Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUDHABI1724
2006-04-29 12:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

TOWNSEND DISCUSSES REGIONAL STABILITY,

Tags:  PTER PINS EPET ETTC MCAP IR AE IQ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 001724 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARPI, S/CT, INR/NESA
NSC FOR FTOWNSEND, MMALVESTI
COMMERCE FOR U/S DMCCORMICK
STATE PASS USTR FOR SDONNELLY, DBELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2016
TAGS: PTER PINS EPET ETTC MCAP IR AE IQ
SUBJECT: TOWNSEND DISCUSSES REGIONAL STABILITY,
COUNTERTERRORISM WITH ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE


Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, for reasons 1.4 b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 001724

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARPI, S/CT, INR/NESA
NSC FOR FTOWNSEND, MMALVESTI
COMMERCE FOR U/S DMCCORMICK
STATE PASS USTR FOR SDONNELLY, DBELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2016
TAGS: PTER PINS EPET ETTC MCAP IR AE IQ
SUBJECT: TOWNSEND DISCUSSES REGIONAL STABILITY,
COUNTERTERRORISM WITH ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE


Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary. During an April 22 lunch meeting with
Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (APHSCT),and Abu
Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ),
Townsend and MbZ discussed counterterrorism cooperation.
Townsend stressed the importance of investigating
counterterror cases fully, and not simply deporting suspects.
When asked by Townsend, MbZ stated that he is concerned
about UAE oil infrastructure vulnerability. He also noted
his concern about the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in
the UAE, particularly after the Hamas electoral victory in
the Palestinian territories. MbZ claimed that if elections
were held in Dubai "tomorrow" he thought the Muslim
Brotherhood would win. Townsend discussed the USG's concern
with the low number of favorable post shipment verification
checks, and Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ -- who
was also at the meeting) assured Townsend that the UAEG would
soon issue an export control law. MbZ stated that he is not
optimistic about the political process in Iraq, and that he
is not confident in the Prime-Minister designate Jawad Al
Maliki. He also stated that he worries that Iran continues
to meddle in the Iraqi's affairs. End summary.


2. (U) On April 22, APHSCT Townsend and Ambassador had lunch
in a local restaurant with MbZ, AbZ, Director Military
Intelligence Brigadier General Essa Al Mazrouei, and MbZ's
International Affairs Director Yousef Al Otaiba. Townsend
was accompanied by NSC Senior Director for Combating
Terrorism Michele Malvesti and APHSCT Aide Michael Taylor.

Dubai Ports World Aftermath
--------------


3. (C) APHSCT Townsend thanked MbZ and AbZ for the UAEG's
patience and understanding during the Dubai Ports World

scandal. She said that the "friendship and strength" of the
bilateral relationship during the furor over the ports deal
"spoke volumes" to President Bush. MbZ appreciated
Townsend's words and told her that the UAE has learned some
lessons from the episode. He said that the UAE's consultants
are partly to blame for letting the controversy get so out of
hand. He also said that it reinforced in his mind the
importance of focusing on the long-term U.S.-UAE cooperation.
As an aside, MbZ observed that the DPW scandal has made the
Saudis nervous, because the extent of their U.S.-based
investments.

Oil Infrastructure Security, CT Efforts
--------------


4. (C) APHSCT Townsend asked MbZ if the UAE was worried about
its oil infrastructure. MbZ responded emphatically,
"absolutely." He told Townsend that there are three
international companies currently conducting risk assessments
of the UAE oil infrastructure and maritime security for the
UAEG. Townsend offered U.S. assistance in helping the UAE to
reduce its vulnerability. MbZ asked the USG to notify him of
any concerns about specific locations. "We are learning now
(about how to address our vulnerabilities),but we have to be
one step ahead. We worry that right now the terrorists are
one step ahead."


5. (C) Townsend and Ambassador discussed with MbZ the
proposed U.S.-UAE Cash Courier operation that Ambassador and
Embassy's DHS ICE attache proposed on April 19 to Sultan Bin
Sulayem, Executive Chairman of Dubai Ports, Customs, and Free
Zone Corporation. MbZ nodded his approval of the concept.
Ambassador also mentioned Treasury Under Secretary Stuart
Levey's upcoming visit on April 29-May 1. She thanked MbZ
for the UAE's engagement and participation in the Joint
Terrorist Finance Coordinating Committee, which she noted
would be meeting on April 30. MbZ agreed that the committee
is important, and he noted that Central Bank Governor Sultan
Nasser Al Suweidi was in Washington that week and had met
with U/S Levey the previous day.


6. (C) In a private discussion between Townsend and MbZ,
Townsend told MbZ that the USG was concerned about the UAEG's
tendency to simply deport extremists and suspected terrorists
-- instead of fully investigating them. Townsend stressed
the importance of conducting full investigations and of
sharing the results of those investigations with the USG.
(Note: MbZ and Townsend discussed other counterterrorism
cooperation issues that will be reported via separate
channels. End note.)

