Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUJA1841
2006-07-18 12:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA:IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BAKASSI AGREEMENT

Tags:  PBTS MOPS PREL NI CM 
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FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6501
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001841 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2016
TAGS: PBTS MOPS PREL NI CM
SUBJECT: NIGERIA:IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BAKASSI AGREEMENT

REF: ABUJA 1537

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Thomas P. Furey for Reasons 1.4 (b and
d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001841 SIPDIS SIPDIS REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2016 TAGS: PBTS MOPS PREL NI CM SUBJECT: NIGERIA:IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BAKASSI AGREEMENT REF: ABUJA 1537 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Thomas P. Furey for Reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU) Summary. From the Nigerian side, plans for implementation of the Greentree Accord on Bakassi are moving forward. The military fully intends to be out of Bakassi in "not a day more" than the sixty days specified in the agreement, the Nigerian police have requested the resources they need to assume their interim security role on the peninsula, and the people and government of Cross River State are ready to resettle those Bakassi indigenes who wish to relocate into Nigeria. None of these interlocutors gave any credence to the secessionist threats that have been widely reported in the Nigerian press. Overall, everyone involved in the process shares a positive outlook and is ready for the Bakassi issue to be resolved so that they can focus on other issues. The question in the whole process is at the top--will the Presidency provide the resources necessary for all of these plans to be implemented? End summary. ¶2. (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU) PolMilOff and TDY EmbOff traveled to Calabar, the capital of Nigeria's Cross River State, the week of 10 July to assess preparations for the implementation of the Greentree Accord on the Bakassi Peninsula. The EmbOffs met with Bakassi's political and traditional leadership, the Cross River State Police Commissioner, and the State Security Advisor (Bassey Okum, Cross River State's NSA-equivalent),and have had an ongoing conversation with Nigeria's defense establishment on the Bakassi issue. The EmbOff's were warmly greeted by all interlocutors, and there was a sense of appreciation for the efforts the USG, as a witness to the agreement, was putting into understanding the situation. Several interlocutors expressed disappointment that no representatives from any of the other witness states have made similar efforts so far. The Local Population -------------- ¶3. (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU) The Bakassi Local Government Area (LGA) Chair, Ani Eric Esin, and Bakassi's representative in the Cross River House of Assembly, Joe Etene, met with the EmbOffs to discuss the indigene view on the agreement. While the agreement remained an emotional topic for the two, both seemingly have come to terms w
ith the legitimacy of the pact and are looking for the best possible implementation. Both continued to raise concerns about the sudden change from Obasanjo's pledge to never cede any Bakassi territory and continued to advocate for a referendum to determine the fate of the peninsula (Reftel). Both said that the residents of the Bakassi view their political leaders as "sellouts" who were part of a "crude oil deal" in the peninsula. The traditional leaders, particularly the paramount chief of the area (young, educated, and former LGA chair in Akpabuyo),are, however, still respected by the population. ¶4. (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU) Both Esen and Etene are pleased with the state's plan to reconstitute the Bakassi LGA in the current Akpabuyo LGA (near the town of Ikang),and say that there have historically been good relations between the two LGAs. They predict some problems in the future over land use issues (Akpobuyo is currently a farming community),and access to the sea (the Bakassi communities rely on deep sea fishing for their livelihood, and Akpobuyo borders the Cross River, not the Bight of Benin). ¶5. (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU) No interlocutors were able to predict how many of the current Bakassi inhabitants would choose to relocate. The State Security Advisor predicted that there would be more movement from northern Bakassi (Archibong area) to southern Bakassi than movement out of Bakassi. As long as they were allowed to continue to fish, live in their traditional homes, and were free of harassment, most will not care (or possibly even know) if they are in Nigeria or Cameroon. The political leaders voiced significant concerns about freedom from harassment, claiming historical abuses of the Bakassi population by Cameroonian gendarmes. The State Security Advisor cautioned that if the issue of protection of the rights of the Bakassi residents was not handled during the transition, "Niger Delta-like violence" could start in the Bakassi. He went further, suggesting an international presence (possibly through either the witness nations or the UN, or as an extension of the ABUJA 00001841 002 OF 003 Mixed Commission's mandate) specifically to ensure the protection of the rights of these residents. (Note: Bakassi's political leaders expressed little confidence in the current population estimates for the peninsula and are exploring performing a new headcount. Even though the population was counted during the recent national census, those results have not been published and may be tainted by the administrative problems experienced during the exercise. End Note.) ¶6. (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU) The paramount chief echoed the concerns of the two political leaders and their hopes for a peaceful implementation in a telephone conversation with PolMilOff (the chief was on his way to survey the proposed resettlement site). He expressed a particular confidence in his ability to work with the traditional rulers of Akpobuyo given his past political activity in the area. He added a request for USD 50 Million from each of the four witness states to fund resettlement and transition