GENERAL ABIZAID WITH ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE: IRAN,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 003944

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS PARM IR AF PK IZ AE
SUBJECT: GENERAL ABIZAID WITH ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE: IRAN,
IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN

REF: ABU DHABI 3835

Classified by Charge Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

Summary
--------------


1. (S) On the evening of October 9, CENTCOM Commander
General John Abizaid and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy
Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin
Zayed (MbZ) Al Nahyan discussed Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
On Iran, MbZ pressed for clarity on U.S. "war plans" and
called for closer coordination than he said he had seen on
Iraq. He looked forward to the October 19 Gulf Security
Dialogue as an opportunity to discuss contingency planning,
with a focus on keeping the oil flowing. MbZ noted the
lamentable history of Iraqi politics under Saddam and cited
the danger of "gangs" loyal to religious leader Moqtada
Al-Sadr. MbZ said the UAE had made no decision on boosting
its troop numbers in Afghanistan to 1,000, yet would be
sending an additional 50 troops soon. He discussed UAE
efforts to calm extremism in southern Afghanistan, with a
focus on schools, mosques, and clinics. He called on Saudi
Arabia to make similar efforts on the Pakistan side of the
border. End summary.

North Korea - Iran
--------------


2. (C) MbZ said Iran was "very nervous" about its situation
in the international community and said he would be watching
to see how Iran reacted to the North Korean nuclear test. He
compared East Asia (which is home to many stable countries)
to the Middle East, where a potential arms race was a much
more complicated "nightmare." He said Iran was determined to
gain a nuclear capability; neither the UAE nor "even Israel"
knew Iran's true plans, he lamented (and "they know more than
us").

Iran - Gulf Security Dialogue
--------------


3. (S) MbZ asked about the upcoming October 19 Gulf Security
Dialogue in the context of protecting the flow of oil from
the Arabian Gulf in the event of an Iran crisis. He said a
lapse in oil traffic of even one day would be difficult for
markets to sustain and quipped about building a pipeline to
Oman when Abizaid suggested the Iranians could conceivably
close the straits of Hormuz for some days (but that they
would quickly lose any military encounter).


4. (S) Lamenting the absence of concrete consultations with
the U.S. on Iran contingency planning, MbZ said "until now,
we have not sat down and talked about it." "That has
concerned us," he added, pressing Abizaid for details of
current USG planning. He said Iranian President Ahmadinejad
was prone to miscalculation and easily provoked. It was a
matter of time before he would make a costly mistake, implied
MbZ, noting the "interesting" remarks made by the Iranian
President during the recent crisis in Lebanon. "He was very
close to making a wrong decision." Ahmadinejad will attempt
to influence events in the Iraqi south and with Hizballah, he
said, retaining the "last card" of blocking the oil flow as a
last resort. He said it was important for the U.S. and the
UAE to talk about details of "the plan" for defending the
Gulf. He stressed that he did not want to see decisions
taken prior to a request for UAE coordination "as happened in
Iraq."


5. (S) The UAE hosts over 300,000 Iranian tourists annually,
said MbZ, and was home to 200,000 permanent residents from
Iran (some estimates run even higher). MbZ said these
Iranians were wealthy and influential (and did not include
"those we don't know about"). He suggested that the UAE
border with Iran was as difficult to control as the U.S.
"border with Texas." With a high level of Iranian influence
within the UAE, MbZ said "we know we will be hit from within"
in the event of a conflict. "We will deal with that," but
"need to know your plan" and don't want to be told of a
decision at the last minute. "If you coordinate you can
count of us," he concluded. Abizaid reviewed the importance
of good contingency planning. He stressed the need to be
prepared in terms of air defense systems, nonproliferation

ABU DHABI 00003944 002 OF 003


efforts, missile defense, and shared early warning to contain
Iranian ambitions. He commended the upcoming Gulf Security
Dialogue as an opportunity to coordinate more closely in
these areas and build mutual capabilities.


6. (C) MbZ agreed that it is "important to have contingency
plans" and to "talk to each other in preparation for the
future." He reiterated that Iran was prone to miscalculation
and adventurism -- "it's going to happen" -- and our common
message should be clear. "Don't let them think they can get
away with it." MbZ said the UAE was geographically doomed to
be involved one way or another in any Iranian attack by
"missile, plane, or Special Operations Forces." Responding
to Abizaid's comment that Iran could cause trouble, yet could
not win in a military engagement, MbZ asked rhetorically "if
he's going to pick a fight" in any case, might it be best to
"make him think he could win?" MbZ said the UAE Air Force
was interested in Link 16 communications systems, enhanced
training in air-to-air operations, and consideration of the
"best options" in air defense. He welcomed the opportunity
to have these issues reviewed (including in the Gulf Security
Dialogue).

