MORE ON VIOLENCE IN GUIGLO AND VULNERABILITY OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000136 SIPDIS AID ADM SIPDIS USAID FOR USAID/A, DCHA/AA, DCHA/FFP, DCHA/OTI USAID FOR DCHA/OFDA MMARX, CPRATT STATE FOR PRM, IO, AF NSC FOR JMELINE DAKAR FOR USAID/WARO/OFDA ACCRA FOR USAID/WARP USUN FOR TMALY E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016 TAGS: EAID PREF PHUM WFP IV LI SUBJECT: MORE ON VIOLENCE IN GUIGLO AND VULNERABILITY OF IDPS THERE REF: ABIDJAN 106 Classified By: OFDA Principal Regional Advisor Regina Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The humanitarian community is still reeling from the violent attacks that took place mid-January in Guiglo against their offices and staff. Providing basic emergency assistance to the camps of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Guiglo is the top priority, but security overshadows all efforts. The protection of the IDPs is a critical concern at this juncture. Although there are no good alternatives for them, all agree that the IDPs are not safe in Guiglo. Hard choices regarding their future must be made before they potentially become the next targets of violence in Guiglo. End Summary. -------------- Background -------------- ¶2. (U) USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) Principal Regional Advisor (PRA) for West and North Africa visited Abidjan 30 January - 01 February to attend meetings concerning the mid-January violence in Guiglo. A meeting of donors with heads of agencies took place on 30 January, followed by an interagency humanitarian coordination meeting (IAHCC) on 31 January, which donors also attended. The meetings followed the UN's security assessment of Guiglo 28-29 January and were chaired by the acting UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC),Youssouf Oomar, the UNICEF country representative. In addition, the PRA held side meetings with heads of UN agencies and NGOs. -------------- Security Concerns in Guiglo -------------- ¶3. (C) In the donors meeting 30 January, the head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) presented a verbal summary of the findings of the UN security assessment. The discussions with Guiglo authorities were described as sobering. They relayed that the U.N. Office in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) is not impartial and denied broadcasting any messages of hate or giving any directions for attacking humanitarian offices or staff. They requested humanitarian organizations to return to Guiglo. The authorities also asked the UN to make reparations to the families for the deaths of the five victims that were shot by UNOCI troops. ¶4. (C) The UN security mission also met with the youth, which was said to be the most difficult meeting. The youth demanded that if the NGOs and UN returned that they be given jobs and that income-generating activities be created for them. They also said the IDPs were not part of Guiglo. ¶5. (C) The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had conducted its own security assessment a few days prior and reported that it was troubled by the fact that the Guiglo authorities took no responsibility for their actions, nor realized the gravity of what had occurred. ¶6. (C) The UN Security Officer was present at the IAHCC and recommended to humanitarian organizations to get guarantees of security from the Guiglo authorities before returning. The PRA challenged this remark, as she felt guarantees of security from the same authorities who broadcast specific instructions for attacks are hollow. The authorities would surely provide assurances, and if directed by Abidjan to do otherwise (as all agree that the directions came from Abidjan),they would follow those instructions regardless of any guarantees. Likewise with the Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (FANCI),which provided shelter to humanitarian staff in Guiglo, but turned a blind eye to the destruction. The FANCI would probably be helpful, unless or until they ABIDJAN 00000136 002 OF 003 received other instructions from their headquarters. ICRC stated that tangible guarantees should be sought. In other words, don't tell me; show me. -------------- The Quandary of the IDPs -------------- ¶7. (C) UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) outlined its plan to accelerate repatriation of the Liberian refugees from Peacetown Camp in Guiglo, as outlined in ref tel. UNHCR also recognized that the Liberians have a particular relationship with their Ivoirian neighbors so their security is more assured than that of the IDPs. ¶8. (C) The two Nicla camps housing almost 7,000 IDPs (of Burkina and Malian descent) pose a much greater problem in terms of security and their future. For the last three years, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) has