UAE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR REQUESTS TRAINING BEFORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 002211 SIPDIS SIPDIS TREASURY FOR U/S SLEVEY, RLEBENSON, PHEFFERNAN, KHECHT FBI FOR TFOS MMOREHART, FWAIKURT DHS FOR ICE KDELACOLLI, JGALLION MANAMA FOR JBEAL NSC FOR FTOWNSEND, JZARATE, NSHAMPAINE, MMALVESTI E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2016 TAGS: PTER KTFN AE SUBJECT: UAE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR REQUESTS TRAINING BEFORE CASH COURIER OPERATION COMMENCES REF: A. ABU DHABI 2081 ¶B. STATE 68520 ¶C. WALLRAPP-GALLION DHS/ICE TELECON DATED 5/30/06 ¶D. 2005 STATE 208617 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.5 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary. At the request of the Central Bank Governor, Embassy's Joint Terror Finance Coordination Committee (JTFCC) team met with the UAE's JTFCC team May 29 to discuss the proposed U.S./UAE Cash Courier Operation. Although the Ambassador had briefed the Governor on this operation during the April 30 JTFCC meeting (ref A),the Governor requested additional information. During the course of the meeting, it became apparent that the UAE Central Bank had put the operation (which had originally been scheduled to commence on May 20) on hold because the Governor was concerned that the U.S. was working directly with Dubai Customs -- vice the federal authorities. At the end of the meeting, Ambassador and team agreed to provide federal and emirate-level customs, Central Bank, and airport authorities a cash courier seminar on June 10. Following the seminar, the Ambassador requested that the U.S. and the UAE identify three UAE airports and launch the U.S./UAE Cash Courier Operation. The Governor also reiterated his request for an MOU to formalize the JTFCC. Action request for DHS/ICE contained in para 5. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On May 29, Ambassador, accompanied by Econoff, LEGAT (FBI),Regional Legal Advisor (DOJ-OPDAT),and Abu Dhabi and Dubai DHS/ICE attaches, traveled to Dubai to meet with the UAE's JTFCC team. The UAE side was chaired by Central Bank Governor Sultan Nasser al-Suweidi. He was accompanied by Brigadier Mohammed al-Qemzi, Director of Dubai's General Department of State Security (GDSS); Ahmed bin Butti, Chairman of Dubai Customs; Mohammed al-Muhairy, Director General of the Federal Customs Authority (FCA); as well as several mid-level Central Bank, GDSS, Dubai Customs, and FCA officials. (Note: the GDSS was formerly called Dubai State Security Organization (SSO). End note.) Cash Courier Operation -------------- ¶3. (C) At the request of the Central Bank Governor, Ambassador and the DHS/ICE attache Bill Wallrapp outlined the details of the proposed U.S./UAE Cash Courier Operation. Ambassador told the Governor that on April 19 she and Wallrapp met with Sultan Bin Sulayem (SbS),Chairman of Dubai Ports, Customs, and Free Zones, and proposed a joint operation whereby DHS Customs officers would assist Dubai Customs officers in targeting cash couriers knowingly trying to evade the UAE's currency reporting requirements. According to the proposal, DHS and Dubai Customs would identify three daily high-risk flights to target for a period of a week. DHS would then work with Dubai Customs to provide technical assistance targeting manifested passengers and air cargo of the identified flights. Ambassador noted that the operation is designed to allow Dubai to take enforcement actions against individuals who are actively and knowingly evading UAE currency reporting requirements. Ambassador told Al-Suweidi that SbS supported the operation, and within two hours of the meeting, Dubai Customs also indicated it wanted to proceed with the proposal. She also reminded the Governor that during the April 30 JTFCC meeting, she had briefed him on the basics of the operation. The Governor and FCA's Al-Muhairy asked a number of questions about the specific role of the U.S. authorities. Ambassador and Wallrapp assured them that the DHS officers would be in an advisory capacity, and that this would be Dubai Customs' operation. ¶4. (C) During the meeting it became apparent that in mid-May the Central Bank Governor had forced the postponement of the planned May 20 operation launch because he felt that Dubai Customs was overstepping its bounds as an emirate-level entity. Al-Suweidi remarked, "There is no U.S. bilateral relationship with a state in the UAE's federation." After laying the marker that the crux of the problem is the UAE's long enduring federal/emirate power struggle, Al-Suweidi identified a way forward. He noted that conducting this operation only in Dubai airport leaves the other airports vulnerable. He requested that the USG provide all of the UAE's federal and emirate-level customs authorities with a ABU DHABI 00002211 002 OF 002 training program on how to target manifested passengers on high-risk flights, "so that we can harmonize and coordinate at the federal level." Ambassador agreed that conducting the operation in only one airport might facilitate the "whack-a-mole" syndrome, whereby the smugglers shift their operation to other airports. The two teams agreed to a one-day seminar on June 10 in Dubai to educate the customs, Central Bank, and airport authorities on how to conduct an operation. Ambassador stressed that the purpose of the seminar will be to develop the cash courier operation, which should be implemented in at least three UAE airports as soon as possible this summer. (Comment: Although the Central Bank Governor did not commit to a date for the actual operation, Embassy believes the upcoming June visit of Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counter Terrorism (APHSCT) Fran Townsend will provide an excellent opportunity to underscore the importance of this operation. End comment.) ¶5. (C) Action Request for DHS/ICE Financial Investigations: Per ref C, DHS/ICE should send an ICE agent with a financial background to participate in the operation, which Embassy hopes will commence prior to the end of June. End action request. JTFCC MOU -------------- ¶6. (C) During both the Jan 24 and April 30 JTFCC meetings, and during an April 22 meeting with EB A/S Tony Wayne in Washington (ref B),Al-Suweidi requested a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the two sides to "formalize" the JTFCC. In the May 29 meeting, the Governor reiterated this request. Al-Suweidi emphasized that an MOU would enable the UAE to call the appropriate federal and emirate officials to the JTFCC meetings without referring the matter to the UAE ruling family leadership on each occasion. The Governor stated that the MOU should be sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that the MFA would determine which UAE body should officially chair the JTFCC. Aware that APHSCT Townsend plans to be in the UAE in late June, the Governor requested a meeting with her to discuss the JTFCC. ¶7. (C) Comment. Although Embassy previously recommended against an MOU, we believe that the Governor's repeated requests and the basis for his argument merit a response. Embassy will prepare a draft MOU and forward it septel for interagency clearance. We believe the MOU should be general and follow the outlines of the original JTFCC proposal (ref D). It will state that the JTFCC is a brainstorming/coordination committee that will meet two to three times per year to discuss terrorist financing. It will also explicitly state that the day-to-day contacts and cooperation between various USG and UAEG agencies will continue at the status quo. Embassy will prepare the MOU and forward it to Washington by Monday, June 5, so there will be time for review and comment in advance of APHSCT's June visit. End comment. SISON