COTE D'IVOIRE: FOURTH MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000190 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNAUS IV SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: FOURTH MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP REF: A. ABIDJAN 180 ¶B. 05 ABIDJAN 1333 ¶C. 05 ABIDJAN 1177 Classified By: Pol/Econ Jim Wojtasiewicz, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Prime Minister Banny briefed the fourth meeting of the International Working Group (IWG) on his plans to adopt the IWG's road map as his government's work plan. In light of the four days of street disturbances in reaction to the previous IWG's stance on the National Assembly, it was decided to echo the UN Secretary General's January 29 statement, expressing disappointment that President Gbagbo extended the Assembly's mandate with full legislative powers, and reiterating the importance of implementing both UNSCR 1633 and the decisions of the IWG. Members of the IWG criticized UN High Representative for Elections (HRE) Monteiro for taking so long to issue a ruling on whether the disputed election for the internal officers of the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) was valid, and then not coming down squarely on one side of the question. However, the IWG endorsed Monteiro's ruling and his call for a political compromise on this issue to be reached urgently. The Mediation Group, tasked with day-to-day mediation on behalf of the IWG, was criticized for not doing enough actual mediation, but defended itself by saying it had been rebuffed by Prime Minister Banny. The French sought to insert into the communique a call for the Security Council to increase UN troop levels, but this was removed at U.S. request. It is a welcome development that Prime Minister Banny is adopting the IWG's road map as his government's work plan, but the group risks losing its effectiveness unless the Mediation Group becomes more active. Monthly meetings at the ministerial level are not enough to have a significant impact on the Ivoirian political process. End Summary. ¶2. (U) The IWG held its fourth meeting in Abidjan on February 17. With the passing of the AU chairmanship last month to Republic of the Congo President Dennis Sassou-Nguesso, for the first time Congolese Foreign Minister Rudolphe Adada co-chaired the IWG together with Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Pierre Schori. Also in attendance were French Minister Delegate for Cooperation, Development and the French Speaking Countries Brigitte Girardin; Ghanaian Foreign Minister Nana Akufo-Addo; Guinean Foreign Minister Fatouma Sidibe Kaba; Nigeran Foreign Minister Aichatou Mindaoudou; Nigerian Foreign Minister Oluyemi Adeniji; South African Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma; ECOWAS Executive Secretary Mohamed Ibn Chambas; UN High Representative for Elections in Cote d'Ivoire (HRE) Antonio Monteiro; and representatives from the United States, Benin, the United Kingdom, the AU, the EU, the International Organization of French Speaking Countries, and the World Bank. ¶3. (C) The meeting was once again preceded by a breakfast for heads of delegation. French Minister Girardin felt the need to emphasize to the other delegation heads that France has no economic interests whatsoever in the three most important sectors of Cote d'Ivoire's economy -- cocoa, coffee and petroleum -- and therefore clearly does not have imperialistic designs here. SRSG Schori noted the delicacy of the National Assembly issue, after pro-Gbagbo militias blocked streets and attacked UN installations for four days after last month's meeting to protest the IWG's stance on this issue. South African Foreign Ministe Zuma said she could go along with making a statment on this issue in the communique but it woul need to be carefully discussed. ¶4. (C) As at te previous two meetings, after the introductory peeches Prime Minister Banny addressed the group. Banny briefed in detail on the seminar he chaired February 9-11 in Yamoussoukro to discuss with hi cabinet the implementation of the IWG's road ma (ref A). Indeed, Banny said the purpose of theseminar was for his government to appropriate the road map as its own work plan for bringing the country out of its political crisis. He was upbeat about the results: all ministers attended except a few who were traveling, and actively participated. Most notably New Forces (FN) leader Guillaume Soro was there, for the first time attending a cabinet meeting of the Banny government. Banny promised he would soon hold a second seminar devoted to the country's economic problems. He spoke at length about the need to restore trust, reconciliation and compromise in the country, but he branded the National Assembly as an obstacle to peace and indicated he would seek to marginalize it. Banny said he would personally take charge of the process of issuing identity cards and registering voters. He insisted that his "tandem" with President Gbagbo is working well -- Gbagbo likes what Banny is doing and supports him. ABIDJAN 00000190 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) In the IWG itself there was extensive discussion of how to treat the issue of the National Assembly in the meeting's communique. Some delegations -- Ghana, Spain, Niger -- were emphatic that the IWG must stick to its principles, not let the pro-Ggbagbo street militias hold a veto over everything the IWG does. Others, most notably South Africa, argued for a more cautious approach. South African Foreign Minister Zuma recalled that on January 18 Nigerian President Obasanjo, as then-AU chairman, appeared to back away from the January 15 IWG's stance on this issue, issuing a joint communique with President Gbagbo that said the IWG had no authority to dissolve the National Assembly and did not dissolve it. Several delegations responded that of