NIGERIA: NEW NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ON THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 002144

SIPDIS

NOFORN

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: NEW NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ON THE
DELTA

Classified by Ambassador John Campbell for reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).


1. (U) Summary: On August 17, 2006, Gen. Abdullahi
Mukhtar, Ret., the incoming National Security Advisor
(NSA),outlined to ambassadors and charges President
Obasanjo's strategy for restoring order in the Delta and
addressing the long-term social and economic
dysfunctionalities. Despite press reports to the
contrary, he confirmed that the Federal government would
continue to avoid force. See Comment in para. 6 below.
End summary.


2. (U) On August 17, the NSA spent some ninety minutes
with the COMs or charges of Belgium, the Netherlands,
Germany, Poland, the UK and the US. The missions
represent many of the nations whose citizens had been
kidnapped in the Niger Delta over the past few days.
Absent were the Irish, Ukrainian, Filipino and Norwegian
missions, the result of summer leaves and other scheduling
issues. The meeting was held at the request of the COMs
led by the U.S. and UK in the immediate aftermath of the
August 13 wave of kidnappings. The NSA, saying that he
was speaking on behalf of President Obasanjo, expressed
gratitude that the COMs had met with him rather than
complaining to the press, which, he said, would have
generated publicity that could have only encouraged the
hostage takers. He went on to say that the Delta is now
of central concern to the President, who had chaired
meetings over the past three days to chart a way forward
with all aspects of the military and security apparatus,
with the oil companies and with the state governors.


3. (U) The NSA said that the President and the Federal
government had concluded that there was a genuine basis to
the grievances of the people of the Niger Delta. Their
plight reflected a degraded environment, too few jobs,
neglect by the Federal and state governments, inconsistent
and contradictory policies by the oil companies in
competition with each other with the goal of only short-
term profitability, sensational reporting by the domestic
and international press that imputed too much importance
to the hostage takers and too little to the development
efforts by the Federal and state governments, and
depredations associated with oil bunkering and the illegal
arms trade. The NSA argued that hostage taking was
"solely" in the hands of criminals who were exploiting the
legitimate grievances of the local people. He divided the
Delta population into three parts: those who were
"peaceful," those who could be persuaded to embrace
violence, and the criminals. The Obasanjo government's
focus on economic development is designed to enlarge and
strengthen the first group, while its enhanced security
efforts would be directed at the latter two, he said.


4. (U) To address legitimate grievances, the NSA
continued, the Federal government would pursue an economic
development strategy of "Marshall Plan" intensity. It
would require the oil companies to all participate in a
coordinated and coherent development strategy to be
coordinated by the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation;
in the area of development, the oil companies would lose
their individual autonomy. The President would hold the
state governors to a much higher standard of
accountability than in the past. The NSA was scathing
about the performance of the state governors, observing
that they received enormous sums of money from the
Federation account, but there was little or no trace of
the development they were supposed to provide. The NSA
also promised better and deeper dialogue with the
community leaders in the Delta, including the militia
leaders. He said that even the militia leaders would be
invited to Abuja for talks "or, if they won't come, we
will go into the creeks to meet them."


5. (U) On the security side, the NSA promised that the
military and the security services would be "much more
proactive," but he disavowed violence: "It would only
exacerbate the symptoms and fail to address the causes,"
he said. However, there would no longer be tolerance for
hostage taking, the paying of ransom by any entity (oil
companies, state governments, or even the Federal
government). There would be "twenty-four hour patrols on
the creeks." He appealed for international assistance in
curbing the flow of illegal weapons. When the U.S.
ambassador recalled a stonewalled German/Canadian/American

effort to do just that, the NSA invoked the shortcomings
of "bureaucracy," and he said he would personally ensure
that it did not happen again. The COMs asked the NSA what
was being done in the short-term to free the hostages. He
replied that already some fifteen individuals have been
arrested and brought to Abuja for arraignment. He asked
for diplomatic patience while the government addresses a
criminal situation. Though he put little emphasis on it,
he did raise the possibility of a Delta state of emergency
if the Delta deteriorates.


6. (C) COMMENT: The Delta landscape is littered with the
wasted paper upon which numerous "comprehensive" plans
have previously be written. It remains to be seen whether
the current effort will be any more successful; giving the
NNPC a lead role is likely to overstretch its capacity.
Given the failure of past attempts, initial reaction in
the Delta may well be skeptical. The President will need
to move quickly to establish the credibility of the
current one
as his April initiative, launched after the February
kidnappings, is already devoid of steam and focus.
Nevertheless, the Obasanjo government appears more
attentive to the Delta than it has been in the past. The
NSA, at least, is deeply embarrassed by the latest wave of
hostage taking. Still, the NSA showed little willingness
to accept the Federal government's responsibility for
delta neglect, and too much willingness to blame the oil
companies and the international press. More positive,
here and there in the NSA's presentation was a greater
acknowledgement that Delta unrest reflects more than
"criminal" activity, and that this unrest could threaten
the Federation's stability. Following newspaper headlines
that Obasanjo was prepared to "fight force with force" or
that the security services "would hunt down the hostage
takers in the creeks," the NSA was at pains to reassert
the Federal government's policy of avoiding violence. For
the moment, there may be political will in Abuja to
address Delta ills. The enhanced dialogue with Delta
community leaders would also be a highly positive
development - if the communities' true leaders are in fact
the government's interlocutors. (By and large, they have
not been in the past.) It remains to be seen whether the
specifics outlined by the NSA are actually implemented -
and, if so, whether Delta denizens are willing to meet the
Obasanjo government half-way.


CAMPBELL