SCENESETTER FOR SCA A/S AMB BOUCHER TO UAE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 003027 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA A/S BOUCHER E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS MASS EINV AF PK AE SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SCA A/S AMB BOUCHER TO UAE REFS: A) ABU DHABI 2695, B) ABU DHABI 2633, C) ABU DHABI 2324, D) ABU DHABI 2129, E) ABU DHABI 1932, F) ABU DHABI 376, G) 05 ABU DHABI 4696 Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (S) Summary: Ambassador Boucher, Embassy Abu Dhabi welcomes your visit to discuss support for Afghanistan with the UAE leadership. We have requested a meeting with a senior member of the ruling family (the Crown Prince or Foreign Minister). We recommend that you acknowledge the UAE contribution to Afghan reconstruction and support for Operation Enduring Freedom, while also reminding your interlocutors that long-term stability in that country will require our ongoing attention. You might touch upon the UAE's non-official offer to expand its troop strength in Afghanistan to assess current thinking on the topic in Abu Dhabi. You might also share your appraisal of the current investment climate in Afghanistan to encourage increased UAE focus on potential projects there, as well as encouraging government assistance (taking note of the UAE's preference for project-oriented donations). Your hosts would also be interested in your sense of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan -- a relationship in which the UAE has invested some of its own political capital. End summary. Military Contributions to OEF -------------- ¶2. (S) The UAE's contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom, ongoing military operations in Afghanistan, and Afghan reconstruction are a testament to the importance the UAE places on a stable Afghanistan. Significant among these contributions is the continued presence of about 250 UAE special operations troops serving under U.S. command at Bagram Air Base. This initiative is a strong signal of support from a key Arab coalition partner and has boosted U.S.-UAE military coordination -- building upon similar coordination in Kosovo. Since the start of OEF, the UAE has also provided substantial assistance-in-kind to the Afghan military, including the provision of vehicles, equipment, and clothing. In 2002, for example, the UAE Armed Forces provided the Kabul municipality 92 new vehicles -- to include ambulances and fire trucks. ¶3. (S) Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan floated the idea May 17 of increasing the UAE troop presence in Afghanistan to 1,000 men (ref D). He said he wanted the UAE contingent to "see action" to harden them for potential future missions against extremists. Subsequent discussions with UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff (ref C),as well as exchanges at the bilateral June 21-22 Joint Military Commission, clarify that the proposal remains under consideration on the UAE side and is not yet a formal offer. CENTCOM, in the meantime, has prepared a letter suggesting that an expanded presence might focus on a conventional infantry battalion, support in the establishment and staffing of a "Commando School," and support for reconstruction and development projects. That letter has not been passed to the UAEG, as the Chief of Staff has indicated that the offer is not yet ready for formal coordination. Reconstruction Assistance -------------- ¶4. (C) Economic cooperation between the UAE and Afghanistan has included investments and humanitarian aid. Of note, the UAE's telecommunications giant Etisalat has been actively trying to invest in Afghanistan's telecom market. Airlines based in the UAE, such as Air Arabia in Sharjah, have flights into Kabul and we have seen reports of investments in hotels as well. The will to invest in Afghanistan is clearly present when the conditions of a particular investment appeal to UAE investors. The UAE has also committed to fund "Sheikh Zayed City," presumably a neighborhood near Kabul built with $4 million in UAE funds. ¶5. (C) A listing of UAE pledges and contributions to Afghan reconstruction (which the UAEG asked be kept confidential) as of last January showed over $70 million in commitments (ref F). Not all funds have been expended, of course. The list included $30 million pledged at the 2004 Tokyo Donors' Conference, humanitarian aid, and commitments by UAE-based charitable organizations (primarily the quasi-official Red ABU DHABI 00003027 002 OF 003 Crescent Society -- the first Arab NGO on the ground in Kabul following the fall of the Taliban -- and the Charitable Foundation led by Dubai Ruler and UAE Prime Minster Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum). This $70 million complements military assistance-in-kind, which may total a similar amount. ¶6. (S) When Ambassador Neumann met last November with Information Minister (now Foreign