COTE D'IVOIRE: PRIME MINISTER,S PEACE TRAIN STUCK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000694 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO EFIN IV SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: PRIME MINISTER,S PEACE TRAIN STUCK AT DISARMAMENT REF: A. ABIDJAN 647 ¶B. ABIDJAN 658 ¶C. ABIDJAN 686 ¶D. ABIDJAN 688 Classified By: Poloff PGwyn for reasons 1.4 b&d ¶1. (C) Summary. Prime Minister Banny's peace train is stuck for the moment at the disarmament station. The Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (FANCI) say they have completed the initial, pre-regroupment phase of the disarmament, where combatants are assembled at designated sites under their own command structure. However, it appears that the rebel New Forces (FN) have barely started pre-regroupment, and the pro-Gbagbo militias refuse to start it at all. Those FANCI and FN forces which have been pre-regrouped are badly in need of food, medicine and other basic supplies -- otherwise their leaders tell us they will not be able to keep them at the sites. The inability of the FN and FANCI even to agree on what should be the central issue in their ongoing talks highlights how deeply the two sides still mistrust each other. The issue of financing is also becoming increasingly important. It is critical for the Ivoirian government's current bond issuance to succeed so that it can clear its World Bank arrears, and for the government's own 2006 budget not to get caught up in the ongoing wrangle over the powers of the National Assembly in the transition to elections. Without money to fuel it, the train may have trouble departing this station. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Prime Minister Banny has taken to using the image of a peace train, on which he urges all parties to stay aboard as it carries the nation toward elections. However, for the moment at least, the train appears stuck at the disarmament station. After some movement over the last month, the three sides involved in the process appear to be once again at an impasse. ¶3. (C) The first phase of the disarmament process is supposed to be pre-regroupment, where former combatants from the FN, the FANCI, and the pro-Gbagbo militias in the West are assembled at designated locations under their own command structure. In the second phase, regroupment, ex-combatants are to be assembled in larger numbers at fewer locations under the control of international peacekeeping forces. Eventually they are to surrender their weapons and be either demobilized or integrated into new, combined armed forces. ¶4. (C) After many delays, the pre-regroupment phase finally started May 18, timed to coincide with the beginning of a pilot identification program, in keeping with the painstakingly achieved political agreement to move forward with disarmament and identification simultaneously. It was to be completed within 45 days. FANCI ¶5. (C) For FANCI, pre-regroupment was relatively straightforward, a matter of withdrawing troops to FANCI barracks. FANCI has announced that they have completed their pre-regroupment, having assembled a total of 12,547 troops at 35 sites throughout the government zone. However, FANCI Chief of Staff General Philippe Mangou has presented the PNDDR (the National Program for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration),which is overseeing the whole DDR process, with a list of urgent needs such as medicine and tents to keep the FANCI soldiers in the pre-regroupment camps. MILITIAS ¶6. (C) The pre-regroupment of pro-Gbagbo militias in the West was supposed to start June 8. The militia leaders postponed the date three times (refs A and B),citing concerns about security for their men and delays in FN pre-regroupment. On June 20 the militia leaders met in Abidjan with FANCI Chief of Staf Mangou and PNDDR Chairman Ouassenan Kone to air their concerns. Denis Maho Glofiei, the chief leaer of the western militias, told the Defense Attche June 26 that the militias were upset that the Prime Minister had refused to meet with them. He said the meeting with Mangou and Kone had not adequately addressed their concerns and the militias were not planning to start pre-regroupment any time soon. Maho said security was their primary concern -- they do not trust ONUCI to protect their men at the pre-regroupment sites after ONUCI troops were so easily chased out of Guiglo in January. (Note: It was the militias who routed them.) PNDDR contacts told us that although the militia leaders said they were concerned about the security of their men, in reality they appeared to be more focused on receiving enough bodyguards and 4X4 vehicles for themselves. Maho said the militia leaders would meet among themselves July 6 in Guiglo, without ABIDJAN 00000694 002 OF 003 FANCI or PNDDR. Maho did invite the Defense Attache to attend. ¶7. (U) However, On June 28, Pastor Gammi, one of the other western militia leaders, announced publicly that he was satisfied with the results of the June 20 meeting and urged his men to begin moving to the pre-regroupment sites. NEW FORCES ¶8. (C) Pre-regroupment was not as straightforward for the