Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABIDJAN837
2006-07-28 15:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

FPI WANTS CONSULTATIONS, NOT CONFRONTATION

Tags:  IV PGOV 
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VZCZCXRO2666
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0837 2091511
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281511Z JUL 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1672
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1399
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABIDJAN 000837 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2016
TAGS: IV PGOV
SUBJECT: FPI WANTS CONSULTATIONS, NOT CONFRONTATION

Classified By: AMBASSADOR AUBREY HOOKS FOR REASONS 1.4 B.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABIDJAN 000837

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2016
TAGS: IV PGOV
SUBJECT: FPI WANTS CONSULTATIONS, NOT CONFRONTATION

Classified By: AMBASSADOR AUBREY HOOKS FOR REASONS 1.4 B.


1. (C) Senior members of President Gbagbo's FPI party have
met twice with the Ambassador in the past week to discuss the
issue of identification. They emphasized that they want to
resolve their differences with Prime Minister Banny through
consultations, not confrontation in the streets. They asked
the Ambassador to persuade the PM to meet with them to
discuss their concerns. The Ambassador has done that and the
PM has agreed to meet them.


2. (C) The first meeting between the Ambassador and Affi
N'Guessan, President of the FPI, occurred on July 21.
N'Guessan was very defensive in his presentation of the FPI
position. He asserted that the FPI supports the principle of
mobile identification teams (MITs) but will go beyond
boycotting to actively block the identification process until
their demands for more consultations and more transparency
are met. The Ambassador suggested to N'Guessan that the FPI
had not formulated a clear message; he as a professional
observer had difficulty determining whether the FPI was for
or against identification. He proposed that N'Guessan state
very clearly in his next speech or communique that the FPI
favors identification and insists on a transparent process.
N'Guessan said he liked that suggestion, and indeed in a
communique published over the weekend, the first sentence
stated that the FPI supported the identification process
although the conditions the FPI proposed raise questions
about the party leadership's sincerity.


3. (C) Early in the week N'Guessan requested another
meeting with the Ambassador. He came to the Residence with
four of his senior colleagues on July 26. He adopted a less
defensive stance in this meeting. He stated that the FPI
wanted to resolve their differences with the PM through
consultations, not through confrontations between youth
groups in the streets. He asked the Ambassador to persuade
the PM to meet with the FPI to discuss methodology for
carrying out the identification process. The Ambassador
agreed to do so and met the following day with the PM to
deliver this message; the PM is more than willing to meet
with N'Guessan and his delegation. The Ambassador commented
to N'Guessan and his colleagues that the FPI, having accepted
the principle of identification, could legitimately raise
questions about methodology, but that the FPI had to be
reasonable in its approach. The political opposition and the
Forces Nouvelles rebels also have the same right. They will
all have to make compromises to keep the process moving
forward. He also observed that the FPI delegation needed to
listen as much as they talked when they met the PM;
furthermore, such a meeting was for discussion, not for
presenting militant positions. N'Guessan said he understood.


4. (C) In the interval between the two meetings, several
clashes between FPI-associated Young Patriots and youth
groups from the opposition occurred, resulting in at least
one death and a number of wounded. The day of the second
meeting the Young Patriots reached an agreement with
opposition youth to call a halt to the confrontations.


5. (C) A number of factors have contributed to the evolving
FPI position, which may be more tactical and short-term than
fundamental. The growing confrontations between the Young
Patriots and an increasingly bold opposition have surprised
the FPI. Furthermore, PM Banny is winning greater support
from the population for the identification process, which he
presents as a prelude to elections and the end to the
political crisis. The FPI, which is a minority party, is
increasingly uncomfortable playing the spoiler when it
entails a loss of popular support. The threat of UN
sanctions may also enter into the equation, although that is
probably a minor factor. The FPI's hardline position is
long-standing and reflects a determination to disenfranchise
citizens in the North who are less likely to vote for the
FPI. The FPI has dominated the political scene since the
political opposition, traumatized by the killings of
demonstrators in March, 2004, largely abandoned the street to
the Young Patriots. That is now changing. Moreover, with
the naming of PM Banny and the designation of a UN High
Representative for Elections, FPI dominance of the political
process is slipping. The FPI has thus resorted to blocking
tactics, which they find are increasingly at odds with large
segments of the population. They are looking for new ways to
position themselves for the next elections.
Hooks

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