COTE D'IVOIRE: INITIAL REACTIONS OF POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 001228

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016
TAGS: PREL IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: INITIAL REACTIONS OF POLITICAL
CLASS TO UNSCR 1721

REF: SECSTATE 181682

Classified By: Deputy PolEcon Chief Ervin Massinga, Reasons
1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary. The streets of Abidjan were calm in the
wake of the adoption of UNSCR 1721 (reftel) and the business
of the country's economic capital went on without incident.
Ambassador Hooks and Emboffs sought out the initial
impressions of major political groups and figures, and found
among the President, his allies, the Prime Minister's
advisors and major opposition figures alike, a general
consensus that the ambiguities of the text will make actual
exercise of executive authority by Prime Minister Banny
difficult. President Gbagbo expressed privately his
appreciation to the United Nations Security Council and U.S.
for preserving the Constitution (and source of his power)
intact, and publicly said the Prime Minister would not/not
wield the power to appoint civil and military chiefs. FPI
leader Affi N'Guessan echoed the President's appreciation for
a somewhat ambiguous text in a meeting with Emboffs. RDR
leader Alassane Ouattara expressed disappointment in the
outcome, arguing its ambiguities would prevent effective
advancement of the peace process. Prime Minister Banny's
Political Advisor expressed disappointment with the
resolution's text as well, and expressed alarm at the
President's initial moves to undercut the effectiveness of
the PM's Office. Indeed, the text is sufficiently ambiguous
that all the parties can read into it what they want. End
Summary.

President Gbagbo
================

2. (C) Ambassador Hooks received a call from President
Gbagbo the evening of November 1, thanking the United States
for its role in bringing to fruition a "balanced" resolution.
Gbagbo remarked that the text of UNSCR 1721 was too confused
and ambiguous to be workable, but clearly preferred it to the
French original.


3. (U) The President during the early afternoon of November
2 appeared on national television to thank the International
Community and the United Nations for sustaining the
sovereignty of Cote d'Ivoire and preserving its Constitution
intact (news report sent to Desk via unclass email). He also
said unambiguously that the Prime Minister would not/not
nominate civil or military leaders as mentioned in 1721, as
the President alone is empowered to do so under the Ivorian
constitution. The President promised to address the nation
in the coming days to present his plan for ending the
political crisis and division of the country.

Pro-Gbagbo Forces
=================

4. (C) Deputy Pol/Econ Chief met with FPI President Affi
N'Guessan at his home on the morning of November 2. Claiming
he had not read the text of UNSCR 1721 (quite possible, as
news of its passage came late in the night of November 1 and
was subject to widely differing analysis by morning dailies
and international radio news programs),N'Guessan opened by
saying he could not speak for the FPI before the party had
the opportunity to review the text collectively, and offered
a relatively subdued initial analysis. Arguing that
advancing the peace and reconciliation process depends on
political will, N'Guessan then placed the onus squarely on
the New Forces to unblock the current impasse. Effectively
avoiding the question of PM Banny's role as an executive
independent of President Gbagbo, N'Guessan responded to
Emboff's question concerning the prospects for restarting the
audiences foraines concept, as noted in UNSCR 1721, by
blaming the New Forces for demanding an unacceptable carte
blanche in the identity/nationality arena. He then presented
his now-familiar litany of "broken promises" by the New
Forces to disarm (that they would do so if they received
amnesty, if N'Guessan himself ceded the Prime Minister's
slot, if Ouattara were allowed to stand in presidential
elections, if an identity/nationality process were
undertaken, etc.). N'Guessan pointed to the creation of 133
new judgeships as a good start towards an effective audiences
foraines process, in which judges can make determinations of
nationality in security and away from the influences of the
armed New Forces, but he stressed judicial decisions would
have to be made in an "orderly" environment. Asked as to how
the U.S. and the international community can help sustain the
peace process during the mandate of UNSCR 1721, N'Guessan
echoed President Gbagbo's sentiments in implicitly thanking
the U.S. for helping to fend of the overly-explicit French

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draft, and then promising to work together with the U.S. (a
nation, he noted, that had not been the previous colonizers)
in the coming year. Asked about the calm in streets, the
former Prime Minister responded by saying youth parties
associated with the FPI are "pursuing their objectives
peacefully and attempting to avoid provoking their opponents."


