STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROL PLAN FOR THE UAE - OUR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 004257 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/ARP, ISN/ECC E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2016 TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL KSTC AE SUBJECT: STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROL PLAN FOR THE UAE - OUR THOUGHTS REF: A. STATE 184118 ¶B. ABU DHABI 4219 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reason 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (C) We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft EXBS program plan for the UAE. The UAE remains a major concern as a transshipment point for WMD/missile related products for a number of reasons: -- the UAE still lacks an export control/transshipment control law; -- the UAE and Iran are major trading partners; -- the UAE has demonstrated a reluctance to take aggressive actions against diversions to Iran both out of concern for the potential security repercussions and the impact on trade. ¶2. (S/NF) Post believes that the EXBS strategy should be closely linked to our ongoing Counterproliferation Task Force (CTF) efforts and the ongoing U.S. interagency discussions on possible actions to take, should the UAE not implement effective laws and enforcement mechanisms. The EXBS plan would be an excellent topic of discussion at the next CTF meeting. In addition, should we need to take actions to encourage the UAE to pass and enforce its export control law, we would want to make sure that our proposed training plan helped move the UAE effectively toward that goal. ¶3. (C) Post offers the following comments on the proposed EXBS action plan. We should focus the plan on a few key items in the near term, with the understanding that further cooperation and training will be forthcoming when the UAE actually implements a new export control law. In addition, we would suggest that the Department give consideration to involving either Singapore or Hong Kong in training programs on transshipment issues. Both are major transshipment hubs and both have shown more progress in the establishment, implementation, and enforcement of indigenous export control systems. The UAE (especially Dubai) is likely to view their experiences as relevant. ¶4. (S/NF) In general, we do not believe it would be effective to offer the UAE any training on control lists or targeting controlled goods until the UAE actually has an export control law and implements control lists under that law. The UAE has received multiple programs on control lists and claims to be incorporating them into its export control law. A recent message from the UAE regarding the transshipment of carbon steel strips, suggests that the UAE is -- at least partially -- consulting some of the international control lists (ref b). It is unclear, however, as to whether it effectively controls goods on these lists. Therefore, programs such as Control List Gap Analysis, and Target and Risk Management should be presented as pending passage/enactment of a law rather than with any specific dates. ¶5. (C) International Border Interdiction Training - The UAE would likely welcome this training as a way to strengthen its border with both Saudi Arabia and Oman. Post notes, however, that all of the information we have received on diversions suggests that it would be more effective to target the ports and airports before the land borders. (Note: The UAE has over the last few years taken steps to tighten controls over its long land borders with Oman and Saudi Arabia, although its primary concern has been more to prevent the illegal entry of goods and people rather than controlling the export of goods. That said, given the UAE's highly efficient ports and lack of export controls, we believe that the land border is less of an immediate concern for WMD transshipment at the present time than the sea and air ports. End Note.) ¶6. (C) Port Security Vulnerability Assessment -- The UAE has agreed in principle to host a USG interagency critical infrastructure assessment team. If this program is coordinated with that effort, it could be very useful, especially if the team looked at the UAE's main oil export terminal of Jebel Dhana. It would therefore appear to be a high priority action. ¶7. (C) Nuclear Commodity Identification training/WMD ABU DHABI 00004257 002 OF 002 Commodity Identification Training -- The USG provided WMD related training in Dubai in 2003/2004. This training should build on the previous programs. SISON