MBZ'S VIEWS ON IRAQ COMPACT, HIZBOLLAH AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 003097 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS ***CORRECTED COPY*** DEPT FOR C - ZELIKOW, NEA/ARP TREASURY FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY KIMMITT CENTCOM FOR J-5 RADM MOELLER E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER EAID EFIN KDEM LE QA IZ AE SUBJECT: MBZ'S VIEWS ON IRAQ COMPACT, HIZBOLLAH AND AL-JAZEERA ABU DHABI 00003097 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1. 4 b and d. ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Treasury Deputy Secretary Robert Kimmitt and Counselor of the State Department Philip Zelikow won Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan's support for the International Compact on Iraq during their July 22 visit. However, MbZ said that he was less worried about Iraq than about Afghanistan, Palestine and Somalia. MbZ argued that Hezbollah should be eliminated, but predicted that if the Israelis didn't succeed in two weeks, "Arabs would pour over the border to fight," egged on by the media. He sharply criticized Al-Jazeera for providing &95% propaganda for the bad guys," and Qatar for acquiescing in Al-Jazeera's control by staff linked to Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and jihadists. MbZ also noted Iranian nuclear ambitions as a major concern. On terror finance, both sides briefly discussed the need to ensure that UAE charities were not abused by contributors funding jihad. End Summary. The Iraq Compact -------------- ¶2. (C) In their 90-minute July 22 meeting, Deputy Secretary Kimmitt explained to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MbZ) that the Iraq Compact is a means for the Iraqis to agree to specific economic reforms in return for international support. Kimmitt added that the UN had agreed to co-sponsor the compact, supported by the IMF, the World Bank, and a preparatory group (including the U.S. and the UAE) that had either pledged $200 million to Iraqi reconstruction or had agreed to debt relief of $4 billion. Kimmitt noted the ambitious timetable for the compact, with the hope being that the preparatory group would be able to meet at the end of August/early September, brief the IMF, the World Bank, and the UN at their respective September meetings, and sign a compact document in November. He explained that there had been a hope that the preparatory group could "launch" the compact in Baghdad, but that regional events had intervened. Despite that, he noted, there had been significant preliminary work done with members of the delegations that had gone to Baghdad. ¶3. (C/NF) MbZ asked where the venue for the signing would be, adding "definitely not Baghdad." He said that, given security concerns, he didn't think there would be anyone willing to go to Baghdad. MbZ added that he thought that location would play a big role in achieving a successful launch for the compact, suggesting that the "biggest player in the region" (i.e., Riyadh) could host. Counselor Zelikow replied that the Saudis had already suggested having the UAE host, a suggestion that startled MbZ. Kimmitt agreed that security was a factor, but noted that the U.S. had offered other delegations the same security package that it had offered its own delegates. ¶4. (C/NF) MbZ told the delegation "You will get your (Iraq Compact) support. I can't say that (publicly) right now, but I can assure you of UAE cooperation." He said that the UAE would work to help the Iraqis. He added that he believed that Iraq "needed a push" but that it could "stand on its own." Iraq had wealth, manpower, and land along with more PHDs than Indonesia. He stressed that what Iraq needed was better management and security. MbZ added that he was more worried about Afghanistan, Palestine, and Somalia, noting that Palestine and Somalia "can't stand on their own." (Comment: It is unclear whether MbZ's reticence to provide public support reflected his concerns about a need for regional coordination. It is also possible that MbZ was unable to commit financially without knowing whether his older half-brother, UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, approves. President Khalifa is in Rabat on an official visit. End comment). ¶5. (S/NF) Zelikow said that a key challenge for Iraqi PM Maliki would be to deal with his security situation and to take on the Shi'a extremists, which would be politically difficult. The compact would serve as a critical incentive for the Iraqi government to make hard choices, he said. The problem, he noted, was that there was a perception that Gulf Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, were ambivalent about ABU DHABI 00003097 002.2 OF 003 the compact. Zelikow asked whether MbZ could provide any insights as to Saudi ambivalence. MbZ said that he thought security concerns were important, but not the deciding factor for the Saudis. The key factor, he said was the amount of support they would get from Washington when Princes Saud and Bandar visited. The other point, he noted was the concern about Arab media, especially Al-Jazeera, adding that if "you invite Qatar, you take away one excuse" from the Saudi Arabia for not participating and make it more likely the Saudis will attend. Lebanon & Hezbollah -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) MbZ recommended that the party thank Saudi King Abdullah for his "courageous stance" with regard to Hezbollah. It was the "greatest decision" in the history of the Arabs and "took guts.8 Now, he added, the Saudis were "getting massacred in the media.8 The UAE would help out Lebanon "as we can," but we are not going to "put ourselves in the fire zone." ¶7. (S/NF) MbZ said that in his discussions with USG officials, he had long noted that Hezbollah was a greater threat to civilization than Al-Qaeda. He noted that Hezbollah could blow up an embassy