Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUJA2508
2006-09-25 08:31:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA AVIAN FLU UPDATE: SOUTHWESTERN OUTBREAKS

Tags:  TBIO KFLU AMED EAGR EAID NI AVIANFLU 
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DE RUEHUJA #2508/01 2680831
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 250831Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7244
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
RHFMISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME 0022
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ASD-HD//
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002508 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

USDA FAS WASHDC FOR FAA/RANDY HAGER
USDA FOR APHIS/JOHN SHAW
USDA FOR WAYNE MOLSTAD/OSEC
USAID/W FOR AFR/WA ANGELA LOZANO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO KFLU AMED EAGR EAID NI AVIANFLU
SUBJECT: NIGERIA AVIAN FLU UPDATE: SOUTHWESTERN OUTBREAKS

REF: ABUJA 2238

ABUJA 00002508 001.2 OF 002


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002508 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS USDA FAS WASHDC FOR FAA/RANDY HAGER USDA FOR APHIS/JOHN SHAW USDA FOR WAYNE MOLSTAD/OSEC USAID/W FOR AFR/WA ANGELA LOZANO E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: TBIO KFLU AMED EAGR EAID NI AVIANFLU SUBJECT: NIGERIA AVIAN FLU UPDATE: SOUTHWESTERN OUTBREAKS REF: ABUJA 2238 ABUJA 00002508 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Cooperation between the Ministries of Agriculture, Information, and Health on the issue of avian influenza (AI) remains an issue, and relations between Agriculture and Health officials remain tense over the extent of AI in Nigeria and whether to authorize poultry vaccinations. The government's continued overall lack of focus against AI contributes to the inaccurate public perception that the virus's threat has abated. The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) opposes vaccinations and contends AI is under control, despite current outbreaks in Lagos and Ogun States. Poor poultry-feed distribution practices contribute significantly to AI's spread in the southwest, as contaminated feed sacks carry the virus with them. The MOA says improper vaccinations by farmers also are contributing to AI's spread. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Cooperation between Nigeria's Ministries of Agriculture, Information, and Health on the issue of avian influenza (AI) remains an issue and relations between Agriculture and Health officials are tense, including over whether to authorize poultry vaccinations. The current extent of AI in Nigeria, and whether the Government of Nigeria (GON) should permit poultry inoculations, are the main issues dividing the latter two ministries. The government's continued overall lack of focus against AI contributes to the inaccurate public perception that the virus's threat has abated. ¶3. (U) Nigeria's chief veterinary officer (CVO) said August 24 at the GON AI Interministerial Committee meeting that despite the current AI outbreaks in Lagos and Ogun States (details remain sketchy, though Lagos State appears to have suffered outbreaks on 25 to 40 farms),there was no cause for alarm. The CVO said AI has abated and is going away in Nigeria, and the situation could be managed using existing resources. ¶4. (U) In particular, MOA officials have told USG officials they oppose vaccinations. The reason given are that available vaccines use live AI fowl pox; available vaccines confer immunity for only two months; the country would need 715 five-man teams to cover 30% of village and backyard flocks and 75% of commercial flocks fo
r one month at an estimated cost of $0.20-0.57 per dose; and the possibility exists of introducing a new "strain/serotype" of the virus, as may be the case with foot and mouth disease. The CVO expressed concern that the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) had permitted the import of AI vaccines, whose mandate comes under the MOA. The CVO demanded that NAFDAC be directed to recall all AI vaccines. He said emphatically it was his decision when or whether to vaccinate poultry in Nigeria, and he declared it forbidden. The CVO and some other GON officials, as well as the GON's policy, continue to oppose vaccination. ¶5. (SBU) Comment: The CVO likely believes that GON resources are inadequate to carry out inoculations properly, especially considering the poultry sector's fragmented nature. Ministry of Agriculture officials appear to be basing at least some of their opposition to vaccinations on incorrect information. The Web site of the Dutch animal-vaccine manufacturer Intervet says recommended AI vaccines are "inactivated (not live)" and that vaccines' efficacy, following two properly administered injections, is one year. The GON's