PRESIDENT OBASANJO FULLY SUPPORTS DEPUTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001009 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, D, INR, DRL, PRM E.O. 12958:QDECL: 05/03/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI SUBJECT: PRESIDENT OBASANJO FULLY SUPPORTS DEPUTY SECRETARYQS PUSH FOR A DARFUR AGREEMENTQNOW SIPDIS CLASSIFIED by Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5,b.d. ¶1. (C) During the Deputy SecretaryQs May 3 call, President Obasanjo promised his full support in the final Abuja push for an agreement between the Darfur rebel groups and the Government of Sudan (GOS). The President and the Deputy Secretary shared ideas about possible ways forward to an SIPDIS agreement. As Foreign Minister Adeniji had foreshadowed during a brief conversation before the Presidential meeting, Obasanjo looked to involve African heads of state gathering in Abuja for a malaria-tuberculosis-HIV/AIDS conference to pressure all parties to reach an agreement. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Deputy Secretary Zoellick called on President Obasanjo at his official residence on May 3, accompanied by AF Assistant Secretary Frazer, the U.S. Charge dQAffaires in Khartoum, the U.S. Ambassador in Abuja and members of the D staff. The President was accompanied by Foreign Minister Adeniji and members of the presidential personal staff. ¶3. (C) After initial pleasantries, the Deputy Secretary asked the President for his views on the Abuja Darfur talks between the Government of Sudan and Darfur rebel groups. The President thanked the Deputy Secretary for coming to Abuja and for continued U.S. involvement in the search for a solution, including the presence of an American delegation during the months of negotiation. The current AU draft text that seeks to mediate between the Darfur groups and the GOS is Qas good as we can get.Q The draft, in his view, considered all elements that any of the parties had put on the table, and took into account what was generally acceptable to them. Salim Salim, the AU Darfur mediator, had briefed him on it with the request that the President help QsellQ it. Obasanjo said that though the text was not perfect, he had agreed to try to win its acceptance. Obasanjo then described how he had convinced the Vice President of Sudan to agree QreluctantlyQ to the text, rather than to bear the onus of having blocked an agreement. Obasanjo said he had met individually with each of the rebel groups in Abuja. In the face of their varying degrees of intransigence, he had argued that delay risked further splintering of the rebel groups and even of international sanctions. He had argued that it was time to move from the battlefield to politics: Qyou could win at the polls, but absent an agreement, you could end up with nothing.Q Obasanjo said he had pointed out to the rebel groups that if they remained intransigent, they risked the perception of being Qthe bad guy.Q ¶4. (C) After praising ObasanjoQs efforts for peace in Darfur, the Deputy Secretary said that the reality is that the GOS has accepted the draft text while the three rebel movements have not. Hence, the task is to persuade the rebels that they risk losing the opportunity for a settlement. Yet, they continue to object to provisions for demobilization, integration of forces and other security issues. Under these circumstances, he saw two ways forward: the first had been his effort to mediate; he was awaiting an early response to his efforts of May 2-3. If that failed, he continued, the other option would be to select certain aspects of the GOS and rebel positions, incorporate them into a text, and present it to all parties as our own package of revisions. There would be sweeteners to encourage its acceptance. With respect to non-security issues, the U.S. and the U.K. have developed modest adjustments to the AU text. In addition they would organize a conference for raising assistance money. He would meet individually with each of the rebel groups Q making the point that the option was a settlement, or nothing. If the parties want to come to terms, we will work with them. But, the Deputy Secretary continued, levels of suspicion were very high. ¶5. (C) Obasanjo observed that by May 4, a significant number of African leaders will be in Abuja, including the chairman of the AU, for a Malaria-Tuberculosis-HIV/AIDS meeting. Obasanjo undertook to use their presence to get the AU and its member states behind what the international community is doing for a Darfur agreement. In response to the Deputy Secretary, the President said he would underscore with the other African leaders the importance of getting an agreement, and that he would try, that very evening, to persuade Sudan President Bashir to recognize that he has his own stake in achieving a settlement. Turning to the issue of a UN force in Darfur, Obasanjo observed that the Sudan did not want one Q but Khartoum is even more afraid of a NATO force, and would recognize that it has no choice but accept one from the UN. The Deputy Secretary observed that ABUJA 00001009 002 OF 002 it was obviously better to have a peace agreement, but, if one were not achieved, Darfur would still need help from international peacekeepers. ¶6. (C) This message has been cleared by D staff. CAMPBELL