(C) NIGERIA: CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF ON THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 003188

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE - PASS TO POLAND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/15
TAGS: PREL PGOV NI
SUBJECT: (C) NIGERIA: CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF ON THE
SPECTER OF CIVIL WAR IN THE DELTA, ILLEGAL ARMS FLOWS,
AND U.S./NIGERIA MILITARY TO MILITARY RELATIONS

Classified by: Ambassador John Campbell for reasons 15
B, D


1. (C) Summary: Gen. Martin Luther Agwai, Chief of
Defense Staff and the most senior military official in
Nigeria, acknowledges the danger that the current
Delta crisis will evolve into civil war, acknowledges
that many of the illegal arms in the Delta come from
military armories, and, while affirming that
U.S./Nigeria military to military relations are at
present good, stated that previous U.S. suspension of
training and other forms of assistance has resulted in
skepticism about our reliability as a partner among a
generation of Nigerian military officers younger than
himself and unfamiliar with the U.S. There was a
brief, inconclusive discussion about the upcoming Gulf
of Guinea security meetings in London at the end of
November. EUCOMQs Gen. Ward invited Gen. Agwai to
visit Stuttgart, and Gen. Agwai accepted in principle.
End summary.


2. (C) EUCOMQs Gen. William (QKipQ) Ward called on
Nigerian Chief of Defense Staff Martin Luther Agwai on
November 23 with his accompanying party. After
pleasantries, Gen. Agwai asked to meet privately with
the General, DOD DAS Teresa Whelan and the Ambassador.
No one else was present, save a Nigerian note taker.
This private meeting lasted more than one hour. Gen.
Agwai effusively expressed his admiration for the
United States and recalled with affection and pleasure
his many training opportunities with the U.S.
military. NB: his wife, an employee of the UN system,
and children live in New York. He was also effusive
about the importance of a close U.S./Nigeria military-
to-military relationship. Nevertheless, amidst the
manifest good will and gift exchanges, Gen. Agwai
delivered important messages.


3. (C) On the Delta, Gen. Agwai said that the current
unrest and militia activity risks becoming a full-
blown civil war. He spoke with feeling about the
tragedy that would be, making specific reference to
one of his officers stationed there, an indigene that
might be called upon to fire upon his own people. He
acknowledged that the origin of many of the illegal
weapons flowing into the Delta is Nigerian military
armories, and welcomed heartily DAS WhelanQs offer to
revive U.S.-led multilateral efforts to develop
Nigerian capacity to trace illegal weapons.


4. (C) With respect to the Nigerian military,
sprinkled through Gen. AgwaiQs conversation were
references to a generational divide. He contrasted
his generation of senior officers, all of whom have
had exposure to the U.S. and/or the UK, with younger
officers, who, because of the suspension or costs of
U.S. training, were far more likely to have been to
China or India, or even North Korea. His generation
understood U.S. separation of powers and the role of
Congress with respect to the suspension of IMET;
younger officers do not, and instead see a pattern of
U.S. inconsistency in the military-to-military
relationship. Even now, he continued, U.S. training
opportunities are hobbled because of the cost. A
multiple of Nigerian officers could be trained in
China for the cost of a single officer at the National
War College, for example. This reality made it
difficult for him to expand the number of Nigerian
officers taking advantage of the U.S. training
opportunities that are available now. Despite these
difficulties, Gen. Agwai reaffirmed over and over
again the advantages of U.S. military training, and
invited direct out-of-channels contact with his office
whenever there are snags on the Nigerian side.


5. (C) Looking toward the upcoming London Gulf of
Guinea security talks, DAS Whelan proposed that
Nigeria and the U.S. present a joint briefing on
progress to date. This approach, she suggested, could
bridge an Qus vs. themQ atmosphere that sometimes has
characterized previous rounds, and emphasize the level
of cooperation already achieved. Gen. Agwai did not
respond to this suggestion, and instead focused on the
lack of continuity amongst Nigerian military
participants to date in the series of talks. This, he
said, he is correcting.


6. (C) Comment: Gen. AgwaiQs candor on the Delta is
unprecedented among top civilian and military
officials in our experience, and was doubtlessly
encouraged by the warm relationship he rapidly
developed with Gen. Ward. The line from the Villa has
been that Delta unrest is the result of criminals and
lack of economic development. (Despite the fanfare
around various development initiatives in the Delta,
we see little sign of anything happening.) Agwai
appeared to see the causes as deeper and longstanding.
AgwaiQs concern about the possibility of civil war may
explain the exceptional restraint shown by the
Nigerian military thus far, despite the magnitude of
casualties it has suffered. AgwaiQs willingness to
face the truth about the origin of many of the illegal
arms is also new to us. Previous multilateral efforts
to trace illegal arms have foundered on Nigerian
military refusal to allow outsiders access to its
armories. His analysis of generational differences
within the military parallels our own Q though he is
more authoritative. We were surprised that he did not
pick up on DAS WhelanQs proposal for a joint briefing
in London on Gulf of Guinea progress to date. The
DATT will follow up with AgwaiQs office.


7. (C) AgwaiQs pro-American stance was palpable
through his meeting with Gen. Ward. We suspect it may
cause him some difficulties with his other military
colleagues, though thus far he appears to have
overcome them. His invitation that we deal with him
directly on training snags, avoiding protocol and
chain of command issues, is a frequent senior Nigerian
response to mistakes. However, no matter how sincere
the invitation is at the time, our experience has been
that such a procedure soon breaks down in practice,
not least because strong leaders like Agwai are
inevitably overstretched in Nigeria. Before his
promotion, Agwai was the Chief of Army Staff;
President Obasanjo often dealt directly with him on
international peacekeeping and other issues, rather
than working through the then-Chief of defense Staff,
Gen. Ogunmudia. As the President functions
essentially as his own Minister of Defense,
Presidential support is probably essential to Agwai,
who was leap-frogged into his present position over
more senior officers. End comment.


8. (U) This message has been cleared by the offices
of Gen. Ward and DAS Whelan.

CAMPBELL