5. (C) FESCI (the student group at the center of many
violent demonstrations) leader Serges Koffi declined to meet
with Emboffs, sending lieutenants in his stead. Augustin
Mian, 2nd Secretary General of the organization and the
effective #3, repeated familiar criticisms of the audience
foraines, the New Forces (and did so without N'Guessan's
Qlan),but he did allow that the group was reasonably happy
because the Constitution remained untouched and because UNSCR
1721 (which they had not read) was sufficiently ambiguous to
prevent effectively transferring power to Prime Minister
Banny. Harping on the excesses of the rebellion, they
categorically rejected the concept of any compromise that
would allow the restart of the audiences foraines, saying
that the process would simply allow the New Forces to put on
the voter rolls "Malians and Burkinabe imported to tilt
elections in their favor." Asked how the U.S. and the rest
of the international community could help encourage the peace
process, FESCI could only offer that international partners
of Cote d'Ivoire ought to condemn vigorously the rebellion.
While the rhetoric was predictable, Emboffs received a
relatively cordial reception at FESCI HQ. The group said it
and other groups supportive of the President were not in the
streets because they are "pursuing their objectives
peacefully," and, more tellingly, that they "work within the
'Patriotic Galaxy,'" effectively taking orders from the FPI
leadership (see para 4).

Opposition
==========

6. (C) Alassane Ouattara (ADO) was relatively pessimistic in
conversation with the Ambassador on November 2, saying Gbagbo
would never cede authority over the armed forces and that the
ambiguities of the text would prove fatal to the aspirations
expressed in the new UNSCR resolution. ADO did not see the
Prime Minister being able to effectively wield executive
authority nor did he envision elections being held during the
timeframe laid out in UNSCR 1721.

7) (C) Deputy Pol/Econ Chief met with RDR Mayor of Abobo
(an Abidjan suburb with 1.6 million inhabitants) Adama
Tounkana on November 2. A close Advisor to ADO, Tounkana was
animated in discussions with Emboffs, focusing nearly
exclusively on identification/nationality as the central
factor in the political crisis, and citing the fact that he
himself, Prime Minister Banny and former Prime Minister
Diarra (put in place by the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement) all
lack national identity cards as evidence that under current
law it is too difficult for average Ivorians to establish
identity and nationality. He said plainly that UNSCR 1721
clearly and unambiguously gives executive authority to PM
Banny, and that Banny has only to take and employ the powers
provided. Referring to disarmament, Tounkana said the issue
is simple, quoting G. Soro: "New Forces soldiers will happily
trade a kalashnikov for an identity card." He threatened in
no uncertain terms that RDR youth groups and other opponents
of the FPI would counter any moves by Gbagbo-supporters and
FPI allies should they take to the streets violently, and
cited recent examples of his supporters' willingness to do
so.

Prime Minister's Office
=======================
8) (C) Contacted by cell phone while he was en route to
Yamoussoukro on November 3, Yaya Dembele, Political Advisor
to Prime Minister Banny, expressed some frustration and
disappointment with UNSCR 1721. Having spoken to the Prime
Minister prior to his trip, he and his team reportedly
believe that the resolution should have been made clearer.
The ambiguities in the text leave it open to "diverse
interpretations", and manipulation by the President's camp.
According to Dembele, the constitution should have been
suspended during the mandate of UNSCR 1721. Of particular
concern was the announcement by the President of a series of
discussions and fora to be held with unions, women's groups,
youth associations, religious groups, etc. concerning the
peace process. The PM's camp believes this to be an effort
to circumvent the national forum to be organized under the
PM's auspices as called for in UNSCR 1721.



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9) (C) Comment. Streets were calm in Abidjan in the wake
of UNSCR 1721's adoption, and all actors we spoke to seemed
to believe this state of affairs would continue for the time
being. Pro-FPI parties were reasonably satisfied with the
outcome. While the opposition appears to be somewhat
disappointed, they seem to be buoyed by the general
perception that their ability to counter FPI-initiated street
violence has grown, while the President and FPI's ability to
bring forces into the street has diminished. The Prime
Minister finds himself immediately faced by Gbagbo's efforts
to undercut him. We will continue follow-up outreach to
various elements of the political class, particularly the New
Forces, as reaction to the adoption of UNSCR 1721 unfolds.

Hooks