ECHOES OF ARETHA FRANKLIN: THE REBELS WANT RESPECT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000179 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO ASEC IV SUBJECT: ECHOES OF ARETHA FRANKLIN: THE REBELS WANT RESPECT Classified By: Poloff Phaedra Gwyn for reasons 1.4 b&d ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador made a three-day trip to Bouake and Korhogo, in New Forces (FN) territory in the North, to urge the ex-rebels to help move the political process forward. We found a relatively relaxed security environment and a population whose most pressing concerns were not the FN, but the lack of water and the continued postponement of school exams. The FN received the Ambassador warmly and were receptive to his message. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) The Ambassador made a three-day trip to Bouake and Korhogo, in New Forces (FN) territory in the North, February 12-14. Since the 2002 coup attempt that divided the country, no other ambassador accredited to Cote d'Ivoire has made the trip to rebel territory by road, spending the night in both Bouake and Korhogo. The Ambassador had discussed this trip with both Prime Minister Banny and President Gbagbo, who supported the visit as a chance to help move the political process forward. The Ambassador's message to the FN was clear: engage more fully in the peace process, disarm, assist in the reunification of the country and help lead Cote d'Ivoire out of the current crisis through free, fair, and transparent elections. The Ambassador communicated these points to Guillaume Soro, Secretary General of the FN; Hamed Bakayoko, FN Army (FAFN) Chief of Staff; his deputy Commander Issiaka "Wattao" Ouattarra; Bouake Zone Commander Cherif Ousmane; Korhogo Zone Commander Martin Fofie (who was one of the three Ivoirians recently sanctioned by the United Nations); and other key leaders of the FN. ¶3. (C) The message resonated very well with all parties. Soro promised to come to Abidjan to begin participating in cabinet meetings within two weeks. Soro also urged that the UN and the international community work with him to address his security concerns. Indeed, the FN's message to the Ambassador was that they want to be taken seriously as partners in the process; i.e. they want respect. Soro noted that UN SRSG Pierre Schori's recent comments, describing the FN as warlords, were not helpful. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador also met with humanitarian workers, municipal authorities, imams, the traditional chief of Korhogo, and other community leaders. All parties agreed on the need to move forward in the political process but pointed out the importance of issuing identification cards to all Ivoirians before elections can take place. When asked about their relations with the FN, no community leaders expressed any serious grievances. In Bouake, the FN capital, the community leaders seemed to distance themselves somewhat from the FN, willing to work with them but not necessarily identifying with them. However, in the predominantly Muslim northern city of Korhogo, community leaders seemed proud of the FN and pleased that the rebels had taken up their cause. ¶5. (C) Though there had been isolated security incidents, security was not a major concern for the community leaders. The security environment in Korhogo and Bouake was more favorable than that of Abidjan. The ambiance of both towns was peaceful and the motorcades of armed FAFN soldiers were regarded with passive stares and occasional waves by the townspeople. We passed more road checkpoints in Abidjan between the city limit and the embassy than we encountered during our entire trip to the FN zone. We also did not see the same long lines of truckers in the FN zone as in the government zone, waiting for hours or even days to get their goods through the omnipresent checkpoints. ¶6. (C) While physical security is not a pressing issue for the communities, water security clearly is and was raised in each meeting. The water pumps have not been maintained since the outbreak of the rebellion and the government in Abidjan has refused to send civil servants to repair the pumps that are owned by the state. During the frequent water shortages, the population has survived by using local wells. ¶7. (C) Education is also a major concern for the residents of Bouake and Korhogo. The government has not held exams for the children in the FN-controlled zone since 2003. After the 2002 coup attempt, the government recalled teachers from the North, and has not called on them to return. Communities are keeping schools open with the help of volunteer teachers, but the numbers of students enrolled are diminishing. Though the government cites security as the reason for not redeploying the teachers, community leaders in the North are convinced that the reasons are more political. The Minister of Education, who is from President Gbagbo's Ivoirian Popular Front (FPI) party, has rejected repeated attempts by international humanitarian organizations and northern community leaders to resolve the government's security concerns. ABIDJAN 00000179 002 OF 002 ¶8. (C) Around town, we noticed that the FN have made an effort to keep up a minimum of maintenance, noticeably more so in Korhogo than in Bouake. The road from Bouake to Korhogo was recently repaved and was better than the government-controlled road north from Abidjan toward Bouake. The streets were cleaner in both northern cities, and in Korhogo there was significant new construction going on. Fofie was proud to show us a cultural center that will soon open, brightly covered with murals depicting Senufo culture. ¶9. (C) The hospitality we received in the FN-zone was exemplary. We were met at the entrances to both towns and escorted to the offices of the FN, then to our accommodations. FN security was present but not oppressive. During meetings that did not involve the FN, the soldiers were not intrusive and left us to meet in private. Both nights we were the honored guests at dinners where numerous troupes of dancers from the surrounding areas performed. Humanitarian workers were also invited to the dinners, giving us a chance to continue our conversations with them in a social setting. Indeed, the FN bent over backwards to make sure every element of our visit was a success. ¶10. (U) The Ambassador's visit to the North received prominent press coverage in the Ivoirian media and was picked up by several international press agencies. The independent and pro-opposition press hailed the length of the visit as a strong, visible sign of U.S. engagement in the Ivoirian crisis. The FPI-owned Notre Voie noted that while the U.S. Ambassador was looking for solutions to the crisis, the French Ambassador was showing his country's support for the rebellion. ¶11. (C) COMMENT: The FN are now trying to persuade the population in the North, as well as the other actors in the political process, to take them seriously. While Soro himself has not come to Abidjan to participate in the new government, all of the other FN ministers have been visible in their work and more fully engaged than in the previous government. While the rebels have told PM Banny that they will not run as the FN in the next parliamentary elections, that does not preclude FN members from running on the tickets of opposition political parties. Indeed, their eagerness for respect and a chance to carve out a political future for themselves could result in progress for the peace process. END COMMENT Hooks