NIGERIAN NSA MUKHTAR ON SITUATION IN THE DELTA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002316 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016 TAGS: PTER EPET ASEC NI SUBJECT: NIGERIAN NSA MUKHTAR ON SITUATION IN THE DELTA Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During an August 31 meeting in his office with AF DAS Linda Thomas-Greenfield and the Ambassador to reiterate USG concern over the situation in the Niger Delta, Nigerian National Security Advisor (NSA) General Mukhtar admitted that problems were complex, and that some key militant leaders trying to open discussions with the Government of Nigeria (GON) were "voices of reason." However, Mukhtar stressed that "the GON would not allow lawless people to hold an entire nation at ransom," but would act within Nigerian laws and UN conventions." As Nigeria does so, he requested patience and understanding from the international community. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) During an August 31 call on Nigerian NSA Mukhtar, AF DAS Linda Thomas-Greenfield expressed continued USG concern about the security situation in the Niger Delta, given accounts in the local press and reports from oil company representatives. In reply to her request for an update and for his opinions, NSA Mukhtar acknowledged that the GON was grappling with a difficult situation with underrated complexities. The international community needed to appreciate the forces at work in the region. The GON has admitted the underlying socioeconomic issues and environmental degradation behind the seeming insurgencies, but that for every peace effort launched by the GON, new unexpected issues would pop up from would-be militants, and the Nigerian people in the Delta were left in the lurch. In a vicious circle, subregional forces had turned to hostage-taking as a means to create, sustain, and finance militias for their own purposes. ¶3. (C) The GON could not sit back and do nothing. "Something positive" had to be done within the laws of Nigeria, according to UN conventions. Insisting there is a limit to lawlessness, and that these criminals cannot hold innocent people hostage, Mukhtar said that the GON had told its Joint Task Force in the Delta that there must be changes in its operating procedures but that there was bound to be "unintended consequences." He criticized the hypocrisy of Edwin Clarke and the ethnic Ijaw General Assembly and Ijaw Council in condemning GON military actions in the Delta without also condemning the hostage-taking. Commenting that society leaders must have "red lines" that they cannot cross, the NSA remarked that, "we are going to continue what we are doing" and "would not allow lawless people to hold an entire nation at ransom." He asked for patience and understanding from the international community as the GON made this painful and difficult decision. ¶4. (C) Reaffirming that any government's legitimacy was based on its ability to provide security, Mukhtar expressed the hope that more lives won't be lost, and that future GON military operations would be properly executed. Every hostage-taking scenario had created an extreme, increasing strain among GON leaders at all levels. Calling them "voices of reason," Mukhtar said that unnamed key militant leaders were trying to open discussions with him in Abuja. AF DAS Thomas-Greenfield remarked that the USG was pleased that the GON was taking the situation (especially hostage-taking) seriously, but that the crisis seemed to be escalating, and that a military solution was not the answer. While the USG understood the GON's dilemma, the GON needed to remember that it would be difficult to calibrate the reaction (both in results and in perception) to such a solution. A continuation of the current scenario would make it untenable for anyone to work in the Delta. When asked who was responsible for paying ransoms, Mukhtar replied that the oil companies not only were using militants as paid escorts for security, but that senior oil company representatives were aware of their firms' authorization of ransom payments. The NSA did not respond to the query of involvement by state government officials, but he noted that the GON had publicly warned about the illegality of making such payments. He hinted that the federal government had suspicions about state governments, but could not prosecute unless concrete evidence was found due to the political sensitivity of accusing a high-level official. When asked by the Ambassador whether the international community could anticipate an increasingly firm GON position against hostage takers, NSA Mukhtar responded that every system is imperfect, that the issue was complex, and he would be the last to say that there would not be more hostages taken. However, he confirmed the GON was prepared to do what was necessary in this "tenuous journey." ABUJA 00002316 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) AF DAS Thomas-Greenfield said that the USG had only learned the other day that the GON had prosecuted and convicted two militants for ten-year sentences, and asked why the GON did not publicize this step. In response, Mukhtar said that in fact, the GON had convicted four militants and would detain indefinitely over 100 other suspects (after the GON had arrested and then released about another 150 other individuals) until it could correctly discern the facts behind their activities. It was tough for the GON to trust the media, which was perceived incapable of properly understanding issues of national interest. When asked how President Obasanjo's public designation of the militants as "terrorists" offered any additional consequences, Mukhtar said that the GON defined "terrorism" in context with universally-accepted norms, including by its own National Assembly. ¶6. (C) Mukhtar said he would get to New York around September 15-17 before President Obasanjo's planned September 19 arrival (and onward travel to Los Angeles, Singapore, and Japan),and DAS Thomas-Greenfield agreed to his request to facilitate appropriate meetings for the NSA in DC on the margins of UNGA with appropriate USG officials. CAMPBELL