COTE D'IVOIRE: PRIME MINISTER'S UPCOMING VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000409 SIPDIS SIPDIS KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID ASEC IV SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: PRIME MINISTER'S UPCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON REF: ABIDJAN 384 Classified By: POL/ECON Jim Wojtasiewicz, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary. Prime Minister Banny told the Ambassador that the primary objective for his upcoming visit to Washington is to request assistance for Cote d'Ivoire's peace process from the World Bank and the IMF. The Ambassador underscored the urgency of moving forward with identification and disarmament now, but Banny's response was cagey and evasive. Banny is learning that it is relatively easy to get Cote d'Ivoire's political leaders to reach broad agreements but so far has proved nearly impossible to get them to carry out their commitments. Senior U.S. officials should remind him that in order to return to the good graces of the international economic community, Cote d'Ivoire must not only clear its arrears with the World Bank, it must make real progress in the peace process, close the Cora investment dispute, and clean up corruption in the cocoa and petroleum sectors. Banny will probably also raise bilateral assistance, and may put in a plug for more UN peacekeeping troops. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with Prime Minister Banny April 20 to preview the Prime Minister's upcoming April 23-29 visit to Washington. ¶3. (C) Banny said his main objective for the visit would be to persuade the World Bank and the IMF to resume assistance programs for Cote d'Ivoire once his government clears the country's arrears with the World Bank. He asked for U.S. support in these institutions. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador reminded Banny that the Cora de Comstar investment dispute remains a major irritant in our bilateral relationship. He urged the Prime Minister to be prepared not just to discuss a deal but to finalize it, when he meets with Cora's stockholders in Washington. Banny indicated he was aware of this issue but did not know all the details. ¶5. (C) Banny asked for a readout of that day's meeting of the International Working Group (IWG),which the Ambassador had just come from (septel). The Ambassador said the heads of Cote d'Ivoire's disarmament commission, electoral commission, and commission on identification had all told the IWG that unless real progress starts to be made on disarmament and identification urgently, by next week, it will not be possible to hold elections by the end of October. Banny's response was cagey and evasive, as his presentation to the IWG had been. He indicated without going into any detail that these things would start moving "soon," but he also talked about President Gbagbo's "parallel diplomacy:" agreeing on the broader political level to move forward with the peace process but in private throwing up any obstacle he can. As an example he cited the recent incident at Tiebissou (reftel),when government security forces blocked the rebel New Forces (FN) chief of staff, escorted by UN peacekeeping troops, from traveling to Yamoussoukro for scheduled disarmament talks with the chief of staff of the government armed forces. Banny said he was sure though he could not prove it that this was a "provocation" instigated by the presidency. ¶6. (C) Comment. Banny is learning the same lesson that many have learned before him. It has been relatively easy to persuade the parties to Cote d'Ivoire's political crisis to reach broad agreements: Linas-Marcoussis, Accra I, II and III, Pretoria I and II, and now, under Banny, Yamoussoukro I and II. Where the rubber needs to hit the road, and never seems to do so, is in the implementation of these agreements, because the Ivoirians never seem truly willing to carry out their commitments. And when each successive agreement fails, the Ivoiorians turn back to the international community for help. ¶7. (C) Banny is coming to Washington in search of assistance not only from the World Bank and the IMF but in all likelihood from the United States as well. His Washington visit comes right between a visit last week to Paris, where President Chirac gave him a head-of-state welcome and reportedly promised substantial additional assistance, and a visit to Brussels on his way back from Washington, where he will make a similar request. Senior U.S. officials should remind him that clearing the arrears with the World Bank is only one of the things that Cote d'Ivoire needs to do to return to the good graces of the international economic community. Real progress must be made in the peace process, and this means disarmament and identification must start now. ABIDJAN 00000409 002 OF 002 Cote d'Ivoire must also commit to take concrete actions to clean up corruption in its cocoa sector and to prevent it from creeping in to the growing petroleum sector. Cote d'Ivoire cannot expect substantial amounts of assistance from the international community when it lets so much of its own money go to waste. ¶8. (C) If Banny raises bilateral assistance explicitly, senior officials should remind him that Cote d'Ivoire must meet these same conditions plus a final resolution of the Cora dispute in order to regain eligibility for AGOA benefits, and that Cote d'Ivoire will remain ineligible for most other forms of U.S. assistance until free and fair presidential elections are held. Senior U.S. officials should also be prepared for Banny to put in a plug for the Secretary General's request to the Security Council for a SIPDIS large increase in UN peacekeeping troop levels in Cote d'Ivoire. End Comment. Hooks