COTE D'IVOIRE: FORCES NOUVELLES COMMUNICATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 001150 SIPDIS SIPDIS KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2016 TAGS: PREL ASEC IV SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: FORCES NOUVELLES COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTOR DISCUSSES ABUJA SUMMIT OUTCOME Classified By: EconCouns Ervin Massinga, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: FN Spokesman Lobognon expressed deep disappointment at the outcome of the Abuja Summit on Cote d'Ivoire, suggesting it would allow President Gbagbo to drag his feet on the identification process for yet another year. Lobognon added that Gbagbo acted to obstruct the consensus adoption of recommendations aimed at reenergizing the peace process. Expressing FN willingness to move forward on disarmament once the identity blockage is cleared up, Lobognon allowed that the notion of a new UNSCR strengthening PM's hand is appealing, but reiterated that constitutional ambiguities could undercut the overall intention. FN leader Soro is looking forward to the upcoming UNSC meeting, which he deems to be the decisive field of action. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Alain Lobognon, Forces Nouvelles (FN) Communications Director and close advisor to FN leader Guillaume Soro, met with Charge and Econ Chief at the Embassy on October 11 to offer both the FN's assessment of the October 6 extraordinary meeting of ECOWAS heads of state on the Ivorian political situation and to preview the position the group will take for the upcoming Cote d'Ivoire-related meetings at the African Union and the UN Security Council. Lobognon had recently returned from Abuja (the FN did not attend the ECOWAS summit but met with participants on the margins of the meeting) as well as the Francophonie Summit in Bucharest, at which PM Banny represented Cote d'Ivoire. ¶3. (C) Lobognon began by offering the standard expression of "deep disappointment" in the outcome of the Abuja Summit that has been publicly expressed by the FN throughout the media in the days since the meeting. While acknowledging that the International Community (IC) cannot "impose" a solution, the FN spokesman said that the situation in Cote d'Ivoire is worsening, and that a renewal of the current arrangement would simply produce another year of political blockages. Referring to what are widely understood as the 'secret' recommendations ECOWAS has forwarded to both the UNSC and the AU Peace and Security Council (publicly discussed in major newspapers since October 7th),Lobognon said that the "ambiguities" of the plan would set the stage for a "rupture." (Note: the nature of the rupture was never addressed, and later he made clear he clearly does not anticipate a strike by the FANCI across the demilitarized zone. End Note). ¶4. (C) Focusing on the details of the ECOWAS plan, Lobognon said the proposal is no great advance, merely UNSC 1633 redux. Acknowledging it would give greater power to the PM and reinvigorate the identification and disarmament processes, he said nevertheless that the use of the Presidential decree mechanism to overcome current constitutional hurdles to the plan's implementation would enable President Gbagbo to simply hide behind the Constitution for yet another year. Returning to the question of specificity in the plan, Lobognon again conceded the overall plan has attractive elements, but sharply questioned how general objectives such as providing greater power to the PM in the domains of identification and disarmament would work without more precision. ¶5. (C) Charge asked Lobognon to address the question of disarmament, a frequent target of President Gbagbo (who broadly attacked the FN on this point at Abuja, according to a copy of his speech in wide circulation) and FPI leaders Affi N'Guessan and Mamadou Koulibaly as the central impediment to peace. Lobognon said that the breakdown of military-to-military contacts and further progress on disarmament was the direct result of the President's failure to honor agreements between the two militaries and to proceed simultaneously as promised along the identification (audiences foraines) and DDR paths. Lobognon concluded this point by saying the FN expects the UNSC to render a decision on how exactly to reintegrate the armed forces. Later in the conversation, the FN representative said that FN soldiers who had been placed in cantonment as part of the pre-regroupment phase of DDR were still in those areas, despite the poor conditions of the sites and rumors of a FANCI or militia-led offensive, which he discounted. ¶6. (C) The FN spokesman then offered some atmospherics of the Abuja meeting. Recalling that the debate was "hot," he tacitly acknowledged the common understanding that Niger's President Tandja often shielded President Gbagbo from what would otherwise be a hostile consensus. Describing Gbagbo as stubborn, Lobognon said the Ivorian President, right from the beginning of the meeting, took full advantage of the desire ABIDJAN 00001150 002 OF 002 to act by consensus through offering his outspoken objection on key points. Host President Obasanjo apparently became so exasperated by the proceedings that he left in the mid-afternoon in the midst of discussions that lasted until after 8pm. ¶7. (C) Turning to logistics for follow-on meetings, Lobognon said the AU Peace and Security meeting will take place in Addis, at the Head of State level on Tuesday, October 17. He also said the FN's understanding was that the UNSC meeting on Cote d'Ivoire would take place no earlier than Friday, October 20, or perhaps a few days thereafter. Soro plans to go to New York and to Addis although the NF have not received an invitation to either meeting. (He added that the unarmed Ivorian opposition, notably the PDCI and RDR, have also not received invitations and may therefore not be present at either venue.) According to Lobognon, ECOWAS has appointed Presidents Yayi of Benin, Wade of Senegal, Compaore of Burkina Faso and Tandja of Niger to "present" the group's recommendations to the AU and UNSC. ¶8. (C) Lobognon said that ECOWAS's proposal to strengthen Banny must be accepted by all including Gbagbo, but hedged somewhat by noting that PM Banny himself is sometimes the problem. He must be willing to grasp the power that the international community provides, he said. Banny, however, whom he called "France's selection," remains the FN's choice. Returning to the question of identity/nationality, Lobognon said the PM must recognize he is trapped in the current state of affairs and that Gbagbo is insisting on naming the judges that will adjudicate nationality (implicitly arguing a new Constitutional arrangement is thus essential). ¶9. (C) Comment: While Lobognon's comments were expected, he eventually softened the FN's public tone of disappointment in the Summit's outcome. Clearly, the FN would prefer to see Gbagbo replaced and the Constitution modified or set aside. However, they have little leverage to insist on this point and would likely accept an extension of Gbagbo's mandate provided Banny receives a reinforced mandate, particularly with regard to authority over the armed forces and the DDR and identification/nationality processes. Valle