DEFEAT OF THIRD TERM BOOSTS CREDIBILITY OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001661

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM NI
SUBJECT: DEFEAT OF THIRD TERM BOOSTS CREDIBILITY OF
POLITICAL PROCESS IN NORTH


Classified By: Political Counselor Russell Hanks for reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The intense mobilization over efforts to
lengthen President Obasanjo's tenure in office seem to have
had a positive corollary effect in Northern Nigeria of
injecting a much needed breath of fresh air into the stale
political process. The defeat of the proposed constitutional
amendment allowing the President a third term has energized
key Northern elites, who are now focusing on developing a
strategy for the 2007 elections. Notwithstanding this burst
of optimism, many people who met with a visiting USG
delegation in the North acknowledge that the legacy of
electoral problems in 1999 and 2003, continues to cast an
ominous shadow over the process and preparations for the 2007
elections. END SUMMARY.

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EFFORT TO DEFEAT THIRD TERM CREATES A SENSE OF UNITY
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2. (C) On a recent swing through key the Northern Nigerian
cities of Kaduna, Zaria, Kano, Sokoto, Gusau, Maiduguri, Jos
and Damaturu as part of a USG search for Muslim extremism,
three important themes involving the Nigerian political
process emerged. The first was an overwhelming sense of
relief and happiness that the third term effort was defeated.
Most interlocutors who met the assessment team called the
defeat a "victory for democracy," helping to unite people
across ethnic, religious and even regional lines. Supporters
of the third term were thus seen as simply opportunistic
and/or corrupt politicians who were not representative of
anything other than their own narrow personal interests.


3. (C) This successful exercise in coalition building
provided a rare opportunity for politicians to rally
Nigerians around a unifying position. The USG was credited
with having made timely and clear statements which our
interlocutors understood almost unanimously, to have been
against the third term, and thus in line with the thinking of
most people in Muslim northern Nigeria. This created a
palpable sense of goodwill towards the USG and its efforts to
support democracy in the country.

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ORGANIZATION IS SEEN AS THE KEY TO AFFECTING CHANGE
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4. (C) The second, more subtle, theme was that the defeat
the third term proved political organization and strategic
action could make a difference, even when underfunded in
comparison to wealthy opponents. Many of those who spoke to
Poloff said the successful efforts had led to raised
expectations. One contact in Kano said constituents asked "if
you can defeat the third term, why can't you organize a
company to give us light or water." In Kaduna, the head of a
leading Muslim NGO made up of political activists said the
third term saga confirmed that people of conscience must step
into the leadership vacuum. Towards that end, she said,
activists were pursing a two-pronged strategy.


5. (C) The first strategy, she said, was to develop a
leadership blueprint for 2007. Capable people were elected in
2003 but many were overwhelmed by the responsibilities of
office and had no specific plans or ideas for meeting the
challenges. The group is pushing the idea that an informal
think tank of activists should be proactive in suggesting
priorities and developing plans that capable leaders might
use a a blueprint for action. This might include development
and political priorities for each of the Northern states.


6. (C) The second strategy was to actually seek out and
recruit credible candidates for various offices. She
suggested one of the themes that her group was recommending
to create interest and credibility for their candidates would
focus on the introduction of policies and programs "which
would support a socially equal and just society." This, she
suggested, would make ordinary citizens more likely to see
themselves as stakeholders in the political process.

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REALITIES ON THE ROAD TO THE 2007 ELECTIONS
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7. (C) A more pessimistic note was voiced by
representatives of a Kano-based NGO which works with street
gangs (Yandaba). The ability to influence gang members, who
are a key component in electoral violence and malfeasance,
was less likely to be accomplished because of the amount of
time it took to debate and resolve the third term issue. With
time running out before elections, many NGO activists said
that politicians would soon be up to their old electoral

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tricks of contracting the Yandaba for a variety of purposes
including intimidating opponents, and thus likely to negate
the nascent efforts of pro-democracy reformers and activists.
A similar phenomenon in Maiduguri also seemed to be set to
disrupt the political process with gangs of youths already
active and identified with specific state politicians.


8. (C) With the major political parties in disarray, many
people pointed out to Poloff that confusion and violence
could as easily result from intra-party competition as from
the long-standing inter-party rivalries. Both scenarios could
be exacerbated by attempts by term-limited governors to
anoint their successors and thus control the politics of
their state. Competition between senators, who want to become
governors, and governors, who have nowhere to go politically,
was singled out as a potential flash point for violence and a
key factor affecting state politics.


9. (C) There was an almost universal lack of confidence in
the ability of the Independent Nigerian Electoral Commission
(INEC) to organize free and fair elections. The corruption of
the electoral process, according to many people interviewed,
started with the politicians at the top and spread throughout
the electoral machinery. The only way to counteract that was
for voters to actively defend their mandate, something that
people in Kano proudly pointed out they had done in 2003.


10. (C) A professor at Bayero University in Kano noted that
the elites competing for power and influence could be broken
down into three groups: the Western educated, traditional
leaders (including traditional religious leaders),and every
day religious leaders. Among these three groups, he said,
religious leaders, comprised mainly of local Imams would have
the most direct influence on how people vote and, as a
result, politicians had already started making their rounds
in order to win endorsements for 2007. This observation was
confirmed in discussions with two prominent Imams in Kano who
suggested that they both wanted to influence and well as be
influenced.

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BUHARI MAINTAINS A LARGE BASE OF SUPPORT
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11. (C) In conversations with Poloff during the trip through
the North, the one candidate whose name came up most
frequently and favorably was General Muhammadu Buhari (the
2003 ANPP candidate widely believed to have won the
election),who was often mentioned as the antithesis of the
normal Nigerian politicians. He was generally described as
the one who could "put things right." With many people in the
north expressing a deep antipathy for the Obasanjo
administration, most contacts told Poloff's that it was the
North's turn to produce the president, and that the person
who had the necessary qualities needed to rein in an out of
control system was Buhari.


12. (C) Many people mentioned his no-nonsense manner, and
his aversion to corruption as the traits which voter's most
admired. He is seen as a politician who could break with the
past and clean up Nigerian politics by bringing some order to
the chaos. Many people saw his image as an anti-politician as
his greatest strength and weakness. As a result, many people
told Poloff that they believed that Buhari would be unable to
garner the support of the political class, who see a Buhari
administration as a threat to their own political and
financial interests. "Most potential financial backers," one
contact told us, "believe they would not get their return on
investment if they back Buhari."


13. (C) Support among northern Christians, who spoke with
Poloff, was decidedly less enthusiastic, as many referred to
him as a Muslim chauvinist, giving as proof a statement from
2001, since discredited, calling for Muslim solidarity. Other
critics of Buhari noted that despite some positive
characteristics, his inability to play the political game,
including building coalitions, raising money, getting
international support and effectively getting out his message
to groups not already predisposed to him, would ultimately
doom his candidacy.


14. (C) Comment: The defeat of the third term has created,
in northern Nigeria, both political space and a glimmer of
optimism about the on-going political process. Numerous
structural issues remain in ensuring credible elections, but
an apparent willingness by many people in northern Nigeria to
engage in the process is an important first step in helping
build the momentum desperately needed to achieve credible
elections in 2007. While Buhari is clearly the favorite
candidate in the region, his lack of political organization
and savvy are rightly viewed as weakening his position in the
upcoming elections. Still, his stand on policies "with a

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human face" and his promise to deal with corruption resonates
strongly with millions of Nigerians, especially, though not
exclusively, with those living on less than a dollar a day.

FUREY