RESTRICTIVE LAWS HAMPER MEPI GOALS AND ACTIVITIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ABU DHABI 000417 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/PI, NEA/ARPI, NEA/FO, DRL/PHD, S/P PLEASE PASS USAID FOR ANE/NEA, DCHA/DG E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016 TAGS: KMPI KDEM PHUM PGOV AE MEPI SUBJECT: RESTRICTIVE LAWS HAMPER MEPI GOALS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE GULF Classified By: MEPI Regional Office Director Hans Wechsel, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This message from the MEPI Regional Office has been cleared by Embassies Abu Dhabi, Doha, Kuwait, Manama, and Muscat. ¶2. (SBU) Summary: Restrictive laws that limit the establishment, funding, and activities of NGOs and other civil society groups have been and will continue to be a major impediment for MEPI efforts - and later those of the Foundation for the Future - to seek and support the growth of democracy in Gulf countries. (An appendix summarizing each Gulf country's legal restrictions on civil society has been included.) Legal restrictions and governmental control over civil society at times are used to hamper some civil society activities that are key to advancing MEPI projects and goals. Furthermore, the current governmental stifling of civil society limits the number and strength of voices that would compete with the voices of extremism. ¶3. (C) Summary Cont: In order to effectively support the efforts of an independent civil society to fuel democratic reforms from within, a two-pronged approach is necessary: First, MEPI should seek programming specifically aimed at liberalizing the laws that govern civil society groups in the Gulf. Second, until new legislation is enacted, the USG will have to press governments to use their discretionary authority under existing laws to accommodate some of the more sensitive MEPI projects currently planned for the Gulf. End Summary. -------------- - The shallow end of the MENA civil society pool -------------- - ¶4. (SBU) In a recent effort to identify local groups that could conceivably undertake small to medium-scale MEPI-funded projects, posts and the Abu Dhabi RO identified twice as many groups in Yemen and Jordan than in the six Gulf countries combined. While the developing status of both of those countries is a key factor in the existence of larger civil society communities there, so is the approach of those host governments' toward the establishment of civil society groups. Yemen has the most liberal (though still flawed) legal requirements in the sub-region. Jordan's law gives the government - like Gulf governments - broad discretion over the establishment of civil society groups. Unlike Gulf governments, however, Jordan generally uses that discretion to let civil society groups proliferate. ¶5. (SBU) In the Gulf, the financial and administrative requirements for licensing an NGO or professional association are more extensive than other sub-regions of the MENA, and are far more onerous than Western standards. Even when those obstacles can be surmounted, the government often uses its broad discretion to prevent licensing. In Qatar, for example, post officials and Qatari contacts estimate that less than 15 percent of applications to establish new civil society groups have been approved. In the UAE, the first &NGO8 (other charitable and educational civil society organizations exist) has yet to be established, and at least two applications known to Embassy officials have been pending for more than a year. Only a handful of "NGOs" exist in Saudi Arabia, and they can only be established by royal decree. -------------- Can local groups accept USG funding? -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Official NGOs are not the only possible recipients of MEPI funds. Other types of civil society organizations, such as professional associations, community groups, and universities are also potential recipients. Whether an official NGO or some other kind of civil society group; local groups in five Gulf countries cannot accept USG funds without the host government's written permission. (Note: The exception is Bahrain, where groups are required to inform the government of their intention to accept USG (and other foreign) funding. The GOB can disallow the group accepting USG funds, but no government response signals consent. Some groups choose to request and receive government permission to accept U.S. funds so they do not run into problems in the future. End Note) Several representatives of civil society groups in Gulf countries have cited the necessary governmental approval of MEPI funding as a reason for either limiting the activities proposed, or not submitting a proposal to MEPI at all. ¶7. (C) Kuwaiti officials made clear to post that its recent effort to broadly publicize MEPI funding opportunities was not welcome. GOK contacts explained that they share the objectives of MEPI programs, but anticipated two negative consequences to publicizing outside funding for NGOs: (1) a conservative backlash within the National Assembly, and (s) pressure from Iran to be allowed to follow the U.S. precedent and provide funding to purported religious NGOs with less benign intentions within Kuwait. (Note: Kuwait's law does permit foreign funding, though the Government's approval is required. In practice, the many sources of both public and private funding available to most Kuwaitis limits interest in seeking outside funding. End Note.) The Omani Government, meanwhile, would not approve an Embassy press release on MEPI funding opportunities for dissemination to local papers. Even in Bahrain, where the Government has a more liberal attitude toward reform and MEPI than other Gulf countries, the Bahrain Transparency Society would not conclude a grant agreement with MEPI until it had written permission from the GOB (per the notation above),which delayed the project for 3 months. -------------- U.S.