programs. When PolMilOff told the chief this his request was not likely to be fulfilled, he angrily questioned the purpose of having witnesses to the agreement. Nigerian Military -------------- ¶7. (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU) Nigeria's new Chief of Defense Staff, General Martin Luther Agwai, has publicly and privately voiced his commitment to remove Nigeria's military forces from the Bakassi in "not a day more" than the sixty days specified in the agreement (Note: Agwai told PolMilOff there are just under 3500 troops deployed to Bakassi). Agwai made a personal tour of the deployed units shortly after the agreement was signed, and is convinced that the soldiers are ready to redeploy back to their home stations. Of particular note, Agwai (in comments widely reported in the local press) publicly praised the Army's performance and stressed that Nigeria--and the military, especially--should not view the withdrawal as a defeat, but as an example of the peaceful resolution of border disputes, a view echoed by several other interlocutors. ¶8. (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU) Agwai is excited to have these troops available for peacekeeping and internal security functions, especially as security requirements in the Delta increase, as the mission in Darfur moves to a UN deployment (with a requirement for UN-standard battalions),and as the 2007 election season begins. He plans to return the units to their home stations, perform any necessary refit (resources permitting),and then deploy the units as required. Importantly, Agwai says that he wants to only deploy entire units, not selectively deploy individuals or components. ¶9. (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU) The British DATT has shared with EmbOffs that the Presidency was noncommittal about providing funding for the withdrawal of troops from the Bakassi. He was unsure if sixty days was a reasonable timeline for withdraw, especially with no actual troop movements yet occurring, speculating that six months might be a more reasonable timeline. Nigerian Police -------------- ¶10. (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU) As the military withdraws, the Nigerian police will assume interim responsibility for security in the Bakassi, until Cameroon assumes full responsibility for the territory. The Commissioner of Police for Cross River State, DanLami Yar'Adua, told EmbOffs that his deputy had recently toured Bakassi with the Inspector General of Police (the Commissioner was on annual leave during the IGP's visit, but intends to make his own tour in the near future) to determine the security requirements. The Cross River police command has made a request to Abuja for four units of mobile police (63 police officers per unit) to handle this new responsibility. They have requested funds to rehabilitate the facilities the Nigerian military is vacating for use as police quarters, and funding to develop a radio communication system to support police operations. ¶11. (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU) When questioned about liaison with his Cameroonian counterparts in the event of a border incident (Note: Cross River State already shares a significant border with Cameroon),the Commissioner said that he had no contacts in Cameroon and that any communication ABUJA 00001841 003 OF 003 would have to be coordinated either through the Cameroonian consulate in Calabar, or (more likely) through police headquarters in Abuja. The State Security Advisor told EmbOffs that there was no formal mechanism in place to communicate with anyone on the Cameroonian side of the border, but did say that some informal networks existed for security issues. Secession -------------- ¶12. (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU) The Nigerian press has covered the Bakassi agreement extensively, initially criticizing the GON for failing to protect the Nigerians of the Bakassi and later reporting on positive steps toward implementation. One other part of the story that gets significant press are calls for secession of the Southern Cameroons (including Bakassi) from both Nigeria and Cameroon and the formation of an Ambazonian Republic. All interlocutors in Cross River downplayed the seriousness of these statements, saying that there was a very small population of English-speaking Cameroonians living "in exile" in Nigeria who were trying to latch onto the Bakassi story as a way to move their cause forward. The State Security Advisor did caution that a true resistance movement could develop, however, if the rights of the Bakassi residents were not protected and cases of abuse by Cameroonian authorities were reported. ¶13. (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU) Joe Etene, the State Assembly representative for Bakassi, provided PolMilOff with a copy of the maiden edition of the Ambaz Star--the secessionist news publication that was recently delivered to his office with a (Nigerian) cell phone number (but no name) for future contacts. The publication is technically good--glossy paper, better editing than is typical in Nigerian media--but ideologically extreme. It accuses France of a plot to destroy Nigeria ("Operation Crush Nigeria"),and calls on Ambazonians to forcefully eject the Cameroonian government "law breakers" (civil servants) from Ambazonian land. The publication also repeatedly tries to justify both the legal basis for Ambazonian independence and the existence of the Ambazonian head of state (Fongum Gorji-Dinka). Interestingly, the price for the publication is denominated in CFA, the Cameroonian currency. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU) With the exception of the request from the paramount chief for USD 200 Million, everyone involved in the transition seems to take a very reasoned view on the transition process. Everyone appears to want peace, to make the transition as smooth as possible, and has come to a realization that whether Nigeria or Cameroon rules the land, there will not be much of a difference on the ground. The real question remains the commitment of the Nigerian government to the process, and how much leverage the witness states will have on this issue with the GON. Any problems with the Greentree Accord will arise from the lack of attention by the Nigerian government to logistical issues such as funding, policing, or internal coordination. FUREY

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