NATO DELEGATION REPORTS ON STATUS OF DISCUSSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 002567 SIPDIS FOR NEA/ARP, EUR/RPM; PM - HILLEN, LOFTUS OSD FOR ASD RODMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2016 TAGS: MARR PREL IZ AE NATO GE SUBJECT: NATO DELEGATION REPORTS ON STATUS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH UAE ON ICI REF: 05 ABU DHABI 1376 Classified By: DCM Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. On June 12, a Turkish admiral heading NATO delegation visiting the UAE briefed diplomats of NATO countries on progress in ICI discussions with the UAEG. UAE interlocutors were described as well-prepped and "very forward-leaning and positive," but are also perceived as having "misperceptions and incorrect knowledge" about NATO's overall goals. Delegation conveyed UAE MFA concerns about Iranian "poor management" of nuclear facilities as well as its apparent preference for bilateral rather than collective military relationships. NATO delegation also relayed UAEG's familiar position that the islands dispute with Iran would not be resolved by force. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Rear Admiral Deniz Kutluk (Turkish Navy),Assistant Director of International Military Staff, Cooperation and Regional Security Head of NATO delegation, briefed Ambassadors, Defense Attaches, and other diplomats of NATO countries at the German Embassy on June 12 concerning progress on Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) discussions with the UAEG. Admiral Kutluk described his Emirati interlocutors (MG Ali Al-Kaabi, BG Al Salah) as "very forward-leaning and positive," noting that they came forward with new ideas, expressing interest in the menu of NATO programs and in force standardization. He said that the UAE, like NATO, recognizes the primary security threats as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. He further described the Emiratis as having come well-prepped for their meetings, asking relevant and specific questions. ¶3. (C) In this regard Kutluk says they discussed intel exchange and info sharing within a framework security agreement. Genevieve Labelle (Canadian Member of NATO Office of Security) noted that there was no military contact at the UAE Embassy in Brussels, a situation the UAEG may seek to remedy as it seeks to comprehend the complexity of NATO's organizational structure. ¶4. (C) However, the conclusion of the NATO delegation is that the UAE may eventually be ready to cooperate even beyond the limits of the program, but for the time being has "some misperceptions and incorrect knowledge" of NATO's overall goals and intentions in the Middle East region as well as how it operates as a coalition of sovereign states. Kutluk noted a discrepancy between the ability of NATO and that of the GCC in terms of "fast reactive" capability. ¶5. (C) With regard to Iran and its nuclear ambitions, Kutluk said the UAEG expressed primary concern about the "poor management" of Iranian nuclear power generators and the likelihood of nuclear fallout following accidents. The UAEG made it clear that the Abu Musa and Tunb islands dispute with Iran will not be resolved by force. ¶6. (C) Kutluk said that the MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid al-Nuaimi described to him the effects of regional turbulence on UAE's development, indicating that it had not been easy for a 35-year-old nation to cope with security challenges. According to Kutluk, al-Nuaimi posed questions about the relative advantages of a collective (NATO) versus a bilateral (US-UAE, US-UK) military relationship. ¶7. (C) During discussion period, UK military attach opined that owing to the tribal habit and structure of the UAE it would take 50-60 years to develop a credible military capacity, noting fundamental mistrust of anything other than a bilateral relationship and inherent difficulty grasping the NATO concept. He noted that the UAE had approached the UK about deploying an additional 600 UAE soldiers to Helman in Afghanistan and also the U.S. about deploying as many as ¶1000. ¶8. (C) The Turkish military representative confirmed that despite earlier indications to the contrary, the UAE did not send observers to the Anatolian Sun exercise in Turkey. The consensus was that the UAE, while selecting nineteen (19) activities from the menu of NATO possibilities, would probably prefer a quieter, less high profile form of cooperation for the immediate future. ¶9. (C) Admiral Kutluk also expressed interest in hearing ideas on how Saudi Arabia and Oman would likely respond to ICI. The admiral indicated that he personally had no future plans to return to the UAE in order to continue ICI discussions on behalf of NATO. SISON