COTE D'IVOIRE: AMBIGUOUS ROLE OF THE SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 001303 SIPDIS SIPDIS KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2016 TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL ASEC IV SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: AMBIGUOUS ROLE OF THE SECURITY FORCES REF: ABIDJAN 820 Classified By: POL/ECON Jim Wojtasiewicz, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary. The armed forces are playing a very ambiguous role in Cote d'Ivoire's political process. No one trusts the security forces: not President Gbagbo, not Prime Minister Banny, and not the public. FANCI (Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire) Chief of Staff Mangou's loyalty to Gbagbo goes well beyond the traditional role of a chief of staff, but he also sometimes obeys orders from Banny and the Defense Minister. Gbagbo's reliance on militias to work his political will instead of the security forces undermines their morale and public trust in them. UN Security Council Resolution 1721 was meant to give Banny more control over the security forces but Gbagbo has made clear he will not allow this. There are signs of divisions with the security forces with some still supporting Gbagbo and others shifting their support to Banny. Some probably also still secretly support the rebels. Clashes within the security forces cannot be ruled out, but Gbagbo seems to have reduced prospects of a coup. The ambiguous role of the security forces is infecting the political process, but the political process is also infecting the security forces, yet another illustration of how deeply rooted Cote d'Ivoire's problems are. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The government security forces are playing a very ambiguous role in Cote d'Ivoire's current political crisis. ¶3. (C) No one trusts the security forces, including President Gbagbo. Instead, Gbagbo continues to rely on the militias he created, and the thuggish pro-Gbagbo FESCI (Federation of University and High School Students of Cote d'Ivoire),to intimidate the opposition and work his political will. To a lesser extent Gbagbo also relies on mercenaries from Liberia and elsewhere as a back-up military force. In one sense this is not surprising, given the attempted coup against Gbagbo in 2002, and the memory of the successful coup against President Bedie in 1999. However, it undermines the morale of the security forces and public trust in them. Indeed, the presence of security forces most visible to the public is at road checkpoints where drivers are routinely shaken down for bribes. ¶4. (C) Prime Minister Banny also does not trust the security forces. Banny and the Defense Minister told the Ambassador July 26 (reftel) that FANCI Chief of Staff General Philippe Mangou is "evasive" in his responses to their requests for support, does not always carry out orders from them, and frequently receives instructions directly from Gbagbo's entourage. ¶5. (C) Indeed, Mangou's loyalty to President Gbagbo goes well beyond that of a traditional chief of staff. On several occasions he has intervened in clashes between pro-Gbagbo militias and security forces to shelter the militias, ostensibly as mediator. And he goes out of his way to make public statements pledging the loyalty of the armed forces to Gbagbo. Notably in a speech November 3 i.e. after UNSCR 1721, he reaffirmed the support of the armed forces for Gbagbo as commander-in-chief. ¶6. (C) However, there was nothing evasive in Mangou's October 31 communique publicly rejecting Banny's proposal to form a special unit from the armed forces to asist with dismantling the militias. The Pretoria Agreement provided for elements of the security forces to be made available to the Prime Minister for this task, and Banny tried to set up his own special unit, but Mangou issued a communique noting that under the Pretoria Agreement it is the President who is to designate these units, turning down Banny's proposal for a newly-formed unit, and designating an existing unit for the task. "Obviously there is a real problem of communication between the Prime Minister's office and the top hierarchy of the Defense and Security Forces," the communique went on to say. ¶7. (C) The chain of command is also very unclear. Presidential advisor and former Defense Minister Kadet Bertin wields a great deal of influence, both over the armed forces and over the militias. In early 2005 during parliamentary hearings about the budget, the Finance Minister admitted that in the previous year large amounts of money had been spent off budget, i.e. not through the defense ministry but presumably through Bertin, to buy weapons. ¶8. (C) UN Security Council Resolution 1721 was meant to give ABIDJAN 00001303 002 OF 002 Banny more control over the security forces, in paragraph 9, which states that the Prime Minister must have "the necessary authority" over the military. However, President Gbagbo noted pointedly in his November 2 address to the nation, that the UNSC 1721 did not say explicitly that the Prime Minister should have the power to appoint military officers, as had been proposed in an earlier draft of the resolution, and he stated flatly that the Prime Minister would have no such power. ¶9. (C) The security forces have an ambiguous relationship with the militias. For example, in January when militias paralyzed Abidjan with street barricades for four days to protest an IWG (International Working Group) communique noting that the mandate of the National Assembly had expired, security forces disappeared from sight. However, in September, when FESCI tried to attack the police academy, security forces fought back, beating and eventually firing upon the protestors. (President Gbagbo later fired the commander of the police academy and welcomed FESCI leaders at his residence.) ¶10. (C) There are signs of divisions within the security forces, with some continuing to support Gbagbo and others supporting Banny. Indeed, there was a front page article about this in the moderately pro-opposition but generally accurate newspaper 24 Heures November 16, which quoted one source within the security forces as saying, "We cannot continue to follow blindly someone who has lost all legality since the mandate expired which made him the supreme chief of the army. Gbagbo was the supreme chief of the armies because he was the President of the Republic. He lost that prerogative as soon as his presidential mandate expired." Indeed, the September incident when security forces fired on FESCI protestors may well be a sign of increasing exasperation at least in some quarters with the way the militias defy them with impunity. It is also entirely possible, though impossible to know for sure, that there is lingering sympathy for the rebels, because most rebel officers are ex-FANCI and there are certainly substantial numbers of Northerners in the FANCI. The possibility of open clashes within the security forces cannot be ruled out, though Gbagbo appears to have peppered the ranks of the security forces with enough loyal supporters at all levels to diminish the possibility of a coup. ¶12. (C) Comment. The ambiguous role of the security forces is infecting the political process here, but the political process is also infecting the security forces. This is yet another illustration of how deeply rooted Cote d' Ivoire's problems are. End Comment. Hooks