NIGERIA: HOSTAGE CRISIS HIDES POLITICAL CRISIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000225 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2016 TAGS: EPET PGOV ASEC PTER KHLS PINR ETRD CASC NI HOSTAGES SUBJECT: NIGERIA: HOSTAGE CRISIS HIDES POLITICAL CRISIS Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (D & E) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The recent hostage incident in Delta State was a political conflict masquerading as a criminal incident. Its resolution, although fortunate, does not address the underlying political issues. Consequently, more such events are likely in the future. The government response demonstrated its lack of vision and an inability to respond in the area. With the backdrop of violence, patronage of thugs, and political manipulation, the Delta's ongoing crises are not likely to go away on their own. With the current crop of political leaders in place and little possibility for a change soon, the problems will likely continue. Real elections--combined with a leadership truly committed to halting corruption and not just a political effort to corral opponents--are necessary to put long term solutions into place. END SUMMARY -------------- TEARS OF THE SUN -------------- 2.(C) The recent hostage incident in the Delta, characterized by threats, counterthreats and a certain degree of ineptitude, was a political conflict masquerading as a hostage crisis. It seems that the original capture of the hostages was part of a carefully planned attack on the "Liberty Service" carrying GON security operatives seven miles offshore and that events blossomed from there. The militia group that claimed responsibility, MEND, seems to have been cobbled together after the fact to mask the participation of other groups in the events that unfolded. Further complicating the situation are the linkages among the militants, government officials, and the unofficial liaisons that offer to mediate in crises. 3.(C) The resolution of the current event has little to do with the underlying political issues, and could signify that more such events are likely in the future. The militias involved with this kidnapping, as well as those watching from the sidelines in this event, have learned that they were able to coordinate attacks throughout the region, seemingly at will, make their escape, and garner international attention. The group directly behind this incident appears to be a senior partner to various other groups operating from Ondo to Akwa Ibom states. According to one contact very close to the group involved in this incident, the militants realize that holding foreigners hostage is not the best way to pursue their political goal: greater Ijaw participation in local and national government. The contact stated that one of the reasons this kidnapping went so long was that the group with the hostages did not want the new Governor of Bayelsa Goodluck Jonathan to gain any prestige from its resolution. 4.(C) The Director General (DG) of Nigeria's State Security Services mirrored Mission's current assessment of the situation in the Niger Delta in a meeting with the Ambassador. The DG characterized the insurgents in the Delta as "fragmented," matching our assessment that they are comprised of numerous groups that cooperate only when mutually beneficial. He also opined that the settlement of this crisis was "not the end" of problems in the Delta. He did not confirm the size of the monetary and political payoff in this instance, but worried that it provided a roadmap for future actions against central government authority. He stated that similar attacks "are likely" in the future. -------------- A TRAGI-COMEDY OF ERRORS -------------- 5.(C) The government response was disjointed. In the early days of the crisis, GON officials treated the incident as a "business as usual" hostage situation inNigeria and appeared more focused on the demonstrations in Ibadan. In those situations, payment of ransom to "community leaders" generally wins release of the hostages relatively quickly. In this case, however, it was evident from the beginning that the demands were of a more political nature. The failure of GON officials to recognize this probably prolonged the crisis. The ongoing management of the situation was also open to political manipulation. The lack of communication between the Bayelsa governor, who recently assumed office after the impeachment of his predecessor under questionable legal circumstances, and the governor of Delta State, ostensibly a political opponent of President Obasanjo, characterized a haphazard operation that likely extended the stay of the hostages on the "Nigerian Riviera" by at least several days. One certainty from recent events is that the attack on the "Liberty Service" demonstrates that off-shore facilities are no longer immune to militant actions, endangering many other employees and facilities of all the major oil companies. 6.(C) Meanwhile, the happy talk from senior GON officials, including the President while he was in Davos, continues to mask the underlying reality. This is a political crisis directed against the Obasanjo government in the context of the upcoming elections, the President's ambiguity about a third term. The hostage dimension has merely been a means to an end, which could soon expand to the renegotiation of the terms of Federation. Added to this is the attempt to force Obasanjo to make clear his political intentions and revenge for the arrest of prominent Ijaw leaders former Bayelsa Governor DSP Alamieyeseigha and militia leader Mujahid Dokubo-Asari. -------------- -------------- PERPETUATING POVERTY, CONSOLIDATING POWERLESSNESS -------------- -------------- 7.(U) The delta region has suffered conflict for much of Nigeria's history. The previous high mark was arguably the Ogoni protests against marginalization culminating in the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995 by the Abacha regime. Since then, the Ijaw have been at the center of most of the area's conflicts, first in inter-ethnic violence with the Itsekeri from 2000-2003 and lately in conflict with the state and federal governments by various militias includingthat of Dokubo Asari. The region's economic destruction through pollution of water, farmland, and forests is a catalyst to violence and conflict. Exacerbated by the oil companies' and GON's utilization of "money politics," frequent clashes are normal. The GON takes advantage of disputes between oil companies and communities to shirk its responsibilities for the welfare of delta residents. The culture of cronyism and corruption plagues agencies, such as the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) set up to alleviate the problems caused by the oil industry. The GON regularly provides security services to the oil companies at the expense of the communities, further inflaming the already bad dynamic. Where it does intervene, the GON has a history of bias on behalf of the oil companies or on behalf of one group of combatants over another. The prevalence of small arms and the recruitment of unemployed youth by sitting governors and other politicians aggravate the conflict. Up to today, there has been no effective targeting of resources by the three tiers of the GON to address the underlying causes of conflict. -------------- A LONG AND WINDING ROAD AHEAD -------------- 8.(C) With the current crop of political leaders in place, problems will likely continue. The long-term situation could be improved with a sincere effort to develop the region's infrastructure and provide economic incentives to eschew militancy. However, a degraded infrastructure and an economy barely functioning for the average Nigerian are endemic throughout the country, and the few economic reforms actually implemented by the Obasanjo Government have shown no sign of improving the national situation. Controlling access to small arms and halting the oil bunkering are steps in the right direction. The challenge for President Obasanjo would be to convince an increasingly skeptical public that he could launch a program with sincere intentions. Currently, his reputation is that of political opportunism and favoritism towards anyone who obeys his directions. Still, the real and lasting solution would be a pragmatic plan for economic development and the right political leadership to implement it while combatting corruption. The best way to get that leadership would be truly representative elections combined with a leadership committed to economic/fiscal transparency and halting corruption, rather than political efforts to corral opponents in the name of fighting corruption. CAMPBELL