-based groups are also stymied by law -------------- ¶8. (SBU) With limited options for supporting democratic change through direct funding of local groups, MEPI often funds U.S.-based organizations instead. These organizations can then hire local representatives, partner with local groups, or provide services directly to individual program participants. Many of these U.S.-based organizations still need some kind of presence on the ground, however, to implement their projects effectively. Like the establishment of local NGOs, the ability of foreign or international NGOs to establish a branch office or resident representative in Gulf countries is also hampered by restrictive laws and/or broad governmental discretion. ¶9. (C) In Bahrain, the lack of legislation allowing the registration of foreign and international NGOs has forced NDI to seek the umbrella of an GoB institute to make its continued presence there legal. NDI and the GoB institute have not yet been able to reach a mutually acceptable MoU, however, and the MFA recently asked NDI to suspend its activities. Per Manama 0092, the Foreign Minister offered to assist NDI in resolving its status, and direct contacts between NDI and the Bahrain Institute for Political Development appear to be yielding positive measures that should lead to a final resolution of NDI's status soon. ¶10. (C) In Qatar, the IRI program director has for more than 15 months unsuccessfully sought legal status for IRI in Qatar. Without legal recognition of IRI, she has been forced to depart the country at frequent intervals to abide by the terms of her visitor visa. More importantly, IRI's ability to work with groups and institutions interested in its services has been hampered by concerns over its lack of legal status and/or their inability to obtain explicit permission from the MFA to conduct an activity with IRI. As a result of the Government's lack of official recognition of IRI and/or explicit permission to carry out activities, IRI has been largely idle in Qatar for several months. ¶11. (C) New MEPI projects in the pipeline for several Gulf countries through AIESEC, Freedom House, and IREX, as well as new phases of bilateral programming through NDI or IRI in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman, may all face these types of problems as they try to roll out their programs in 2006. No U.S. implementer can effectively move programming forward in the Gulf unless the host government accommodates the project. -------------- Don't get "political" -------------- ¶12. (U) Whether directly funded or just partnered with an U.S. implementer, civil society groups in every Gulf country are legally prohibited from engaging in "political" activities. Other vague prohibitions for civil society groups include undermining "national unity", "social peace", and even "harmony". Sanctions if the government deems that a group has violated these provisions range from shutting down the organization to jailing its leadership. ¶13. (SBU) Such actions are rare, but occur enough - including in the past year - that the possibility creates some degree of "self-censorship" among most civil society groups. With the exception of Bahrain, where there has been more political space for civil society than elsewhere in the Gulf, most groups in the Gulf are cautious about advocating reform positions on highly political issues that are critical of government policy. Combined with the above-mentioned requirement for governmental approval of foreign funding, MEPI is unlikely to get many proposals from local groups that are significantly more forward-leaning on political reform issues than their host governments. ¶14. (C) Partnering - or even participating - in a forward-leaning political reform project with a U.S.-based implementer also gives local groups pause. Many Gulf countries require civil society groups to report any official contacts with foreign groups or governments. The UAE Journalist Association (JA),for example, was eager for a MEPI project that would provide it the services of an U.S.