Minister) Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, Abdullah noted that Afghanistan needed to be more proactive in seeking assistance in specific areas. An excessively "insular" Afghanistan needed to "market" itself better, he noted, citing other pressures on GCC aid priorities (Pakistan earthquake, hurricane Katrina, Iraqi infrastructure, Palestinian development). Appealing to potential donors, according to Abdullah, would require the recipient to be more specific and forthcoming in describing its needs (ref G). The UAE typically tries to "projectize" its foreign aid, and officials have told us that in the case of Afghanistan, they are waiting on the right projects to fund. (Note: By way of comparison, the UAE's earthquake relief contribution to Pakistan began with $100 million in medical and transport support, but was soon boosted by President Khalifa to $200 million. End note.) In Search of Political Stability -------------- ¶7. (S) On the political front, the UAE has worked to smooth relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan in a bid to bring more stability to the region. That effort featured a June 15 meeting between Presidents Karzai and Musharraf, brokered by the UAE. Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed Al Nahyan reported that the meeting had gone "very well" (ref B) and that the two had agreed to "calm the rhetoric" and to coordinate border monitoring more closely. That meeting was followed by a meeting in Abu Dhabi of the Afghan and Pakistani intel chiefs. State Security Department (SSD) Director Sheikh Hazza bin Zayed Al-Nahyan told us June 19 that this series of meetings should build trust between the two countries' security services, adding that Afghanistan's future relied on Pakistani understanding (ref A) You might want to express appreciation for the UAE's mediation and inquire about recent developments. ¶8. (S) Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed noted in May that UAE commitments to Afghanistan would include sending an Ambassador "very soon" (ref E). That has still not happened. The Afghan Embassy in Abu Dhabi notes that the UAE has an "active Embassy" in Kabul but that the Ambassador in Islamabad oversees the Kabul mission. The Afghans have had a fully accredited Ambassador in Abu Dhabi since February, 2005, partly to look after the more than 70,000 Afghanis resident in the UAE (estimates run as high as 170,000 including Afghans with Pakistani passports). Regional Petroleum Investments by the UAE -------------- ¶9. (C) The International Petroleum Investment Corporation (IPIC),Abu Dhabi's overseas investment arm in the petroleum sector, has two significant Asian investments: 1) a 40% stake in the Pakistan Arab Refining Company (PARCO),which does refining, marketing, and pipelines; and 2) investments in refining and marketing operations associated with the Hyundai Oil Bank in Korea. IPIC is reportedly reviewing investments in Central Asia (with Conoco Phillips) but has not made any concrete commitments. In the Caspian basin, IPIC contacts note that Dragon Oil (based in Dubai and 52% owned by Dubai's Emirates National Oil Company) has an offshore concession in Turkmenistan which produces about 50,000 barrels per day. Unable to transport this oil to the Gulf, however, Dragon Oil has a deal with Iran by which Dragon sends the oil to Iran and receives an equivalent amount of condensate at a location on the Arabian Gulf. Given Iran's influence in the region, as well as its geographic location vis-a-vis oil transit routes, any success in Caspian Sea oil investments requires investors to work with the often less-than-helpful regime in Tehran. Other SCA-related Issues -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Of the South and Central Asian countries, the UAE is closest to Pakistan, in which senior members of the Al-Nahyan family (including the President, Crown Prince, and ABU DHABI 00003027 003 OF 003 Foreign Minister) take personal interest. Traditional hunting trips to Pakistan, as well as to Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, partially explain the Al-Nahyan interest. Of note on the investment front, the majority government-owned UAE telecommunications concern, Etisalat, acquired a 23.4% stake in Pakistan Telecommunications Company Ltd. in 2005. ¶11. (SBU) The UAE hosts guest workers from throughout the SCA region as well, with Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis as the three largest non-Emirati groups. Indians, in fact, form the largest single nationality group in the UAE at an estimated 30 percent (Emiratis themselves being closer to 20 percent). In addition to the estimated 1.2 million Indians, 500,000 Pakistanis, and 300,000 Bangladeshis, workers from Sri Lanka likely number near 100,000 and constitute over two percent of the population. Remittances from these guest workers are important to each of these countries. Finally, and unfortunately, trafficking-in-persons (TIP) is a notable problem with girls from Central Asia. SISON