Countering the Muslim Brotherhood
--------------


7. (C) Turning to a discussion of the recent Hamas electoral
victory in the Palestinian territories, MbZ said that the UAE
"felt the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) rally behind Hamas after
the election." He said that the Hamas victory should be a
lesson to the West. "The West is telling us to open up and
have elections, but if we were to have an election in Dubai
tomorrow, the Muslim Brotherhood would take over." Al Otaiba
agreed, noting that the MB is the "most organized." "We have
to take time to make democracy so we are sure we do not have
a democracy with someone like Iranian president Ahmadinejad."
MbZ opined that the challenge is to find a way to "take them
(the MB) down in a way that they never come back," and he
said that a key component to this involves reforming the
education system (which he said was penetrated by the MB in
the late 1960's).


8. (C) AbZ mentioned that the local Al Arabiyya television
station had aired a Saudi show on the history of the MB and
extremism the previous evening. In an interesting
interaction between the two brothers, MbZ "quizzed" AbZ on
the reason for the show. AbZ and MbZ discussed that the show
had been produced to show that the problem of extremism was
not indigenous to Saudi Arabia, but rather that it stemmed
from Egypt's Nasserism. MbZ smiled and said that he looks to
AbZ to handle the UAE's relationship with the Saudis.

MbZ: Glum Outlook on Iraq, Iranian Meddling
--------------


9. (C) During a discussion of the Iraqi political process,
MbZ stated that he has "no confidence" in the new Iraqi Prime
Minister-designate, Jawad Al Maliki. "We worry about the new
government. We have to live with it for the next four years,
and if we do not start out on the right foot, then we have to
start over." Although he is "not optimistic" about the
future of Iraq's political process right now, he said he will
refrain from judging until the entire government is formed.
He told Townsend, "the Iraqis need someone who understands
the Iraqi's interests" and that if Maliki is "on the
Iranian's side there will be problems." MbZ also said he
thinks the British made a mistake in the south of Iraq by
advocating for SISTANI, because he does not believe Iraq will
be able to have a successful political system with "someone
like SISTANI."


10. (C) MbZ stated his belief that the Iranians will try to
gain from the electoral process in Iraq. "Iranians know how
to play the game. They are smart and very patient. They
have a strategy in Iraq." He anticipates that Iran will
never let Iraq out of its influence, and he said that that
the Iranians are "betting" that the U.S. will not do anything
about their meddling in Iraq.

Iran and Export Controls
--------------


11. (C) Turning to a discussion of Iran's nuclear ambitions,
MbZ noted that the Iranians think that the U.S. will also not
do anything about their recent declaration that they have
successfully enriched uranium. "I think they are wrong. I
think I know that if your President sees danger, he will take
action." Stating that Iran has been trying to acquire a
nuclear capability for years, he observed "we see the real
face of the regime in Ahmadinejad." MbZ also observed that
the Iranians are "playing a dirty game" with Russia and
China.


12. (C) APHSCT Townsend told MbZ that the USG is concerned
about the low percentage of "favorable" Department of
Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security post shipment
verifications. Informing him that the international average
is 90% favorable, she said that the UAE only has a 55%
favorable rating (with 20% unfavorable and 25% unverifiable).
AbZ assured Townsend that the UAEG does not want Iran to
take advantage of the UAE's open trading environment. He
said the UAE was in the final stages of ratifying its export
control law and that it would be announced "soon." He also
mentioned that the UAE had just endorsed the Proliferation
Security Initiative's Statement of Interdiction Principles
(PSI SOPs). (Note: In a sidebar discussion, AbZ told
Ambassador that the USG could tell the other Gulf adherent to
the PSI SOPs that the UAE had submitted a "silent
endorsement" (septel). End note.)

FTA: Problems with Investment Chapter, Business Opposition
-------------- --------------


13. (C) At MbZ's request, AbZ briefed Townsend on the status
of the U.S./UAE Free Trade Negotiations (FTA). AbZ told
Townsend that there have been a "few bottlenecks" in the
talks, "especially on oil and gas." He said "if we end up
with no FTA, oil and gas will be the main reason....The UAE
has been as cooperative and as creative as possible, but this
issue is very serious for our national security." AbZ noted
that the U.S./UAE negotiations are the first between the U.S.
and a major OPEC exporter, and he said that he anticipates
this problem will be an issue in other countries. (Note: Abz
told the Ambassador in an aside, "if the U.S. cannot sign an
FTA with the UAE, you will never get one with Qatar, Kuwait,
or Saudi Arabia." End note.)


14. (C) AbZ also said that as a result of the Dubai Ports
World episode, the private sector is now "trying to push the
FTA away." Recounting a recent meeting between UAE Minister
of Economy Sheikha Lubna al-Qasimi and all of the UAE
Chambers of Commerce, AbZ said that the UAE business
community was "trying to make use of the DPW fiasco as the
basis for claiming that a U.S./UAE Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
will hurt the UAE business community." In response to
Townsend's question about how to move past this, Al Otaiba
said that they need to be able to show the average UAE
citizen some tangible benefits from the agreement. Turning
to a discussion of the Arab League Primary Boycott, AbZ told
Townsend that the general public does not understand why
trade with Israel has anything to do with an FTA, but he
noted his personal belief that the FTA process could be a
good way for the UAE to lift its ban against trade with
Israel.


15. (U) This cable was cleared by APHSCT Townsend.
SISON