in Argentina and leave no fingerprints for 2-3 years, and that Hezbollah had 20 years experience with fighting the best army in the world. He stressed that if Hezbollah was not eliminated it would be "worse for everyone," but that if Israel didn't defeat Hezbollah within two weeks, large numbers of Arabs would pour across the Syria-Lebanon border to fight. Zelikow noted that Hezbollah was also tied into Iraq, with Hezbollah training Iraqi jihadists. He said that the U.S. view was that Hezbollah must be defeated, but that Lebanon must be saved. ¶8. (S/NF) MbZ opined that Al-Jazeera was using the conflict with Israel to justify fighting to defend Hezbollah. If some "holy man" said fighting the U.S. in Iraq or the Israelis in Lebanon was a first class ticket "not to Dubai but to heaven," people bought it. MbZ added that irresponsible TV personalities were sending young boys to die in order to demonstrate that they had a following. Qatar and Al-Jazeera -) strong words -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) Continuing in the same vein, MbZ sharply criticized Al-Jazeera. He said that the U.S. was losing the media war, which cost it casualties in Iraq and in Afghanistan. He added that a recent poll in Abu Dhabi on the causes of the conflict in Lebanon showed the following response: 50% said the Israelis want to occupy the country, 2% said that Hezbollah provoked the attack, 2% said Iran backed the conflict, 2% said Arab governments were weak, and 40% said that the U.S. was telling the Israelis to attack Lebanon. He argued that this was because 56% of the UAE public watches Al-Jazeera. Anti-U.S. propaganda can convert pro-American Arabs to Anti-American Arabs, he stressed. ¶10. (S/NF) MbZ said that the perception was that Al-Jazeera existed because CENTCOM protected it. Asking that the U.S. not share his views with Qatar (as he claimed it had in 2004),he said that Qatari actions on Al-Jazeera were more than "irritating," and that he did not understand Qatar's decisions. He said that he believed that the "good guys" were fighting three battles: Lebanon, the Iran-Syria link, and the media. He stressed that the UAE had no problem with free and independent media that aired both sides of an issue. He argued, however, that there can't be a station giving 95% propaganda for the "bad guys" operating out of a country with the largest CENTCOM base in the Middle East (i.e., Qatar). ¶11. (S/NF) MbZ said that although the Qatari ruling family finances Al-Jazeera, the people "controlling" it were the same ones financing Osama bin Laden, Hamas, and Iraqi jihadists. He said that the Qataris had cut a deal for protection. MbZ added that he thought Qatar had been "completely hijacked," adding that "if you didn't have Al-Udaid Air Base there, Qatar would soon find itself in a position where it could not even buy a Diet Coke8 ABU DHABI 00003097 003.2 OF 003 (presumably because its irate neighbors would descend on it). Weathering this storm, Zelikow agreed that this might be an opportune moment to press Qatar to be more responsible, and that it might no longer be able to play both sides of the street. Saudi Arabia -------------- ¶12. (C/NF) MBZ said that the UAE and Qatar had conflicts with the Saudis, noting that the UAE and the Saudis had fought 57 battles over the last 250 years in response to Saudi efforts to occupy the UAE. He said the Saudis are "not my dear friends, but we need to get along." On GCC coordination, MbZ noted that while the UAE had a problem with Saudi Arabia, including the border and the UAE-Qatar pipeline (the Dolphin project),but that "we all" needed to look at the bigger picture: U.S. troops fighting and dying in Iraq and Afghanistan trying to bring stability to those countries, and Iran trying to build nuclear weapons, which it would succeed in doing unless it received a "clear message" not to. He stressed, however, that he wasn't suggesting that the first option was "bombing" Iran." Democracy in the UAE -------------- ¶13. (C/NF) MbZ noted that the West was pushing Arab states toward democracy, adding that "this is fine with us," but that the approach needs to be tailored. MbZ asked, rhetorically, how he could accept a member of parliament in the UAE whose loyalty was to "Tora Bora," with another six members' loyalty to a "guy in Egypt," another ten to a "guy in England" and the last ten uncommitted. He asked whether the Kuwaiti parliamentarians were working for the Kuwaiti people or for others. He said it was easier in some parliaments (Lebanon, Afghanistan) to have loyalty to a militia rather than to a country. MbZ argued that he could not have a parliamentarian whose loyalty was not to the UAE. Charities -------------- ¶14. (S/NF) On terror finance, Kimmitt and MbZ briefly discussed charities. Kimmitt noted that there was a need to ensure that the financial system, including charities, was not abused by terrorists and proliferators. MbZ stated that "a lot of money" was being spent on jihad. Muslim contributors would give money to charity, and the charities would send it to jihadists. The media was inciting such behavior, he added. Participants -------------- ¶15. (SBU) UAE Delegation --Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince, Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces --Major General Ali Mohammed Sobaih Al-Kaabi, UAE Land Forces Commander --Rashed Al-Hareb, Office Director to UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan ¶16. (SBU) U.S. Delegation --Robert Kimmitt, Deputy Secretary of Treasury --Dr. Phillip Zelikow, Counselor of the Department of State --Ambassador Michele J. Sison --RADM Robert Moeller, CENTCOM --Evangelia Bouzis, NSC Director for Iraq --J. Alexander Monsarrat, Department of State --Vickie Alvo, Department of the Treasury --Olier John (notetaker) ¶17. (U) This cable has beencleared by DepSec Kimmitt and Counselor Zelikow. QUINN