LEBANON A KEY TOPIC IN A/S HILLEN DISCUSSION WITH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 003632 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR PM, NEA/ARP, NEA/ELA, NEA/IR NSC FOR EABRAMS AND MDORAN CENTCOM FOR RADM MOELLER AND AMB RROTH E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2031 TAGS: MASS PREL EAID LE QA IZ SY IR AE SUBJECT: LEBANON A KEY TOPIC IN A/S HILLEN DISCUSSION WITH ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE REF: STATE 147383 (Lebanon Security Assistance) ABU DHABI 00003632 001.2 OF 003 Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (S) Summary: Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs John Hillen and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ) met on September 11 and discussed the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD),Qatar and Lebanon. MbZ welcomed the GSD scheduled for October 19 and reiterated his concern for growing Iranian influence in the region, offering that Ahmadinejad was "lost in another era" and should not be allowed to get away with extreme behavior. Hillen raised U.S. concern with Qatar's recent worrisome behavior and MbZ offered harsh criticism for Qatar, noting that Qatar was "spoiled" and was using its large U.S. base for political cover. Qatar's weak position on Iran, coupled with all the trouble caused by Al Jazeera, led MbZ to question Qatar's true intentions. ¶2. (S) Summary continued: MbZ requested his Lebanon assistance team meet with the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi to coordinate assistance efforts for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) more closely. Concerned that Hezbollah "thought it had won," MbZ agreed with Hillen that urgent reinforcement of the LAF and Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) were critical to give the Lebanese government a decisive presence in the south. The UAE is willing to help fund this project, said MbZ, but would demand results on the ground. Hillen pledged to coordinate U.S. efforts on the LAF with UAE. End summary. GSD and Increasing Iranian Dangers -------------- ¶3. (S) MbZ stated Iran will have nuclear weapons in the future, "it is not a matter of if." Iran was determined to have that capability and regional allies needed to work against that Iranian desire. Dealing with Iran sooner will be cheaper, he suggested. Referring to Ahmadinejad's provocative statements on Israel and the holocaust, MbZ stated one "cannot talk like that in the 21st century and get away with it." MbZ predicted the region "will still see bad times before good times." Hillen raised the possibility of Iranian miscalculation given recent Israel-Hezbollah fighting in Lebanon. MbZ agreed with Hillen that the dangers of miscalculation leading to conflict were very real. MbZ added that to deal effectively with Iran in the future it is important to "fix Lebanon" today. Disappointment with Qatar -------------- ¶4. (S) MbZ ended the GSD discussion by hinting the USG be careful in sharing potential planning on Iran with certain GCC countries (comment: MbZ was clearly referring to Qatar) because that information would be leaked to Iran. Taking this cue, Hillen raised U.S. concerns with Qatar and inquired whether Hamad bin Jasem's (HbJ) actions reflected simple mischief or a new strategic direction for Qatar. Hillen emphasized that the GSD was based on a shared strategic perception of the Iranian threat, and Qatar's recent behavior called this calculation into question. MbZ said he had no reason to defend HbJ personally, but that he (MbZ) did not think HbJ was the problem. He asked how long the U.S. had harbored doubts about Qatar and acted somewhat surprised that the U.S. had not "seen it coming" when Qatar voted the wrong way in the UNSC on 31 July. ¶5. (S) MbZ said he had cautioned Qatar long ago to act more prudently but that Qatar held its hosting of a U.S. base as a "backbone" of sorts protecting it from U.S. retaliation. MbZ said Qatar needed to know where the red lines were and light censure from the U.S. only gave an "overconfident" Doha "a few extra meters to work with" as it moved ever closer to a precipice. Hillen stated that Qatar may not understand that U.S. basing in the region is continually reviewed and must be designed to address current regional threats. MbZ returned unprompted at the end of the meeting to the deployment and ABU DHABI 00003632 