Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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06ABIDJAN150 | 2006-02-12 08:03:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Abidjan |
VZCZCXRO3783 PP RUEHPA DE RUEHAB #0150/01 0430803 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 120803Z FEB 06 FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0948 INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 1279 RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2/ECJ3/ECJ5// PRIORITY |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000150 |
1. (C) Since 2002, the Cote d'Ivoire peace process has gone through multiple mediators and mediations including Lome, Linas-Marcoussis, Accra, and Pretoria. Each has petered out in turn, leaving Cote d'Ivoire far short of reunification, disarmament, and elections. Per reftel, the new government has been slow to launch its agenda, though Prime Minister Banny's February 10 seminar in Yamoussoukro to establish the responsibilities and priorities of the government, which is being attended by the New Forces leader Guillaume Soro, could be a positive beginning. The central theme of any future engagement must contain the core message that President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Banny make their partnership work for peace. While we recognize that USG assistance is limited by resource constraints, there are low-cost ways for the US to maintain and deepen its engagement in advancing the peace process. We offer the following recommendations: Political Engagement: 2. (C) The new AU President Sassou has indicated that he will relaunch the AU mediation effort with the arrival in Abidjan of Foreign Minister Adada next week. It is unclear what form Sassou's efforts will take and whether Presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo will be central to that mediation. The USG can signal to Sassou that we strongly support the AU mediation but the AU needs to be consistent in its message and not subject to internal tugs of war. 3. (C) Both Washington and the Post should continue to engage in the political process with all parties, as we are one of the few international actors that is seen as impartial and respected by all sides. The Ambassador will travel to rebel-held territory February 12 to press the New Forces on the need to participate in the government and move to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation (DDR). PM Banny and President Gbagbo support this visit. 4. (C) The US should continue to be an active participant in the International Working Group (IWG) to promote the Gbagbo/Banny partnership. 5. (C) We understand that UN Secretary General Koffi Annan may invite President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Banny to New York as early as February 20. We should encourage the Secretary General to host this meeting. SIPDIS 6. (C) The New York meeting may also be an opportunity for Secretary Rice to meet with President Gbagbo and PM Banny as SIPDIS well to reinforce the importance that the USG places on making progress towards reunification, DDR, and free, fair, and transparent elections. 7. (C) We recommend that Washington consider demarches in Ouagadougou and capitals of Cote d'Ivoire's other regional neighbors to emphasize the importance of their playing a helpful role in the peace process. The Government of Burkina Faso in particular could influence the New Forces to move toward disarmament and reunification of the country. Elections 8. (C) We should help the UN to identify a proactive, strong, senior-level official as a replacement for the departing UN High Representative for Elections Antonio Monteiro. 9. (C) We should consider funding for organizations such as IFES or NDI to assist with elections support. 10. (C) We should also encourage involvement by organizations such as the Carter Center. Identification 11. (C) Identification is central to the peace process as well as to elections and is of particular concern to the NF. We should reinforce the need to complete the identification process and to issue new national identification cards in all of our discussions, and consider how we might assist this process. Disarmament Demobilization and Reunification 12. (C) We believe that US support in the area of reintegration and community reconciliation would be particularly useful. We could explore ways of doing this through the NGO community or more directly should elections be held and 508 sanctions lifted. ABIDJAN 00000150 002 OF 002 13. (C) DOD should also consider committing a small transformation study team from the US Joint Forces Command to work with the FANCI Chief-of-Staff and the New Forces Chief-of-Staff to develop a shared vision for the army's reunification. 14. (C) DOD should also consider a combined civil-military team to work on the need to reinsert former combatants into civil society. Current disarmament plans focus on disarmament and demobilization but give little attention to reintegration. ONUCI 15. (C) The redeployment of civil servants to the north is critical to the reunification of the country. Both in Abidjan and in New York we should urge the UN to exercise greater flexibility in the redeployment of troops from the Zone of Confidence to the north to facilitate the return of the civil servants. 16. (C) UNDPKO should work to develop a more rapid redeployment process to provide greater flexibility in moving troops from missions outside Cote d'Ivoire to backfill gaps in ONUCI's coverage, particularly in times of crisis. 17. (C) Though it is a bit premature at this point, we should also begin to look at our post-election engagement, which will include the need to expeditiously lift 508 sanctions so that we can resume assistance programs and DOD can resume cooperation programs with a new Ivoirian military. 18. (C) Immediately following credible elections, we should hold an extraordinary AGOA review for Cote d'Ivoire. Bringing Cote d'Ivoire back into AGOA based largely on the tremendous political progress that elections represent would be a strong endorsement of the newly elected government. Hooks |