NIGERIA: HOSTAGE CRISIS HIDES POLITICAL CRISIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000225

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2016
TAGS: EPET PGOV ASEC PTER KHLS PINR ETRD CASC NI HOSTAGES
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: HOSTAGE CRISIS HIDES POLITICAL CRISIS

Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (D & E)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The recent hostage incident in Delta State
was a political conflict masquerading as a criminal incident.
Its resolution, although fortunate, does not address the
underlying political issues. Consequently, more such events
are likely in the future. The government response
demonstrated its lack of vision and an inability to respond
in the area. With the backdrop of violence, patronage of
thugs, and political manipulation, the Delta's ongoing crises
are not likely to go away on their own. With the current
crop of political leaders in place and little possibility for
a change soon, the problems will likely continue. Real
elections--combined with a leadership truly committed to
halting corruption and not just a political effort to corral
opponents--are necessary to put long term solutions into
place. END SUMMARY

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TEARS OF THE SUN
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2.(C) The recent hostage incident in the Delta,
characterized by threats, counterthreats and a certain degree
of ineptitude, was a political conflict masquerading as a
hostage crisis. It seems that the original capture of the
hostages was part of a carefully planned attack on the
"Liberty Service" carrying GON security operatives seven
miles offshore and that events blossomed from there. The
militia group that claimed responsibility, MEND, seems to
have been cobbled together after the fact to mask the
participation of other groups in the events that unfolded.
Further complicating the situation are the linkages among the
militants, government officials, and the unofficial liaisons
that offer to mediate in crises.

3.(C) The resolution of the current event has little to do
with the underlying political issues, and could signify that
more such events are likely in the future. The militias
involved with this kidnapping, as well as those watching from
the sidelines in this event, have learned that they were able
to coordinate attacks throughout the region, seemingly at
will, make their escape, and garner international attention.
The group directly behind this incident appears to be a
senior partner to various other groups operating from Ondo to
Akwa Ibom states. According to one contact very close to the
group involved in this incident, the militants realize that
holding foreigners hostage is not the best way to pursue
their political goal: greater Ijaw participation in local and
national government. The contact stated that one of the
reasons this kidnapping went so long was that the group with
the hostages did not want the new Governor of Bayelsa
Goodluck Jonathan to gain any prestige from its resolution.

4.(C) The Director General (DG) of Nigeria's State Security
Services mirrored Mission's current assessment of the
situation in the Niger Delta in a meeting with the
Ambassador. The DG characterized the insurgents in the Delta
as "fragmented," matching our assessment that they are
comprised of numerous groups that cooperate only when
mutually beneficial. He also opined that the settlement of
this crisis was "not the end" of problems in the Delta. He
did not confirm the size of the monetary and political payoff
in this instance, but worried that it provided a roadmap for
future actions against central government authority. He
stated that similar attacks "are likely" in the future.

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A TRAGI-COMEDY OF ERRORS
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5.(C) The government response was disjointed. In the early
days of the crisis, GON officials treated the incident as a
"business as usual" hostage situation inNigeria and appeared
more focused on the demonstrations in Ibadan. In those
situations, payment of ransom to "community leaders"
generally wins release of the hostages relatively quickly. In
this case, however, it was evident from the beginning that
the demands were of a more political nature. The failure of
GON officials to recognize this probably prolonged the
crisis. The ongoing management of the situation was also
open to political manipulation. The lack of communication
between the Bayelsa governor, who recently assumed office
after the impeachment of his predecessor under questionable
legal circumstances, and the governor of Delta State,
ostensibly a political opponent of President Obasanjo,
characterized a haphazard operation that likely extended the
stay of the hostages on the "Nigerian Riviera" by at least
several days. One certainty from recent events is that the
attack on the "Liberty Service" demonstrates that off-shore
facilities are no longer immune to militant actions,
endangering many other employees and facilities of all the
major oil companies.
6.(C) Meanwhile, the happy talk from senior GON officials,
including the President while he was in Davos, continues to
mask the underlying reality. This is a political crisis
directed against the Obasanjo government in the context of
the upcoming elections, the President's ambiguity about a
third term. The hostage dimension has merely been a means to
an end, which could soon expand to the renegotiation of the
terms of Federation. Added to this is the attempt to force
Obasanjo to make clear his political intentions and revenge
for the arrest of prominent Ijaw leaders former Bayelsa
Governor DSP Alamieyeseigha and militia leader Mujahid
Dokubo-Asari.

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PERPETUATING POVERTY, CONSOLIDATING POWERLESSNESS
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7.(U) The delta region has suffered conflict for much of
Nigeria's history. The previous high mark was arguably the
Ogoni protests against marginalization culminating in the
hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995 by the Abacha regime. Since
then, the Ijaw have been at the center of most of the area's
conflicts, first in inter-ethnic violence with the Itsekeri
from 2000-2003 and lately in conflict with the state and
federal governments by various militias includingthat of
Dokubo Asari. The region's economic destruction through
pollution of water, farmland, and forests is a catalyst to
violence and conflict. Exacerbated by the oil companies' and
GON's utilization of "money politics," frequent clashes are
normal. The GON takes advantage of disputes between oil
companies and communities to shirk its responsibilities for
the welfare of delta residents. The culture of cronyism and
corruption plagues agencies, such as the Niger Delta
Development Commission (NDDC) set up to alleviate the
problems caused by the oil industry. The GON regularly
provides security services to the oil companies at the
expense of the communities, further inflaming the already bad
dynamic. Where it does intervene, the GON has a history of
bias on behalf of the oil companies or on behalf of one group
of combatants over another. The prevalence of small arms and
the recruitment of unemployed youth by sitting governors and
other politicians aggravate the conflict. Up to today, there
has been no effective targeting of resources by the three
tiers of the GON to address the underlying causes of conflict.

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A LONG AND WINDING ROAD AHEAD
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8.(C) With the current crop of political leaders in place,
problems will likely continue. The long-term situation could
be improved with a sincere effort to develop the region's
infrastructure and provide economic incentives to eschew
militancy. However, a degraded infrastructure and an economy
barely functioning for the average Nigerian are endemic
throughout the country, and the few economic reforms actually
implemented by the Obasanjo Government have shown no sign of
improving the national situation. Controlling access to
small arms and halting the oil bunkering are steps in the
right direction. The challenge for President Obasanjo would
be to convince an increasingly skeptical public that he could
launch a program with sincere intentions. Currently, his
reputation is that of political opportunism and favoritism
towards anyone who obeys his directions. Still, the real and
lasting solution would be a pragmatic plan for economic
development and the right political leadership to implement
it while combatting corruption. The best way to get that
leadership would be truly representative elections combined
with a leadership committed to economic/fiscal transparency
and halting corruption, rather than political efforts to
corral opponents in the name of fighting corruption.
CAMPBELL