002 OF 003 basing of U.S. forces and stated that if the USG wished to discuss this topic in the upcoming GSD, it should provide a direct sense of timing and keep this discussion away from the Qataris. On the UAE's relations with Qatar, MbZ said he would continue to buy gas from them but would not "adopt" their positions. Stubborn Syrian Meddling -------------- ¶6. (C) Syrian interference in the region was a problem, said MbZ, adding that Egypt "tried to accommodate" Asad and Jordan did likewise. Saudi had given up trying to convince Syria to mend its ways a year ago. The UAE also "gave up on Bashar" when it could find no "breakthrough" in his thinking. The UAE was willing to "pay a large bill" to create a stable region, as the alternative was too difficult to contemplate. Aftermath of Recent Fighting in Lebanon -------------- ¶7. (C) MbZ stated that the situation which arose in Lebanon was "something that everybody expected, but not in this way." He said few anticipated Hezbollah to be so aggressive and Israel to suffer "that much failure." Hillen said miscalculations fed the crisis; MbZ said the UAE did "not accept" the notion that Hezbollah came out ahead in the exchange, adding that it is "bad to let them think they won." ¶8. (C) Hillen discussed the need for a muscular peacekeeping force. The key was now to support Lebanon, strengthen the LAF and ISF, and coordinate assistance from the GCC, the UK, and France for a cohesive approach to helping Lebanon carry out UNSCRs 1559, 1701 and the Taif Accords. Preventing Hezbollah from constituting a military force was critical, said Hillen. MbZ agreed that we are all seeking a "strong government" in Lebanon, which was difficult as long as Hezbollah maintained its current role. He called for a stronger Lebanese military and more capable "security agencies" and expressed a willingness to assist if results were likely. MbZ stated frankly, the UAE is "paying a hell of a lot of money" building infrastructure in return for little appreciation from Lebanon ("we pay and they swear at us"). ¶9. (C) MbZ said strengthening the Lebanese government would not work if done "as is being done in Iraq." Like Iraq, Lebanon was inhibited by Iran's involvement and ethnic divisions. MbZ asked rhetorically "who can wait 25 years" for Lebanon to stabilize? He called for tangible improvements within five years, working "from top to bottom" to change Lebanon and "cut down" Hezbollah. He said Syria must be kept out of the process of elections in Lebanon; "if they have a role we will go another four years without progress." Hillen expressed two primary desires: 1) coordinated assistance to Lebanon to make a larger impact quickly, and 2) urgent action. MbZ replied that "we are there" and ready to coordinate efforts now. He said the Saudis were similarly engaged. MbZ called for recruiting more Sunni and Druze soldiers, less Shi'a (MbZ said the current 40% ratio of Shi'a should be reduced to 15%). Hillen cited pre-conflict studies of Lebanon's security assistance requirements by the U.S., UK, and France. MbZ said he wanted to "compare notes" on each others' roles in training and equipping the LAF. He said his team leader now on the ground in Beirut would like to interface with the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi when he returns to the UAE shortly. (Note: Embassy has received a releasable version of CENTCOM's LAF needs assessment. We will share this information along with that contained in reftel -- plus Embassy Beirut's suggestion on ammunition needs -- with MbZ's Lebanon team during an upcoming meeting. End note.) MbZ added that Iran would "never let go" of its desire for regional influence and Syria was also stubbornly backing Nasrallah (who he said was one of "those people who should be dead yesterday"). UAE-Saudi Relations "More Brotherly" -------------- ABU DHABI 00003632 003.2 OF 003 ¶10. (C) Unlike sour relations with Qatar, MbZ said the UAE had better communication with Saudi Arabia than before, suggesting that Prince Bandar kept the dialogue coherent. Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal was often "sailing alone" in the past but seemed to be falling into line these days and communicating more effectively with the world. MbZ added that it can be "difficult to have a serious conversation with (King) Abdullah." ¶11. (U) Assistant Secretary Hillen cleared this message. SISON