UAE FOREIGN MINISTER, U/S LEVEY DISCUSS TARGETED

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 002080 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR T - U/S RJOSEPH, ACTING A/S SRADEMAKER, PM - A/S HILLEN, NEA FO A/S WELCH, GRAY, NEA/ARP MISENHEIMER, SWALKER, EB/ESC/TFS DNELSON TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY NSD FOR DSTEPHENS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2016 TAGS: ETTC PARM MCAP IR AE SUBJECT: UAE FOREIGN MINISTER, U/S LEVEY DISCUSS TARGETED FINANCIAL MEASURES AGAINST IRAN Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1. 4 b and d. ¶1. (S/NF) Summary. On April 30 Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey met with UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (AbZ) to discuss the possibility of imposing targeted financial measures to isolate the Government of Iran, in the event the United Nations route is unsuccessful. U/S Levey discussed multilateral measures that would financially isolate the Iranian regime, with the aim of putting the Iranian leadership on the defensive. AbZ said that he thinks it is important for Iran to understand that there is "no way out," and that if there is a third option (other than a nuclear armed-Iran or outright war) for the international community to pursue, then "why not" try that option. AbZ requested a memo on the proposed options, and said he would discuss the concept of targeted financial measures against Iran with senior members of the UAEG. AbZ also suggested the U.S. coordinate a meeting in Europe with the key players to develop these ideas. He noted that the participation of other Gulf countries would be critical to success. Action request contained in para 9. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) U/S Levey was accompanied by David Nelson, Director, Office of Terrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs; Matthew Epstein and Kristen Hecht, Treasury Financial Analysts; Ambassador; and deputy econchief (notetaker). ¶3. (S/NF) U/S Levey told AbZ that the USG wants to find an option -- other than military confrontation -- in case UN diplomacy fails. He said that the USG has developed a plan to financially pressure the Government of Iran (GOI) by creating a dynamic where the GOI is shunned by the international financial community. He explained that the U.S. and its international partners could pressure the Iranian regime by cutting off access to financial institutions in Europe, Japan, and the UAE, where most of the regime's financial transactions are handled. The initial measures would seek to financially isolate entities and 
individuals engaged in proliferation, terrorist support activity, destabilizing Iraq, or corruption, creating a dynamic where typically risk-averse organizations (such as banks) perceive that the risk of doing business with such entities and individuals is simply too high. He also noted that the regime could be further isolated if international financial institutions closed GOI bank accounts. U/S Levey suggested that if financial institutions cease doing business with the GOI and Iran's elite, then the public may begin to question Ahmadinejad's policies, and his regime will be put on the defensive. U/S Levey declared that "the goal is not to bankrupt Iran, but to exacerbate tensions among Iranian elites." U/S Levey stressed that, in order for these measures to be effective, buy-in from all of the major financial centers would be essential. Ultimately, if Iran persisted in pursuing WMD, steps could be taken to financially isolate the regime more broadly. He told AbZ that the USG is discussing these options with the G-7, Austria, the Netherlands, and certain Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. ¶4. (S/NF) AbZ, who took detailed notes throughout the meeting and focused intently on the U/S while speaking, asked a number of detailed questions. He inquired whether the USG had a timeline for when each of the steps would be implemented. U/S Levey responded that the first step would be to identify the entities and individuals, but he also noted that the U.S. would develop an implementation timeline that marries up with the UN process. AbZ asked whether imposing travel bans on Iran's senior officials was an option. U/S Levey responded that it was. AbZ inquired whether the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) might be able to impose such a travel ban. Smiling, AbZ noted that the Secretary General of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larajani, would be in Abu Dhabi on May 2, and ABU DHABI 00002080 002 OF 003 that it could be "very embarrassing" if people like him wanted to come and the Gulf countries told them they were not welcome. (Comment: UN