FN as it was for the FANCI because they had no barracks to withdraw to, having destroyed all the FANCI barracks in their areas during the 2002 rebellion. Initially they were to assemble at 100 locations throughout the areas they control, but they eventually reduced that number to 50. The New Forces announced in a press conference on June 23 that they had pre-regrouped 12,885 soldiers in 31 sites. However, the commanders of the UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (ONUCI) and the French Licorne peacekeeping force told the International Working Group (IWG) the same day that the FN had thus far only occupied 7 of the planned 50 sites. On a more positive note, FN leader Guillaume Soro confirmed at the same IWG meeting that the FN would allow UN and French peacekeepers to enter their sites to verify that pre-regroupment was actually taking place. ¶9. (C) Sidiki Konate, Director of Cabinet for Guillaume Soro, told us June 21 that the FN continued to hope to complete pre-regroupment by the end of the month. However, he said the FN were very concerned by delays in the pre-regroupment of pro-Gbagbo militias in the West, because assembling FN soldiers at pre-regroupment sites made them vulnerable to surprise attack. ¶10. (C) The FN pre-regroupment sites are basic encampments throughout the countryside in rebel-held areas, with no real support structures for the men. Poloff visited one of these sites at Botro, near the rebel capital of Bouake, on June 26. The site was a former prefecture building in a regrettable state of disrepair. There was no running water and the bathrooms were unusable. Cherif Ousmane, Boauke Zone Commander for the FN, told us that the UN was supposed to deliver water regularly but had not done so in ten days. The ceilings of the building had either collapsed or were crumbling, though the roof was intact. A chalkboard indicated that the total number of troops at the site was 79. Ousmane said that food, water, medicine, electricity and better housing conditions are urgently needed to keep the men inside the camps. POST-DISARMAMENT ¶11. (C) Another disarmament-related issue on which progress is stalled is the restructuring of the armed forces. The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement stipulated that, in the context of disarmament, the government would restructure the armed forces to provide for the reintegration of some of the FN with the FANCI, but it didn't say how or when this would happen. Questions about this restructuring/reintegration are at the top of the list of FN priorities in the ongoing talks between the FN and FANCI chiefs of staff. The FN want agreement now on the formation of a combined FN/FANCI joint staff, in part to assure no retribution against FN soldiers who rejoin the FANCI after disarmament, and in part to assure a role for the FN in providing security for the upcoming elections. The FN also want former FANCI soldiers who joined the rebellion but will now be reintegrated with FANCI to retain their current ranks (many have been promoted to much higher ranks in the FN),and they want such FN soldiers to be paid their salaries retroactively to the beginning of the rebellion. FANCI refuses even to discuss any of these demands, arguing that such issues only distract from the task at hand of going forward with disarmament without delay. The latest round of FN/FANCI talks, scheduled for June 29-30 in Bouake, broke up a day early over these three restructuring issues, though the two sides did agree to meet again July 6. COMMENT ¶12. (C) We should have a better sense of how badly pre-regroupment may be stalled after the next round of FN/FANCI talks and the upcoming conclave of western militia leaders, both on July 6. The inability of the FN and FANCI even to agree on what should be the central issue in their ongoing talks highlights how deeply the two sides still mistrust each other. The issue of financing is also becoming increasingly critical for the success of disarmament. In turn, this makes it all the more important for the Ivoirian government's bond issuance to clear the country's arrears with the World Bank, which closes at the end of this month, to succeed. It also casts a spotlight on the government's ABIDJAN 00000694 003 OF 003 own 2006 budget, which could well become caught up in the ongoing political wrangle over the powers of the National Assembly after its mandate expired December 15. Prime Minister Banny told the IWG that he had no intention of submitting the budget to the Assembly for approval (ref C), and the agreement which representatives of the President, Prime Minister, President of the National Assembly and all the parliamentary groups signed on June 23 contained implied assurances that the Assembly would not take up peace process-related legislation (ref D). However, President Gbagbo, who has the right to submit legislation to the Assembly, and his FPI (Ivoirian Popular Front) party, which controls the Assembly, could well assert that the budget is not peace-process related. Without money to fuel it, the peace train may well remain stopped for now at the disarmament station. End Comment. Hooks