course the IWG didn't dissolve the National Assembly -- its mandate expired December 16. SRSG Schori elaborated that at the January 18 meeting, which he attended, President Obasanjo was very clear that the National Assembly should remain as only a consultative body, without legislative powers, and President Gbagbo seemed to accept this. This is why on January 29 the Secretary General issued a statement expressing his disappointment that Gbagbo had subsequently used his decree authority to extend the Assembly with full legislative powers. The statement also called on all parties to refrain from unilateral action, and reiterated the importance of implementing UNSCR 1633 as well as the decisions of the IWG. In the end, consensus was reached that the communique should not ignore the issue of the National Assembly but should also not return to the question of the expiration of its mandate. Accordingly, it was decided to incorporate language from the Secretary General's January 29 statement. ¶6. (C) There was also considerable discussion about the continued, five-month deadlock in the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI). (President Gbagbo's Ivoirian Popular Front (FPI) party, backed by a Supreme Court ruling, refuses to accept as legitimate the October internal election of CEI officers because consultative members were not allowed to vote, and the opposition refuses to allow consultative members to vote for internal officers or to cede another senior position to Gbagbo's camp.) The previous day, HRE Monteiro had issued a ruling that the election was fully consistent with the Pretoria agreement, but was not consistent with President Gbagbo's July decree enacting the necessary legislation to set up the new CEI (ref C). (Monteiro's ruling explicitly acknowledged that this means Gbagbo's decree is not consistent with the Pretoria agreement even though South African President Mbeki as mediator ruled that it is (ref B).) Monteiro declined to rule on whether the Pretoria agreement should take precedence over the Gbagbo decree, but rather called for President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Banny to find a political solution. ¶7. (C) At the IWG, Monteiro came under sharp criticism, especially from Nigerian Foreign Minister Adeniji, for taking so long to come out with a ruling -- he promised at both the January and February IWG's that a ruling was imminent -- and then not coming down clearly on one side of the question. Monteiro defended his actions animatedly, saying he put a compromise solution on the table (an additional senior leadership position for FPI) and spent weeks trying to persuade the Ivoirian political parties to accept it, but they refused. He had done all he could do. Monteiro also protested that it was unfair to single out the CEI issue when all the other elements of the peace process also remain stalled. Congolese co-chair Foreign Minister Adada noted that he had met recently with FPI parliamentary leaders, and they had indicated they might be willing to accept Monteiro's compromise on a one-time basis, only for these upcoming presidential and legislative elections. (Note: However, it was clear from Monteiro's presentation that there are also opposition parties that turned down his proposal.) In the end it was decided that the communique should explicitly endorse Monteiro's ruling that the CEI election was consistent with the Pretoria Agreement, and should also endorse his call for the Ivoirian parties to reach a political compromise urgently (the communique says before the beginning of March). ¶8. (C) There was also a heated discussion about the Mediation Group's report. (The Mediation Group is chaired by South African Mediation Special Envoy Sokupa, and the other members are SRSG Schori, HRE Monteiro, and the local representatives of ECOWAS and the AU. It is tasked with carrying out day-to-day mediation on behalf of the IWG, to facilitate the implementation of UNSCR 1633.) Members of the IWG noted that while the Mediation Group's report was an excellent review of the current situation and the various significant events that had taken place since the last IWG meeting, there was nothing in it to indicate that the Mediation Group had done any ABIDJAN 00000190 003 OF 003 actual mediation. SRSG Schori (Sokupa was not present) replied that immediately in the wake of the last IWG, conditions were not conducive to mediation because of the street disturbances. After that, the group tried to set up regular weekly meetings with Prime Minister Banny, as they had done with his predecessor, but he declined. Schori noted that there were several recommendations at the end of the report suggesting ways that the IWG could task the Mediation Group with reinserting itself into the process. IWG members then pointed out that there were six recommendations but only one had anything to do with the Mediation Group. Schori reiterated the group's frustration at having been rebuffed by Prime Minister Banny. No mention of the Mediation Group was included in the communique. ¶9. (C) France once again sought to insert a paragraph into the communique calling on the Security Council to increase UN troop levels in Cote d'Ivoire but this was deleted at U.S. request. ¶10. (C) Comment. It is a welcome development that Prime Minister Banny plans to adopt the IWG road map as his government's work plan. Beyond that, the IWG was able to work out reasonably good, strong but not overly inflammatory, communique language on the National Assembly and the CEI, as well as a number of other important but less potentially explosive issues. However, the group risks losing its effectiveness unless the Mediation Group becomes more active. Communiques emanating from monthly IWG meetings at the ministerial level are not enough to have a significant impact on the Ivoirian political process. End Comment. Hooks