been managing the two camps and although all its local staff were evacuated to Abidjan, its office in Abidjan has maintained daily contact with the IDPs via telephone. The IDPs have also sent IOM a letter. In meetings during the three days, various options for the IDPs were discussed, but with no conclusions. The PRA stressed the following two points to IOM and others: ¶A. (C) The international community (IC) needs to have a frank discussion with the IDPs regarding their security and their options. After the violence that occurred in Guiglo and the departure of the UNOCI Battalion, they should have no illusions that the IC can provide protection for them. Even though this is a difficult message to deliver, it is our responsibility to say it. A.1. (C) Comment: In our global discussions about protection for IDPs, such a message goes against the humanitarian community's philosophy and against the spirit of The Guiding Principles for Internal Displacement, but in this scenario, the IC has a responsibility to be honest with these people. At the moment, the IC has a very limited presence in Guiglo (only Medecins Sans Frontieres/France (MSF/F) and Caritas remain),and the PRA would estimate it would be quite some time before humanitarian organizations re-establish any full-time presence in Guiglo. End Comment. ¶B. (C) The IDPs must make a difficult, but necessary, realistic decision about their future. The IC will try to help them as best as it can to support their choice, but hard choices must be taken in the very near future, as we are all concerned about their safety. The IDPs may be the next target in Guiglo. We have known that this camp is not tenable in the long term. The IC has been avoiding making decisions about these people, but now it must be done. ¶B. 1. (C) Comment. The IDPs have no good alternatives. They state in their letter to IOM that they cannot return to their ancestral countries because their spirit is in Cote d'Ivoire and their plantations. They say it is still too unsafe for them to return to the plantations (further west of Guiglo) they fled in 2002 and that they are tired of seeing their families and friends being killed by machetes of the Guere. They are afraid to stay where they are-and so should they be. They ask IOM to direct them to a country where they can work in peace. "Our sole wish is to leave this country," states the letter. (Apparently, the IDPs are ignoring the contradiction between declining to return to their ancestral countries because their spirit is in Cote d'Ivoire and expressing the strong desire to leave the country.) The PRA suspects they are hoping to be moved to a third country, just as the Liberian refugees do. End Comment. -------------- Some Progress -------------- ¶9. (C) A subsequent smaller meeting was held 3 February with ICRC, UNHCR, IOM, UN World Food Program (WFP),and European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO),as ECHO is funding IOM. In this meeting, the group decided that it would be ABIDJAN 00000136 003 OF 003 impossible in the immediate future to evacuate the IDPs from Guiglo because of the "political implications," and that urgent humanitarian assistance would be provided in the short term (through February) while searching for a long-term solution. At the same time, the HC should condemn the hate messages broadcast via radio and put in place measures to control the radio transmissions. The HC should also convey the concerns of the humanitarian community to the highest levels of the Ivoirian government. The UN hopes to use the upcoming visit of Jan Egland, the Under-Secretary-General of OCHA, to reinforce these messages during his visit to Cote d'Ivoire February 14 and 15. ¶10. (C) Lastly, the group stated that the UNOCI Force Commander should immediately obtain from the Chief of Staff of the FANCI and the Commander of the Gendarmerie a plan to put in place a mechanism to physically secure the Nicla camps. The group will also ask ONUCI to organize a mechanism by which to call forward the Quick Reaction Forces of the French Licorne, if needed. -------------- Final Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Finding a solution for the IDPs and refugees is not going to be easy, and may even be a bit messy, but is something that must be pushed at this juncture. The UN has demonstrated that it cannot protect the Burkinabe/Malian-origin IDPs and the Liberians are a potential source of mercenary recruits for the Ivoirian conflict. The UN should consider providing a package of incentives to encourage the refugees to return to Liberia and the IDPs to return to their homes or ancestral countries or resettle elsewhere in Cote d'Ivoire. Not to do so would leave the international community responsible for their welfare but unable to provide for it. HOOKS Hooks