level of technical competency on the issue of vaccinations is not clear. Internationally, the regulation of veterinary drugs typically resides with a CVO or a similar official. Also, the U.S. Mission has received reports of NAFDAC-recognized medical doctors offering advice to poultry farmers on vaccinations, which is cause for concern. End comment. ¶6. (U) The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),however, recommends that a consultant carry out in Nigeria's north and southwest an assessment of the scope of vaccinations against highly pathogenic avian influenza. The terms of reference for this study would be established by the MOA and the FAO. Such a study could provide the GON with convincing evidence of the benefits of vaccination. The Ministry of Health, the FAO/World Organization for Animal Health, and the Veterinary Association of Nigeria think the GON should implement a controlled vaccination program, because they believe AI no longer can be controlled in Nigeria. ABUJA 00002508 002.2 OF 002 Reasons to vaccinate commercial flocks in Nigeria -------------- -------------- ¶7. (U) Supporters of poultry inoculations believe the GON should authorize vaccinations of commercial flocks for a combination of reasons: -- Commercial producers are already employing poor vaccination procedures and, regardless of what the CVO directs, will continue to vaccinate using a variety of unregulated vaccines. -- Owners of large commercial flocks can afford professional services and already use trained veterinary services. They could implement a proper vaccination program if the MOA legally permitted this. -- Nigeria's large size and the thinness of its rural highway police force mean the GON cannot effectively control poultry products' movement. -- Controlling AI's spread among medium and small poultry farms cannot reasonably be expected in the short term because of the lack of proper training and the failure to implement biosecurity measures. -- Even with adequate biosecurity training, farms' layout, method of construction, and the feed systems on medium and small farms are not conducive to good biosecurity. Even if the proper procedures are implemented, avenues for AI's spread will continue: unscreened buildings permit the entry of wild birds and rodents, dirt floors are difficult to decontaminate, and porous, rough-cut lumber cannot be sanitized. Flawed feed procedures in Nigeria spread AI -------------- ¶8. (U) A USAID Abuja officer with substantial experience in commercial-sector animal disease control expressed serious concern about the continuing spread of H5N1 in southwestern Nigeria's commercial poultry sector, resulting from the industry's method of feed delivery. To achieve world-class commercial biosecurity, it is necessary to deliver animal feed in bulk and to minimize recycling or farm contact with feed-delivery mechanisms or articles, especially recycled feed sacks. Nigeria's small and medium commercial poultry farms do not use the bulk delivery of feed. Farms take delivery of feed in nylon sacks that are reused and recycled many times, because of the bags' high relative cost and the lack of automated feed-delivery systems. ¶9. (U) Poultry feed is delivered from farm to farm in bags and is physically carried into each poultry house, where the sacks become contaminated with poultry dust and feces while being poured into poultry feeders. The sacks act as a robust disease vector. The contaminated feed bags then are taken back to the feed mill, where they are refilled and delivered to another poultry farm. The entire feed mill becomes contaminated as the bags, including new sacks, touch the floor and various pieces of equipment. ¶10. (U) AI then spreads rapidly through the portion of the commercial sector supplied by a particular feed mill. The only Nigerian poultry farms immune from this are those that produce all their own feed and that also do not sell feed to outside farms -- but most large farms with their own feed mill sell bags of feed to smaller farms. It is very likely the farms that rapidly became infected in Lagos and Ogun States shared the same feed-mill processing center. ¶11. (U) The USAID officer expressed to the CVO and the local FAO representative his concerns about feed-sack contamination. He recommended that they issue a brochure, to be delivered to the Poultry Association of Nigeria and commercial feed mills, which would recommend: Buy disposable paper sacks from a local cement factory for use in interim feed delivery and dispersal and burn the paper bags after use. When recycled, nylon feed sacks should be soaked in disinfectant for three minutes and then dried before refilling. Do not take nylon feed sacks into a poultry house, but rather pour feed into buckets for carrying into poultry houses.

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