-based media law expert, but was concerned that some UAEG officials might try to thwart the project if informed. To avoid broadly informing the Government, the JA moved forward with the project on the condition that its verbal assurances would suffice, as any written communications to the USG would have to be forwarded to two UAEG ministries as well. -------------- Mosque-based "civil society" -------------- ¶15. (SBU) The ability to organize and get messages out is central to any group's ability to influence issue debates and affect public opinion. Without a free and vibrant civil society, however, it is difficult to for groups in the Gulf to form and affect public opinion. Islamic extremists, meanwhile, are able to spread their ideas through existing networks. ¶16. (C) The absence of a robust civil society free to advocate issue positions that are critical of government policy contributes to a disproportionate influence for extremists as detractors. A robust civil society would expand the number and strength of voices that are critical of government policy without advocating extremism. Along with a free press and political parties, a robust civil society is part of an equation for creating a marketplace for ideas in the Gulf that does not disadvantage moderates. -------------- -------------- Aim programming at liberalizing civil society laws -------------- -------------- ¶17. (SBU) All of the Gulf posts' democracy strategies rightly call for strengthening civil society, and MEPI has some programs available to the Gulf that can contribute to that. The key to broadly strengthening civil society in the Gulf, however, is liberalization of the laws that govern its establishment, funding, and activities. With or without MEPI support, civil society will not be a significant force for democratic reform in the Gulf unless the legislative ties that bind it are loosened. ¶18. (C) MEPI should seek programming that would work with existing Gulf civil society groups to promote better civil society laws from elsewhere in the Arab world, and/or help them draft new model legislation. Such a project could, however, quickly run into many of the obstacles described above. Existing civil society laws could easily thwart a project aimed at liberalizing those laws. In the current situation, a civil society law project - like any sensitive project in the Gulf - will only go forward if host governments are persuaded to accommodate it. ¶19. (C) In addition to bilateral efforts to liberalize civil society laws, it may also be worth raising the issue through the GCC structure. The GCC Secretariat in Riyadh, regular GCC ministerials, possible sidebars with GCC colleagues at FFF events, and the Secretary's annual meeting with GCC FMs at UNGA, are all potential opportunities. -------------- -------------- Advancing MEPI democratic reform projects this year -------------- -------------- ¶20. (C) Civil society laws in the Gulf are hindering some existing MEPI projects. Nevertheless, most of these laws also give broad discretionary authority to the government. Until laws are liberalized, "pushing the envelope" of democratic reform in partnership with civil society groups in the Gulf will rely on the USG convincing governments on a case-by-case basis to accommodate some of the more sensitive MEPI projects. We should expect that in 2006 bilateral dialogue might be necessary with Gulf governments to advance several key MEPI regional programs already in the pipeline through Freedom House, AIESEC, Arab Civitas, and IREX; as well as bilateral programs through IRI and NDI. Otherwise, some of these programs - as well as the key aspects of posts' democracy strategies they are meant to support - simply may not move forward. -------------- -- Appendix: Summary of Civil Society Restrictions -------------- -- ¶21. (U) Bahrain: Licensing: --The Ministry of Social Development licenses civil society associations and organizations. --Applications can be rejected by the Ministry for broad, ill-defined reasons. Funding: --Local societies planning to receive funding from foreign groups or governments must inform the Ministry of Social Development. --Bahraini associations must also apply for a fundraising permit to the Ministry of Social Development. The application is a lengthy process, and must be tied to a specific project or activity after which a new permit must be sought for a new activity/project. Activities: --Bahraini associations registered with the Ministry of Social Development cannot participate in &political activities8, must adhere to "public order and morals" and must ensure its activities do not affect the "the safety of the state, the form of government or its social order." --Possible sanctions for activities deemed illegal include dissolution. The Minister also has the right to halt the implementation of any decision made on the part of the NGO if it was deemed to contravene the law, NGO regulations, public order or morals. --Affiliation with international or foreign NGOs must be approved by the Ministry of Social Development. --The Ministry must be notified of any "General Assembly" meeting 15 days in advance. The NGO must provide the Ministry with a copy of the invitation letter, the meeting,s agenda, and all other documents the members receive. The Ministry can designate a representative to attend the meeting on its behalf. The minutes of meeting must be provided to the Ministry within 15 days of its occurrence. ¶22. (U) Kuwait: Licensing: --The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs licenses civil society associations and organizations. --Applications can be rejected by the Ministry at its discretion without citing any provision of law. More common than outright rejection is a non-response, with applications