could be assured the hostages would be
released unharmed, after which the GON intended to address
the underlying socio-economic problems in the Niger Delta,
while also beefing up security in the region to ensure no
further incidents. The Ambassador said in addition to the
Delta, the U.S was concerned about sectarian violence, the
lack of preparation for elections, and the Avian Influenza
epidemic. Kayode said sectarian violence was being
deliberately stirred up for political purposes, and those
doing it would either give up or be stopped. On AI, the
President was personally engaged and the GON was doing its
best given limited resources. While saying the President had
not made up his mind, Kayode strongly defended a third term,
saying no other leader could maintain Nigeria's stability.
End Summary.

Assurances on the Delta
--------------


2. (SBU) On February 28, Special Advisor on Public Affairs
Femi Fani-Kayode met with the Ambassador to deliver a message
from the President regarding the hostage crisis in the Niger
Delta. He said that we could be certain no one would be
killed and the hostages would be released unharmed. The GON
was doing everything possible to assure their immediate
release. The military could have stormed the place, but
decided not to risk casualties. He said the Hostages should
be released within 24 hours. He then asked if we had heard
that before, and the Ambassador said we had. Kayode, said
this time it was said with "great confidence." Once the
immediate crisis was resolved, the real issue was what to do
in the Delta. The President had decided to put in place
social and economic remedies to address the underlying causes
of what was criminal activity. He also would put in place the
security machinery to prevent another hostage crisis.


3. (C) The Ambassador asked whether this would be where the
UK security services company Saladin came in. The response
was that Saladin, or others, would have at most an advisory
role. Time would be needed to allow the socio-economic
measures to take root, but security would need to be beefed
up at the same time. Recommendations were before the National
Security Advisor Aliyu, the Chief of Defense Staff Ogumudia
and the Director General of State Security Services Kayode
Are. In fact, steps had already been taken to improve
security, and without them the situation could have been
worse. There would be no kid glove treatment, since the
militia were using the economic problems of the region as an
excuse for criminal behavior. The Ambassador noted the
political goals, but Kayode dismissed this as further gloss
to give the militias respectability. All they wanted, he
claimed, was to be left in peace to carry out lucrative oil
theft. Whether criminal or political, however, the GON would
address the problem. Kayode welcomed any U.S. advice or
assistance in this area, noting that U.S. vital interests
were of paramount importance to the GON. The Ambassador
noted that if Nigeria hoped to meet its goal of 4 million bpd
of oil production additional investment must be attracted to
the Delta.

Other Concerns
--------------


5. (C) Kayode asked whether the U.S. was satisfied with the
situation in Nigeria aside from the Delta crisis. The
Ambassador said there were several concerns including
sectarian violence, the lack of preparation for elections,
including slow movement on key legislation and no release of
funds to the election commission, and Avian Influenza.
Kayode agreed that sectarian violence was a real concern.
People were taking advantage of existing tensions to foment
unrest for political reasons. The government knew who was
behind it and why, but felt it was on top of the situation.
Those funding demonstrations would see that they were failing
and give up. If not, the GON would "take them out," it would
not allow a blood bath. Only President Obasanjo, he opined,
could manage the current tensions in Nigeria.


6. (U) On AI, Kayode noted the President was personally
involved and being briefed daily, and the GON was doing the

ABUJA 00000494 002 OF 002


best it could given its limited resources. The Ambassador
said we had noticed that and it was rare to see such high
level involvement but that the USG was concerned about
surveillance and spotting human cases, and is working with
the GON and WHO to help with this. We were also concerned
about the economic and nutritional impact. Kayode agreed
this needed more attention.

Third Term
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador noted the U.S supported term limits,
and believed it opened the political process and promoted
democracy. President Obasanjo had relinquished office in the
1970s and had a chance to repeat the act and go down in
Nigeria history, much like President Washington who declined
a third term, though many pressed him to stay on. Kayode
countered by citing Roosevelt who stayed for a third term
when the country faced critical challenges. Climbing on a
soap box, he said it would not be right to deny Nigerians the
right to write their own constitution. If the National
Assembly, elected by the people, wanted to amend the
constitution they must consider it. If in that case the
President chose to run again, those who opposed a third term
could support another candidate. It was a rigorous
process*both the national assembly and two thirds of states
must approve an amendment. It could not be accomplished with
bribery; the President would never bribe anyone, anyway. Then
it would all be up to the elections.


8. (SBU) The DCM noted that Roosevelt's third term, in fact
led the U.S. to amend the constitution to prohibit it. Kayode
then gave a list of leaders, Lee in Singapore, Mathahir in
Malaysia, and Ataturk in Turkey, who remained in power to the
great benefit of their countries. Obasanjo had a duty to
remain, especially as he was completely selfless and
completely honest. No one who opposed him alleged he was
corrupt, but were just annoyed that he did not open the
treasury to them.


9. (C) Comment: Kayode's comment about strengthening
security in the Delta hints that a military solution is in
the making. Regarding the aftermath, despite the rhetoric
and increased concern, it appears the GON is more interested
in tinkering at the margins of the economic and social
problems in the Delta, rather than addressing the root causes
of its problems. Unwilling to acknowledge a real political
element to the current dissent, the government appears to
prefer the carrot and stick combination of a few economic
concessions and an increased security presence, hoping to
keep the Delta in a low simmer and maintain the status quo.


10. (C) While we agree that the sectarian violence has a
strong political element, where Kayode sees only political
manipulations we believe it reflects genuine popular
unhappiness with a third term. We doubt it will just go
away, which raises the uncomfortable specter of Kayode's
threat that those "behind it" will be "taken out." If the
line in the Villa is that only Obasanjo can contain the
seething tensions in Nigeria, then unrest may only bolster
the determination and self-justification for a third term.
Campbell

CAMPBELL