mandated travel bans do have exceptions for official travel and may not affect all of the GOI's key players. End comment.) AbZ also asked if Hizballah would be on the targeted list of terrorism supporters. U/S Levey responded that the USG would like to add Hizballah to the list, and if the group of countries involved supported that decision, it would be included. Considering the question of whether isolating Iran's elite would create the right kind of tension within the regime, AbZ noted that Rafsanjani and his son are frustrated with Ahmadinejad and they believe that it is already difficult for Iranians to do business around the world. "If Rafsanjani -- who is already pissed at Ahmadinejad -- is on the list, then you will just isolate him," AbZ declared. Stating that AbZ's comment essentially confirmed the USG's belief that there is already tension among the Iranian elite, U/S Levey explained that we would consult with our partners as to who should be on the list. U/S Levey and AbZ mused that keeping certain regime insiders on or off the list could be perceived by the GOI as an insult or as a triumph. Either you are the enemy of the U.S., which could be good or bad PR for the individual, or you are ignored by the U.S., which could have the same effect. "This is exactly why we need our friends around the table to discuss the tactics that can exacerbate tensions in the regime," added U/S Levey. ¶5. (S/NF) Thoughtfully considering U/S Levey's proposal and the answers to his questions, AbZ said that he believes it is important for Iran to understand that there is "no way out." "Senator McCain said the smartest thing when he said that going to war with Iran is horrible, but Iran having a nuclear bomb is worse." AbZ said that we must ensure that both options (war or a nuclear-armed Iran) are difficult. "If there is a way to get Iran out of this in a face-saving way, then why not?" AbZ asked whether Iran could get around these efforts by going through China, Russia, South Africa, or Latin America. U/S Levey said that Iran could get around the measures in their early stages, but as the plan escalated, Iran would be financially cut off. "Iran needs access to dollars, yen, and the Euro, and if it is fully isolated from the EU, Japan, the U.S., and the UAE, there would be no other way for Iran to access sufficient amounts of those currencies," said U/S Levey. Understanding, AbZ noted with a rueful smile, "This is one of those times where I wish the UAE was not a major financial hub." ¶6. (S/NF) AbZ suggested that the USG coordinate a meeting in Europe with all of our international partners to discuss potential financial measures against Iran and formulate an implementation strategy. AbZ said that the UAE would welcome such a meeting, but that it was also important to have at least one or two other Gulf countries involved. "Having them involved will also help them to realize the consequences if we do not implement measures such as these. If we do not do this, and if the UNSC fails, then it will be much worse." AbZ also told U/S Levey that GCC involvement was critical because if the UAE were to block Iranian entities, access to UAE financial markets, they would move the money to other Gulf countries which are currently trying to increase their trade with Iran. AbZ suggested that Kuwait and Bahrain would probably be the first GCC countries that the GOI would move money to if closed off from the UAE. Asking U/S Levey if the Europeans are on board with the strategy to financially isolate Iran, U/S Levey responded that all the countries he presented the strategy to have gone back to their respective capitals to discuss the options. ¶7. (S/NF) U/S Levey told AbZ that, in the short run, the USG hopes the UAE will close any accounts of entities designated on the annex to Executive Order 13382. AbZ asked for a copy of the list, and U/S agreed to provide it. (Note: Embassy passed AbZ the Executive Order, the annex, and the list of derivative companies on May 1. End note.) ABU DHABI 00002080 003 OF 003 ¶8. (S/NF) AbZ also requested that U/S Levey provide him with a memo outlining the proposed actions. He said he would take the memo to the UAE's senior leaders and discuss the issue with them. "The Iranians are patient and will try every trick to achieve their objectives. We must delay them and make it more difficult. If we can achieve that, it is good enough, at least for the time being." ¶9. (S/NF) Action Request for Treasury: Please provide a memo summarizing the presentation, "Financial Measures to Pressure and Isolate the Iranian Regime," with corresponding estimated timeline, to the Embassy for passage to AbZ as soon as possible. ¶10. (U) This cable has been cleared by U/S Levey. SISON