DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT: ABUJA AFTERMATH

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001079

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, D, INR, DRL, PRM

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT: ABUJA AFTERMATH

REF: ABUJA 1076


1. (SBU) Summary: Sudan Liberation Movement faction
leader Minni Minnawi remains under considerable pressure on
number of fronts for signing the Darfur Peace Agreement. His
followers are seeking assistance in bolstering his ability to
promote the deal in Darfur. SLM's Abdelwahid Nur continues
to try to strike a supplementary side deal that includes a
region and majority of seats in Darfur, and SLM participation
in verifying the disarmament of the janjaweed Justice and
Equality Movement leadership is sticking to its position, but
some rank-and-file, particularly non-Kobe Zaghawa, support
signing the agreement. The African Union is holding the
agreement open for signature before May 15 and closing down
its operations at the Chida International Hotel on May 11
when the Movements depart. This marks the last report from
the Abuja venue. End Summary.

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MINNI UNDER PRESSURE
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2. (SBU) Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) faction leader
Minni Minnawi remains under considerable pressure for signing
the agreement. He is a convenient target for Justice and
Equality (JEM) propaganda claiming he has "sold out" to the
Government of Sudan. In addition, SLM-Minni supporters claim
that JEM's Dr. Khalil Ibrahim is spreading around "a lot" of
money to Minni's commanders in the field. Khalil is
allegedly offering them positions in his "army". Another
popular accusation going around is that Minni signed under
"American duress". Unfortunately, many of those around Minni
are so provoked by these tactics that they fail to counteract
them by coolly publicizing the benefits of the DPA to Minni's
constituents. Finally, Ali Traiyo confided that Minni spent
everything he had to secure consensus within his faction and
has nothing left to offer those in the field. As a result,
his forces are highly vulnerable to these verbal accusations
and monetary enticements. Minni plans to go to Tripoli to
appease the Libyans and most likely seek some support on the
ground for his troops.

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INSIDE ABDELWAHID'S HEAD
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4. (SBU) SLM faction leader Abdelwahid Nur still believes
he can get a supplementary deal that will allow him to sign
onto the DPA. Abdelwahid told remaining USDEL member on May
11 that he needs the following to bring the Fur onboard:
Darfur must be a region, the Movements must have a majority
of the seats and positions (55 percent) in Darfur, and SLM
must be part of the verification of the disarmament of the
janjaweed. Abdulwahid said he is completely satisfied with
the Senior Special Assistant position but still believes SPLM
will allow Darfur to become a region. Abakar Abubashir,
Abdelwahid's chairman of the Wealthsharing Commission, said
Abdelwahid met with Sudanese Government delegation head
Magzoub Al Kaliffa the night before he departed. According
to Abubashir and Abdelwahid, Magzoub agreed to consider a
supplementary side deal. However, upon return to Khartoum,
Magzoub, reneged on this promise. Nonetheless, Abdelwahid,
surrounded by three close advisors (Ahmed Abdulshafi, Nouri
Abdullah, and Ahmed Al Deen) continues down this path.


5. (SBU) Abdelwahid saw President Obasanjo on May 10 and
presented his ideas and asked Obasanjo to assist him in
brokering this deal. According to Nigerian Special Envoy
Ambassador Abayomi, Obasanjo rejected the idea and told AU
Chief Negotiator Sam Ibok that he does not want to see
Abdelwahid again. Abdelwahid also refuses to participate in
the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation. Abdelwahid said
that he is worried that the Government of Sudan is going to
have him assassinated so that he can be replaced with a more
pliable Fur leader. USDEL requested that Abdelwahid be
careful not make any public statements about the agreement
that could incite unrest in the refugee and IDP camps. At
this point, given his demands, the odds remain low that
Abdelwahid will sign, according to the AU mediation.
Abdelwahid is moving to a cheaper hotel for the next few days
and says he intends to travel to Chad and then to Jebel Marra.

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JUSTICE AND EQUALITY
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6. (SBU) Justice and Equality Movement apparently continues
its propaganda offensive against Minni. According to two

ABUJA 00001079 002 OF 002


dissident JEM members, Mohammed Abdul Adam and Ismail Ahmed
Rahama, Hassan Al-Turabi and Sadiq Al Maddi are arranging to
disrupt an SLM-Minni press conference to be held in Khartoum.
According to Adam, Turabi is angry that JEM did not deliver
the Vice Presidency or the region. The dissidents said that
the well-financed Khalil-run mafia will not stop in its
efforts to undermine Minni. Adam said that there are many
more disgruntled JEM members like him who are having
difficulty returning to Egypt. The Egyptian Embassy in
Nigeria is awaiting a list from Abderahmane Moussa verifying
their opposition to JEM's decision not to sign. Adam said
that Khalil is now in France, who supports his efforts to
back Chadian President Idriss Deby. They also said Khalil is
likely to travel to Tripoli and back to Chad within the
coming week. Khalil is also exploiting the statements of
Minni's London-based "assistant foreign minister" Ibrahim
Adam Ibrahim (who was the planner for the Haskenita
conference). Ibrahim has insinuated that Minni is waffling
on the deal.

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COMMENT
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7. (SBU) Minni's SLM faction is becoming desperate in its
appeals for assistance. He urgently needs a public relations
campaign in Darfur and in the international press promoting
the agreement, not himself. The campaign, which could
include radio spots and handbills, should outline the
benefits and timeline and how Darfurians can participate in
the process. SLM lacks any capable public relations
personnel and lacks a headquarters after being moved out of
Asmara. SLM is looking to establishing a SLM center in
Abuja, Cairo, or Tripoli. In addition, SLM members are
seeking political party training and have been invited to
Juba to work with SPLM members there. SLM is asking for
assistance with transport and securing a house there for
members who will be virtual "apprentices" to SPLM. An
important aspect of a public relations campaign is that it
must target the Fur, Dadjo, Masselit, Birgid and other small
ethnic groups to prevent the deal from looking like a Zaghawa
pact with the Government of Sudan. The GOS should also be
encouraged not to say or do anything that will undermine the
signatories. Meanwhile, Abderahamane Moussa and other
dissents should not be shut out of the process. In this
vein, Minni needs to be encouraged to be highly inclusive of
other groups in nominating people for positions in Darfur.
CAMPBELL