left to languish within the bureaucracy. --Rejections can only be appealed to the Minister. There is no judicial review. Funding: --Associations are prohibited from accepting funds or benefits from any source outside of Kuwait without the approval of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. --The Board of Directors must annually submit to the Ministry complete financial accounts for the previous year's activities, and its draft budget for the next year. Activities: --Associations are prohibited from &engaging in politics, religious conflicts, or other activities that may incite sectarianism or discrimination.8 --Possible sanctions for activities deemed illegal include dissolution, fines, and imprisonment. --The Ministry can designate a representative to attend the meetings of any General Assembly meeting. --Affiliation with international or foreign NGOs is prohibited without the permission of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. ¶23. (U) Oman: Licensing: --Ministry of Social Development licenses civil society associations and organizations, except some licensed under special laws. State security services must screen applications and membership rolls as an obligatory step in this process. --Applications can be rejected by the Ministry for broad, ill-defined reasons. --Rejections can only be appealed to the Minister. There is no judicial review. Funding: --The Minister,s approval, after proper vetting with state security services, is required before funds can be accepted from any source outside Oman. Activities: --Allowable fields in which associations may work include care of orphans, care of children and women, women,s services, care of the old, care of the disabled and special groups, care for the environment, and any other sphere or activity that the Minister of Social Development approves along with the Council of Ministers. --Associations &may not engage in politics or interfere in religious matters, and must avoid tribal or sectarian groupings.8 --Possible sanctions for activities deemed illegal include dissolution, fines, and imprisonment. --The Minister of Social Development may rescind any decision or action taken by an NGO's Board of Directors. --Associations may not send delegations outside Oman or host delegations from outside the country before obtaining the approval of the Ministry. --Affiliation with international or foreign NGOs must be approved by the Minister. --Associations are subject to the Ministry,s "supervision"; including the right to attend activities, and the right to enter an association's office(s) and examine its records and documents. ¶24. (U) Qatar: Licensing: --The Ministry of Civil Service Affairs licenses civil society associations and organizations. --Applications can be rejected by the Ministry without justification or comment. --Rejections may be appealed only to the Cabinet of Ministers. There is no judicial review. --Membership of all civil society groups must be at least 80% Qatari. --NGO licenses cost $14,000. Funding: --Ministry approval is required before funds can be accepted from any source outside Qatar. The association,s board of directors must annually present to the Ministry complete financial accounts for its previous year's activities and its draft budget for the next year. Activities: --"Involvement in political matters" is prohibited. --Possible sanctions for activities deemed illegal include dissolution, fines, and imprisonment. --Affiliation with international or foreign NGOs must be approved by the Ministry. --The association,s activities are subject to the "supervision and control" of the Ministry. ¶25. (U) Saudi Arabia: There are no specific provisions in Saudi law that deal with the establishment, funding, or activities of civil society organizations. The few "NGOs" in country were established by decree. Some professional associations have been allowed to form. All "civil society" organizations exist and operate under governmental control. ¶26. (U) UAE: Licensing: --The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs licenses civil society associations and organizations -- Applications can be rejected by the Ministry at its discretion without citing any provision of law. --Rejections can only be appealed to the Minister. There is no judicial review. Funding: --Groups must obtain a special permit from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs before funds can be accepted from any source outside the UAE. Activities: --Groups may undertake social, religious, cultural, educational, and technical activities, and/or provide humanitarian or charitable services. -- Groups are &prohibited from engaging in politics, or in activities that may raise religious, ethnic, or sectarian conflicts.8 --Possible sanctions for activities deemed illegal include dissolution, fines, and imprisonment. --Groups are not allowed to participate in any conferences or meetings abroad without a permit from the Ministry of Social Affairs. --Affiliation with international or foreign NGOs must be approved by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Interior. -- The Ministry of Social Affairs has the right of &direction and technical supervision8 over any association's projects and programs. SISON SISON