HOPES FOR PEACE AND TALK OF WAR AT DARFUR TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000232 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2031 TAGS: PREL PINS PGOV PREF PHUM ASEC SU DARFUR SUBJECT: HOPES FOR PEACE AND TALK OF WAR AT DARFUR TALKS Classified By: USDEL Member Erin Y. Tariot, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The pace of the Darfur Peace Talks has accelerated. The parties appear to have more of a negotiating mandate, and although red-lines remain, those committed to a settlement still outnumber the spoilers. International observer corps, enthusiasm about the improved op tempo, however, has been tempered by events in N,djamena, and continued allegations of military excursions along the Sudan/Chad border. The fragility of the rebel movements, alliance has grown, increasing with it fears of intra-Movement military conflict between JEM and SLM. Mixed signals from Khartoum to Abdelwahid,s SLM faction remain a significant impediment to the development of alternative avenues toward peace. Issues at play on the Talk,s margins could either scuttle or save a political settlement. The latter is achievable only through rapid, coordinated, and clear international action aimed at keeping the parties focused at the table, and maintaining cooler heads in the field. END SUMMARY. -------------- PACE, PROGRESS ARE PROMISING, BUT( -------------- ¶2. (C) The hopes of the international observer corps were buoyed by the post-Eid spike in activity at the Darfur Peace Talks. Technical experts, save for previously promised and still required USG military advisors, are in train. Skilled AU mediation has established an important store of cross-table goodwill critical for continued progress as working groups approach thornier political/military issues at week,s end. The inter-parties distance on security arrangements remains significant, but progress is occurring, albeit slowly. (NOTE: Pertinent security arrangement issues septel. END NOTE.) Positive movement has been seen on decisions regarding representation within the Council of Ministers and National Assembly; proactive AU mediation has been promised should the parties fall short. Reparations and quantifying shares of natural resources remain the sole obstacles to the conclusion of a wealth-sharing agreement. The parties remain firmly anchored in negotiating mode. -------------- TALK OF SLM/JEM VIOLENCE ABOUNDS -------------- ¶3. (C) In contrast, the attention of observers is increasingly focused elsewhere, seized by an urgent sense to shelter the fledgling progress from external events -- 
alleged and actual -- that are at best unclear and at worst disturbing. Although the Abdelwahid Nur SLM faction (SLM/AW) has been able to compartmentalize NMRD,s potential political implications at the Talks, the same cannot be said for the perceived threat of SLM/AW-JEM violence. &We remain committed to a political settlement beneficial to all of Darfur, and to the negotiating agreement that places us at the same table with the other Movements, but should JEM attack, for us, the talks are over.& Abdelwahid emphasized. The SLM co-chair told PolOff January 28 that recent JEM militia increases in and around Malit, and the &troubling8 arrival of Khalil in Darfur, have increased SLM concerns that a JEM attack may be imminent. He posited with reference to Ghelil &why is he here now, when he has been absent from Darfur since the early 1990s?& His representatives alleged to PolOff in the same meeting a substantial arms and militia buildup by JEM throughout West and North Darfur, and have promised the USDEL, although not yet delivered, a list of purported locations. ¶4. (C) Abdelwahid,s concerns on field violence may be premature, if only because they have been usurped by flaring intra-Movement tempers at the talks themselves. On January 26, JEM ordered the removal of three dissenters from its negotiating team after they internally criticized the NMRD decision. The erstwhile JEM delegates were given 30 minutes to vacate the hotel on the heels of their argument, made during a sidebar on power-sharing, that the NMRD decision was taken without proper Movement-wide vetting. Abdelwahid,s SLM faction prevented the involuntary expulsion by offering up rooms within the SLM delegation -- and a seat at on their section of the negotiating table. ¶5. (C) On January 27/28, a physical altercation between four JEM representatives and one of the dissenters -- at 3:30AM -- resulted in the man and his wife seeking medical treatment at a local hospital. In an AU briefing January 28, the Deputy Secretary,s Special Representative to the Sudan (D/SpecRep) SIPDIS pushed the African Union to take the assault seriously, and not &smooth it out,8 as the AU was intending. (COMMENT: The AU response to this request has improved. At its insistence, JEM expelled the three attackers from the delegation and the hotel. END COMMENT.) -------------- IS KHT OFFERING A DEAL, AND WOULD IT MATTER? -------------- ¶6. (C) A cadre of AU mediators profess confidence that Khartoum could be persuaded to deal on power sharing arrangements. More forward-leaning AU resource people believe a deal between Khartoum and Abdelwahid,s faction could bring the talks to a final signing ceremony. Both argue that it would be centered on two tenets: the creation of an assistant president and the acceptance of Darfur as one region, vice its current construct of three states. Sidebar discussions between select AU resource people and the GNU have elicited the following negotiating posture, should Khartoum following through with its efforts to court Abdewahid Nur: Assistant President would be removed from his position, and replaced with a Darfur repetitive agreed upon by the Movements. The portfolio for the position would be modified, awarding the incumbent specific, and sole, responsibility for Darfur. GNU would also concede to SLM/AM regional status for Darfur, but through a gradual process that would enhance the administrative and political capacities of the Movements before ceding them