PRIME MINISTER MBR TELLS AMBASSADOR "DUBAI PORTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000933 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARPI E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2021 TAGS: PREL EINV PNUC PTER IR IQ IS AE SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER MBR TELLS AMBASSADOR "DUBAI PORTS WORLD WILL NOT AFFECT OUR RELATIONSHIP" REF: ABU DHABI 850 (NOTAL) ABU DHABI 00000933 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, UAE Vice President/Prime Minister and Dubai Ruler, told Ambassador and CG Dubai March 11 that the recent furor related to Dubai Ports World "will not affect our relationship at all." The U.S.-UAE relationship was excellent in all fields -- military, business, intelligence cooperation -- and "nothing is going to change that," MBR emphasized. He also provided a readout on his recent meeting with visiting Iranian deputy FM Mostafavi, who had warned that Iran would not give up its "peaceful" nuclear program, and would "damage a lot of places" if it was "hit." Expressing surprise at the Iranian president's speech several months ago about "wiping out" Israel, MBR noted that Israeli delegations, including a recent one from the Israel MFA, visit Dubai regularly. Following the meeting, DPW Executive Chairman Sultan bin Sulayim told Ambassador and CG that DPW intends to divest itself fully of P&O's North American operations, possibly a "long process." Sulayim said he was hesitant to state that publicly out of fear it could lead to pressure for an immediate sale. In the short term, DPW would look for an American company to which it could transfer control of day-to-day operations (para 9). End Summary. ¶2. (C) The office of UAE Prime Minister/Vice President (and Ruler of Dubai) Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid (MBR) contacted ConGen Dubai March 11 afternoon to request an urgent meeting with Ambassador. Ambassador opened the 1630 meeting by expressing appreciation for MBR's reference to the "strong relationship" with the U.S. in announcing the DPW would transfer control of P&O's North American operations to a U.S. entity. (Prior to MBR's entering the room, his staff had advised Ambassador and CG Dubai that it was MBR himself who had penned those words.) Nodding, MBR told the Ambassador that for his part, he greatly appreciated President Bush's statement that "the UAE is our ally." MBR advisors Sultan bin Sulayim (DPW),Mohammed Gergawi (UAE Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs adn Chairman, Dubai Holdings),and SSO Director Al-Qemzi also attended. Military, Intel, Business Relationship Unchanged -------------- --- ¶3. (C) MBR said he had asked to meet the Ambassador in order to "tell you that this (DPW) will not affect our relationship at all -- everything is going to remain the same." The decision to back down on DPW's bid to run U.S. ports had been taken "in order to save the (U.S.) President from embarrassment, and because of the strong partnership." Turning to his State Security Director Mohammed Al-Qemzi, MBR asked in Arabic: "How are things with the Americans?" Qemzi said, "Cooperation is excellent and detailed a recent interdiction effort and joint counterproliferation task force meeting." MBR welcomed the news. ¶4. (C) Later in the conversation, MBR reiterated that "we have a good relationship, and nothing is going to change that." Ambassador replied "That has been my message back to Washington, that U.S.-UAE bilateral cooperation is not a relationship that would be challenged by one transaction -- we know that nothing will change at Jebel Ali for the U.S. Navy or Al Dhafra for the U.S. Air Force; we are in this partnership for the long term. We couldn't ask for a better ally in our regional stability or counterterror efforts." Agreeing enthusiastically, MBR (who also holds the title of UAE Minister of Defense) added "nothing will change on other levels, either -- the business, airplanes, engines, weapons -- everything should stay the same." He added that the UAE wants "to set ourselves as an example" to other countries in the region. Iran's Nuclear Program -------------- ¶5. (C) MBR said that in his March 6 meeting with Iran's visiting Deputy FM Mostafavi (reftel),Mostafavi had brought a letter "claiming that the Bushehr reactor was not a threat" because it was based on "first German, and now Russian" technology and was therefore safe enough to be located "in a European city." The Iranians had said they were "not going ABU DHABI 00000933 002.2 OF 002 to give up, but were going ahead with their nuclear program for peaceful purposes." They ("just like Secretary Rice") had predicted that the UN would split, with Russia or China not backing the U.S.; in any event, the Iranians argued, the world could not boycott Iran because doing so would "cause the price of oil to shoot up." Mostafavi had expressed concern that "the U.S. would get Israel to hit Iran," and had threatened that "if they hit us, we will damage a lot of places." MBR said he had told them they should back down, and that "if you hit anyone else, you yourself will be gone." ¶6. (C) Ambassador told MBR that "we do have serious concerns in Iran, as the Secretary outlined to you during her February 23 visit, and there is growing international concern over Tehran's nuclear ambitions." The Iranians needed see the weight of the international community; the pressure was not coming from just one or two countries. MBR said, "We do not want Iran to have a nuclear program, and we do not want you to fight them, because we would be affected." Solidly With The U.S. -------------- ¶7. (C) MBR intimated that the Iranians were "crazy" for saying that Israel must be wiped out at "at a time like this, when all the Arabs, including the Palestinians, agree that there must be peace with Israel." MBR noted that Israeli delegations came to Dubai regularly, that a delegation from the Israeli MFA had just been to see DPW Executive Chairman Sultan bin Sulayim a few days ago. ¶8. (C) Reiterating that "we believe in the relationship, with the U.S., and want it to be stronger than ever," MBR recounted some of the UAE's own experience with terror attacks, mostly from the early 1970's, including the assassination of the UAE Foreign Minister at the Abu Dhabi airport, and the hijacking of a Japanese airliner in Dubai, which MBR himself (as Minister of Defense) had been involved in handling. SSD Chief Al-Qemzi summed up by noting that "we also are victims of terrorism, and we are still solidly with you; no one is immune, but we are doing our best to make Dubai a safe place." Dubai Ports World -------------- ¶9. (C) Although MbR noted during the meeting that DPW was working with Treasury to implement the transfer decision, he offered no details. In subsequent phone conversations with CG and Ambassador, DPW's Sultan bin Sulayim clarified that DPW's "intent is full divestiture." DPW would find potential buyers for its North American operations, and would then consult with Congress as to which ones might be acceptable. That could be a "long process," however; so in the short term DPW was looking for an American company to which it could transfer control of day-to-day operations. (Congress would be consulted on that, too, he said.) "We do not want to be forced to sell in a hurried or stressful way," Sulayim emphasized. The danger, as he saw it, was that a public declaration could lead to pressure to "sell immediately." That would not be acceptable to DPW, Sulayim declared. SISON