Iraq
--------------


7. (C) Noting the complexities of Ramadan, MbZ opened a
brief discussion on Iraq by asking if Iraqi soldiers fasted
during the holy month and inquired when the U.S. might start
reducing its forces there. Abizaid noted that each Iraqi
unit had a slightly different character, but that overall
they were at 95% of our target in terms of numbers trained.
More work was required, he noted, in the areas of chain of
command and logistics. MbZ said his view of PM Malaki's
strength as a leader had not changed since his previous
conversations with Abizaid, yet accepted Abizaid's comment
that the PM's government was showing increasing strength.


8. (C) MbZ lamented that Iraq suffered from two generations
of a Baathist regime, Wahabi-ism, and a Jihad mentality. He
said the U.S. Army contingent which clashed with Moqtada
Al-Sadr forces at an Iraqi mosque some time ago "should have
gone all the way," adding that it was difficult to combat
"gangs" led by a religious hard-liner. Dialogue with the
Baathist regime had even been easier, he said.

Afghanistan
--------------


9. (S) Recalling his visit to UAE troops in Afghanistan
three weeks previously, MbZ said his forces "seemed to be
doing fine." He cited UAE plans to send an additional tank
platoon (approximately 50 troops -- a move which had been
relayed to the USG in a letter a few days prior to this
meeting). He said his Chief of Staff felt this plus-up could
make a useful contribution in supporting existing special
operations troops in Afghanistan (about 250 personnel) and
would involve rotations of members every few months.
Regarding longer term plans to increase its presence, MbZ
acknowledged UAE consideration of sending 1,000 soldiers yet
noted that the UAE "could not make that decision yet." He
said the new unit being sent soon would give the UAE a better
picture of the feasibility of sending more troops within 3 to
4 months.


10. (C) MbZ asked whether Pakistani President Musharraf was
sufficiently in control of security issues; he also asked
about the legitimacy of a rumor that Pakistan might be
building a "500-mile wall" along its border with Afghanistan.
A fence with Pushtun on both sides would be difficult to
maintain, noted Abizaid. They discussed the numbers of
Pushtun along the border (approximately 20 million) and MbZ
remarked that more would keep attacking coalition forces if
we simply kept killing them. Abizaid cited the need for an
economic component to working with the Pushtun population;
MbZ said the Pushtun did not "need much" to sustain their
simple way of life.


11. (S) MbZ said the UAE was working with Afghanistan in the
south of that country to tamp down extremism. UAE
intelligence forces were working with Afghan Pushtun who had
worked for some years in the UAE -- and who total 40,000 from
Helmand Province alone -- in an effort to calm the region.

ABU DHABI 00003944 003 OF 003


MbZ quipped that such a number of Afghanis could even sway
election results. He said the goal was to "penetrate" two
areas in the south: the clinics and the mosques. Mosques
were linked to schools, he noted, and thus schools also
needed to be built to keep religious extremists out of the
education process. "Don't let the mosque be the school." He
suggested that the UAE was taking its clerics to "penetrate
the mosques" in the area. He said President Karzai was
agreeable to this effort, which he hoped would begin to show
results within 2 to 3 months.


12. (C) As for the Pakistani side of the border, MbZ
suggested that Saudi Arabia should be pressed to fill a
similar moderating role. He commended the Saudi decision two
days earlier to "halt all overseas charity funding" as a
"good" and "strong decision." He said that over the past 36
years, Saudi Arabia had invested 70 to 80 billion dollars in
"Wahabi-ism" and that this new decision was a clear
indication of a change of direction. He suggested that Saudi
should help "put the right men in the right place" in
Pakistan while the UAE worked in a similar direction on the
Afghan side of the border. (He suggested the USG might
discuss such a program with Prince Bandar.) MbZ said we
could "keep killing" forever without making progress if we do
not connect our efforts with the economic situation of the
people. Abizaid agreed that Presidents Karzai and Musharraf
needed to recognize that they faced a common extremist enemy
and coordinate to fight it.


13. (U) General Abizaid approved this message.
QUINN