complete oversight of the new region. ¶7. (C) Although popular within some AU mediation circles, SLM/AW has yet to be persuaded of the plan, and it remains uncertain if they have even been approached by the GNU. In a January 28 meeting with D/SpecRep, Abdelwahid initially dodged the question of whether his faction was being courted by Khartoum, instead lamenting his lack of access. &I have been here throughout,8 he complained, &Mini is gone, Khalil has never come, so why not approach me?8 Midway through the meeting, however, he returned to the point unprompted, actively soliciting D/SpecRep,s views on how such a move would play in Washington. D/SpecRep demurred on the direct question, instead emphasizing USG desire for a speedy and sustainable peace in Darfur. ¶8. (C) Mixed signals from Khartoum, not at the table but in Sudan itself, further strain the initial credibility of the proposal. In follow-on talks with PolOff largely centered on violence in Golo and Kaure, Abdelwahid and two advisors, while seemingly receptive to the idea of dealing one-on-one with the Government of National Unity, remained perplexed by the alleged uptick in SAF activity against this faction of the SLM. They stressed repeatedly their belief that Khartoum is attempting to leverage recent SAF/SLM skirmishes in Darfur to drive SLM-AW to a political settlement in Abuja. They scoffed, however, at the SAF,s &misguided belief8 that this would force SLM/AW to capitulate at the talks. -------------- WHAT IS JEM THINKING, AND IS MINI ONBOARD? -------------- ¶9. (C) JEM,s post-NMRD objectives at the Talks, when contrasted against Abdelwahid,s characterization of their field activities, remain murky. AU Security Arrangement Mediator Laurie Nathan (STRICTLY PROTECT) noted to D/SpecRep and PolOff January 28 that JEM Chief Negotiator Tadjedine had requested expediting the working group schedule so the sides could immediately tackle disarmament modalities, ostensibly an unusual request for a militia purportedly in the process of weapons, stockpiling. Nathan further remarked to PolOff January 26 that JEM,s position had &visibly sweetened8 during the plenary sessions on security arrangements normally reserved for grandstanding. Nathan opined JEM,s transition to listening mode appeared legitimate, albeit hobbled a superficial understanding of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration mechanisms as they related to the CPA. ¶10. (C) AU advisor Alex de Waal (STRICTLY PROTECT) argued to D/SpecRep and PolOff on January 27 that JEM s Chadian/Libyan-influenced negotiating style made JEM a key aspect in finalizing any possible political settlement between SLM/AW and Khartoum &on behalf of the Movements,8 but maintained that JEM was not to be mistaken for a swing vote to peace. De Waal claims JEM is psychologically positioned the &jump and follow the strong man,8 and would quickly align itself with a &winning8 SLM/AW faction -- regardless of the current pro-JEM power set-up within NMRD -- should an agreement be reached with Khartoum. (COMMENT: If de Waal,s read of JEM,s motivating factors is correct, and Abdelwahid,s assertion about JEM militia activity true, one has to question what signals JEM is getting as to who currently holds military supremacy in Darfur. END COMMENT). ¶11. (C) Mini Minnawi, absent from the Talks (and claiming to us to be on the Sudan/Chad border, exploring ways to fortify vulnerable allied populations there) remains somewhat of an enigma in Abuja. His SLM negotiating team (SLM/Minnawi) is led by three hard-line political advisors who remain insufficiently schooled in military demobilization to move the talks forward, and visibly nervous about the level criticism (and in limited cases, outright dissent) from field commanders about perceived capitulations by the Movements at the negotiating table. De Waal has speculated Mini would accept an agreement, even if led by SLM-AW, to avoid being left out in the cold. (COMMENT: Whether Chad or Libya could persuade Minnawi to remain a holdout to a SLM/AW-driven political agreement in a fashion that would undermine peace in Darfur remains the subject of considerable speculation at the Talks, margins. We are arguably too close to the issues here to accurately forecast the degree to which any such theories are correct. END COMMENT.) -------------- SAF/DARFUR VIOLENCE: LITTLE IMPACT, SO FAR -------------- ¶12. (C) Unlike previous rounds, recent skirmishes between the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM/AW and SLM/Minnawi) and the Sudanese Armed Forces in Darfur have had a negligible impact on the Talks. Although neither faction has relinquished their status as the aggrieved party, both GNU and SLM-AW interlocutors at the talks are satisfied that AMIS has the situation in hand, and mechanisms exist for minimizing fallout following the events in Golo. Abdelwahid,s SLM faction -- to include the chairman himself -- maintains that the SLM attack in Golo was in retaliation for the burnings of 21 villages in the immediate area that served as SLM supply garrisons. Abdelwahid claimed to PolOff that a heightened SLM alert posture triggered ground units to misread the SAF arrival near Kaure as an approaching attack, and noted field commanders have since been disciplined for the pre-emptive strike. (NOTE: It is doubtful that said &discipline8 was significant. Abdelwahid held a lengthy discourse on the &burden of responsibility8 field commanders shoulder to defend allied civilians from &SAF and Janjaweed aggression,8 allowing for little difference between the two. END NOTE.) -------------- COMMENT: -------------- ¶13. (C) The situation in Abuja remains fluid, but the rapport between the parties -- when at the table -- indicates an improved environment. External events warrant a close look. Equally important, the speedy delivery of resources: be it political pressure in Khartoum or the arrival of USG military advisors, is important for international community traction once the parties truly commit themselves to crafting a final settlement. CAMPBELL