NIGERIA PLANS NORTHERN ANTIDESERTIFICATION PROJECT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001826 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE PASS TO USTR TREASURY FOR DPETERS USDOC FOR 3317/ITA/OA/KBURRESS USDOC FOR 3130/USFC/OIO/ANESA/DHARRIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SENV EAID EAGR EIND NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA PLANS NORTHERN ANTIDESERTIFICATION PROJECT REF: ABUJA 1505 ¶1. Summary. Nigerian and Israeli companies are proposing an anti-desertification agricultural project for 11 states in northern Nigeria, to be expanded to eight additional states. After a tree belt stabilizes an area environmentally, the GON would bring back the people driven out by desertification, establish sustainable agriculture, and pay the settlers to build houses and then farm. President Obasanjo has endorsed the anti-desertification project. The Nigerian partner has not addressed the logistical challenges of bad roads, fuel shortages, and almost nonfunctioning railroads. The project's domestic- political goals may clash with its economic rationale. End summary. ¶2. Economic officer and agricultural attache met on June 14 with Emeka Mba, Framan Nigeria Ltd. managing director and CEO, who is seeking political and financial support for a proposed anti-desertification agricultural project for northern Nigeria. The Charge d'Affaires met previously on June 7 with Minister of Environment Helen Esuene at her request to discuss the project (reftel). The proposed program to combat desertification is known as the Nigeria "Desertification Project" as well as the "Desert to Food Program." Framan is the local representative of Israel's Agricultural Development (Agridev) Company (International), which has agricultural projects worldwide. Project Is Ambitious in Its Extent -------------- ¶3. The anti-desertification project would start big, launching in northern Nigeria's 11 "frontline" states -- its two northernmost tiers -- and the Federal Capital Territory. Mba explained this was for "balance and political reasons." Framan would expand the project to eight additional states two to three years later, after which the project's shelter belt of trees would total 1,500 km (940 miles) in length. Agridev assessed that about 35 million people in northern Nigeria suffer from the effects of desertification. ¶4. Once an area is stabilized environmentally by trees, including those producing commercial fruit and nuts, the Government of Nigeria (GON) would seek to bring back people driven out by desertification and establish sustainable agriculture. The GON intends to resettle 200 families in each local government area (LGA) -- about 1,000 families per state eventually creating at least 250,000 jobs. The GON would pay resettlers to build houses and then farm. The government will give settlers everything needed -------------- -------------- ¶5. Each family would farm 25 hectares (61.75 acres) and would receive the income from this produce. Produce from outside the 25 hectares would be owned by various levels of government, each sharing the revenue. The GON would provide seeds and seedlings, animals, houses, tools, equipment, schools, and wells -- everything needed. Most of the plants, crops, and animals would be imported hybrids expected to do well in Nigeria. For the first five or six years of the project, water would be trucked in for agriculture, until mechanized irrigation was extablished. Framan plans to use solar power exclusively to avoid relying on the electric grid. ¶6. Mba envisioned 4,000 employees -- mainly unemployed young graduates -- per state who would work outside the 25-hectare plots. Agridev would supply 100 expatriates nationally to supervise the project and Framan would manage the areas inside and outside the 25-hectare plots. Mba later upped his projected employment figures and said after two years, the project would employ 1.5 million to 2 million people. ¶7. Mba said President Obasanjo endorsed the anti- desertification project and authorized 300 billion naira ($2.34 billion) for it in 2006 with further federal money to follow -- in part because Obasanjo believed the project would burnish his legacy. The GON would commit its own funds first. Funding sources for the project would be 50% from the federal government, 20% from state governments, 10% from LGAs, and 20% from donors and the private sector. The GON would sign the contract on behalf of the states, and state governments must provide all employees that the project required. This would be a federal project with private-sector management. Framan would manage the project for 15 years and help procure donor aid. After 15 years, ABUJA 00001826 002 OF 002 the GON could choose to renew the project or to privatize it completely. Framan was seeking soft loans from the World Bank that the GON could guarantee. Conference is to seek donor assistance -------------- ¶8. Framan planne to hold a "major international conference" for ECOWAS heads of state, probably on September 8, in Nigeria. Vice President Atiku supported the project and "may have a role" in the conference, Mba said. Israel's Shimon Peres, former prime minister and currently minister for the development of the Negev, Galilee, and the regional economy, would attend. The World Bank, UN officials, and foreign donors would be invited to help launch the project. ¶9. Mba volunteered no information about how Framan would address the logistical challenges presented by bad roads and fuel shortages. When pressed, he attempted to explain away these difficulties, as well as the state of Nigeria's nearly nonfunctioning railroads. Mba did not anticipate Muslim Nigerians having any concern about the Israeli company's involvement as long as the project provided jobs and prosperity. Comment -------------- ¶10. The project is almost certainly too ambitious. The anti- desertification plan appears to be driven by political motives, as opposed to having a sound and self-sustaining economic basis. It is unlikely that the GON, northern states, and LGAs will be able to provide settlers with almost all necessary tools and infrastructure, when government now fails to provide most northern Nigerians with the most basic infrastructure and services. ¶11. Framan does not appear to have addressed in detail how the project's agricultural output will be transported and marketed. Nigeria's patchy road network is already overburdened. High-cost and unreliable transport undermine commercial agriculture in Nigeria, which needs a functioning rail network to transport bulk commodities in a cost- efficient manner. This very large, complex plan, which would require sustained budget funding assumes a high degree of efficient cooperation between multiple levels of Nigeria's governments -- cooperation that is rarely achieved. The large amounts of money and materiel to be purchased would require consistent monitoring. Would-be donors to the project may express similar concerns after being approached for their financial assistance. FUREY