A/S WELCH MEETING WITH UAE STATE SECURITY DIRECTOR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 001233 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN NSC FOR E. ABRAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/06 TAGS: PREL KPAL IR IZ GZ WE AE SUBJECT: A/S WELCH MEETING WITH UAE STATE SECURITY DIRECTOR CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: NEA Assistant Secretary David Welch consulted with UAE State Security Director Sheikh Hazza bin Zayed al-Nahyan March 29 on regional developments, and specifically on Iran, Iraq, and Hamas. A/S Welch was accompanied by Ambassador and Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, Director of Plans and Policy at U.S. CENTCOM. Welch advised that the USG was looking to its friends in the region to counter the rhetoric coming from IranQs leadership and outlined growing USG concerns regarding Iranian intent in the region. On Iraq, Welch noted the USGQs growing concern regarding IranQs attempts to influence the Iraqi situation and to undermine the stability of the new government. Sheikh Hazza outlined efforts that the UAEG had undertaken in order to weaken pro-Iranian coalitions, and to provide support to moderate Sunni parties in order to ensure Sunni participation in the upcoming government. With regard to Hamas, Welch delivered a straightforward message regarding the USGQs position on support to the Hamas-led Palestinian government. End Summary. Shared Concerns about Iran -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) A/S Welch noted WashingtonQs growing problems with Tehran. While public concerns were focused on the nuclear issue, IranQs growing influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and with extremist Palestinian groups and Hamas was a growing concern to Washington. Welch further advised Hazza that he wished to open a dialogue with our friends in the region in order to determine the best way to counter this rhetoric, noting that there needs to be both economic and security elements to any plan. Welch informed Hazza that he would be talking to key allies in the region and would solicit advice on what the best approach for gaining regional support to this initiative would be. He suggested Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) discussions or visits to the U.S. in order to pursue a dialogue on countering IranQs aggression. Welch noted that we fully intended to share our plans and intentions vis-`-vis Iran with the UAE, but that we requested the advice of the Emiratis as we go forward. ¶3. (S/NF) Hazza noted that it would take time for the UAEG to respond to this request and it would require input from his Qpolitical leadership.Q He further noted that the main task of the security services was to ensure the safety and security of the UAE, but quickly added that Qwe canQt stop Iran.Q Hazza advised that he was concerned by the consequences of the progression of IranQs nuclear program, and had considered IranQs threats against Israel and other neighbors in their evaluation of the situation. He also noted the environmental impact of IranQs nuclear program. (Note: After the GCC Summit in Abu Dhabi in December 2005, the UAEG issued a statement expressing the GCCQs Qlegitimate fearQ of IranQs nuclear program, focusing mainly on environmental concerns. Rather that explicitly condemn Iran, the GCC opted for a more generic approach. End Note.) Hazza reminded Welch that the Ayatollah Ali Khameini had once issued a fatwa prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons by Iran, but noted that this should not be considered a guarantee. Hazza assessed that Iran is also a threat due to its ties to international terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, as well as their financial support to Hamas. He added that the relationship between Iran and Syria, and their links to Hizballah, was also of concern, as was IranQs attempts to expand its influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the world. ¶4. (S/NF) Welch responded that it was the job of the USG to make sure that the Iranians do not get a nuclear weapon, and that POTUS favored a diplomatic solution to this problem. On the issue of Syria, Welch noted that the Syrians need a new understanding of the problems that their relationship with Iran brings, pointing out that President Bashir al-Asad is a card for Iran, whereas his father used Iran as one of his cards. ABU DHABI 00001233 002 OF 003 Countering Iranian Influence in Iraq -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) Welch said the U.S. was interested in a new level of dialogue with the GCC about what needs to be done to counter IranQs influence in Iraq. Hazza immediately replied that his service was participating in a series of consultative meetings with the intelligence services of six regional countries in an effort to support a nationalist, moderate Iraqi government. Hazza noted their goals as bringing an end to the QIraqi civil warQ and supporting Sunni involvement in the new Iraqi government. Hazza noted that there had been 15 meetings to date, most recently on March 28. The regional services support six moderate groups in Iraq in an effort to solidify their positions in the Iraqi parliament and the new government, he said, and were looking to these groups to work as a cohesive unit, including moderate ShiQa in a coalition. Hazza noted that the Jordanians were in the best position to influence Iraq, followed by Egypt and the UAE. Influencing Moqtada al-Sadr -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) Hazza told Welch that the UAE had good relations with the Sunni Iraqis. The UAE is also attempting to bring the ShiQa and Sunnis together in a moderate coalition, and working to influence Moqtada al-SadrQs group. Hazza noted the UAEQs good connections with key elements in MoqtadaQs party who influence his decisions. The Emiratis hope to influence these Moqtada associates in order to have them influence him, he said. The UAE wants to work with MoqtadaQs associates in an effort to split the ShiQa. Their aim is to QcontainQ Moqtada and prevent him from becoming a good politician like Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. The Emiratis would like to bring Moqtada to a moderate coalition. Welch said he regarded Moqtada as a Qdangerous fellow,Q and noted that he has some power in the Iraq parliament by virtue of the fact that he won seats in the election and can negatively influence the composition of the new government. Seeking Support for the U.S. Position on Hamas -------------- - ¶7. (S/NF) Hazza discussed his belief that the Palestinian elections had been a disaster and were largely a result of corruption in the Palestinian Authority and the leadership of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Hazza noted that Hamas was surprised at the fact that they had won the election. The State Security Directorate assessed that there was both a positive and a negative aspect to the Hamas win. On the negative side, he cited HamasQ position with regard to Israel, and their violent (jihadist) agenda. On the positive side, Hazza noted the fact the Hamas was now in power and was accountable to the international community. QWe think Hamas will be firing Fatah people everywhere,Q Hazza opined. He spoke of the threat posed by Muslim extremists, which Hazza and his al-Nahyan brothers often refer to generically as the Muslim Brotherhood. ¶8. (S/NF) Welch questioned the amount of private financial support going into HamasQ coffers. The U.S. does not want to see any of its friends support the new Hamas government, and requested the UAEQs help in that regard. However, Welch said the U.S. will continue to provide support for the Palestinian people. Hazza replied by asking who would pay the government salaries if the UAE and other Arab countries did not. QThat is not our problem, and it is not yours,Q Welch told Hazza, underscoring the need for Hamas to show accountability. QPlease donQt give one pennyQ to support Hamas, Welch said. If the Palestinians resort to violence, the Palestinian government will be responsible for controlling it, he added. ¶9. (S/NF) Hazza wanted to know how the USG would react to those countries that did support the Hamas government. Would they run afoul of U.S. laws restricting support to terrorist organizations? Welch said that could be a real problem. QWe have no problem with providing support to Abu ABU DHABI 00001233 003 OF 003 Mazen, but we do have a problem with providing support through Abu Mazen. We donQt want to punish the Palestinian people, but do want to punish the government.Q Welch reiterated the U.S. position: QNo money to the government.Q If Hamas Qchanges its tuneQ in the next six months and renounces violence, and accepts Israel, we will accept them. I bet that they wonQt, and therefore, we want to exert pressure on them and make them fail.Q ¶10. (U) A/S Welch has cleared this message. SISON